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chapter 1
Micro-Rhetoric in Dialogic Interaction
(1.1) Oh! I’m invited to a wedding that night. But the bride is pregnant so I
might drop by in the wee hours
The piece of discourse in (1.1) is taken from the facebook event page for a
birthday party. The person who wrote (1.1) on the wall of the event did so to
communicate that she would be busy on the night of the party, but that she
might be able to stop by anyway. Many of us might find her communication
clear and her reason for possibly being able to stop by quite reasonable. How-
ever, if we think of the argumentation in the second part of the example it is
not obvious how the discourse coheres:
(1.2) The bride (of the wedding I am going to) is pregnant, so I might drop
by (at the party) in the wee hours.
Because of the conventional implicature generated by “so”, we recognise (1.2)
as an argument. By “argument” we mean a piece of discourse where some
proposition is supported or explainedby another proposition.However, for this
argument to be successful—in the sense that the host of the birthday party
understands and accepts that the bride being pregnant is a good reason for the
guest to be able to stop by at the birthday party later on—additional informa-
tion is required. This additional information might be a chain of inference like
“if the bride is pregnant, shewill be tired”, and “if she is tired theweddingmight
not go on for that long”.
Moreover, it seems to be the case that—faced with a discourse like (1.1),
which conveys an argument—a language user may tentatively accommodate
some warrant which would underpin the argument. Arguments like these,
which require additional world knowledge to be acceptable or understand-
able, are important in rhetoric where they are called enthymemes. Crucial for
the use of enthymemes in rhetorical discourse is that they are based on prin-
ciples or notions which are so obvious to the audience that the argument
seems to express necessity, rather than possibility. The basis for this seems to be
cognitive—if we have to do less work to understand an argument, the content
of it will appear more natural to us.
Walker (1996) suggests that this is also true for dialogue: Presenting a propo-
sition in connection with some support or back up facilitates processing even
2 chapter 1
when the supporting proposition does not add new information. Walker gives
numerous examples that can be seen as constituting arguments with implicit
premises.
Enthymemes are not uncommon in conversation. They seem to play a role
over and above the rhetorical device found in speeches, and enthymeme-like
inferences are at the heart of theories of implicature—not least RelevanceThe-
ory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2004). Despite this, very
little work has been done on enthymemes as such in dialogue. An exception to
this is Jackson and Jacobs (1980) who link the phenomenon to general princi-
ples of conversation.
This work aims to remedy this situation by placing the enthymeme in the
context of interactional linguistics and pragmatics. We propose an account
of how enthymemes in dialogue interact with patterns of reasoning stored
in our cognitive resources to provide structure in discourse and communi-
cate implicit information. Such patterns, in rhetorical theory, are referred to
as topoi. We also suggest how enthymemes and topoi can be included in a dia-
logue semantic program, extending theories like KoS (Ginzburg, 2012), where
ttr, a type theory with records (Cooper 2005a, 2012) is used to capture dia-
logue phenomena unaccounted for by traditional formal approaches. In this
chapter we will first look at some fields of research in linguistics and computa-
tional linguisticswhichprovidemanyof themain ideas of the theory presented
in this book. We will then provide some brief background on enthymemes
and topoi and their role in interaction, and finally sketch an outline of the
book.
1.1 Interaction Based Linguistics
Consider the interpretation of rise in (1.3):
(1.3) Cherrilyn: Yeah I mean ⟨pause⟩ dog hairs rise anyway so
Fiona: What do you mean, rise?
Cherrilyn: The hair ⟨pause⟩ it rises upstairs.
(BNC file KBL:4201–4203)
A snippet of dialogue such as (1.3) can be difficult to make sense of, and this
difficulty lies in determining the meaning of particular lexical items (such as
rise), but also—perhaps to a greater degree—in building hypotheses about sit-
uational anddiscursive contextswhere the exchange in (1.3)wouldmake sense.
If we consider a larger excerpt from the same dialogue (1.4), we get a better idea
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of what is going on. From an analytical point of view, however, describing in a
precise way how a speaker of English makes sense of (1.4) is challenging to say
the least.
(1.4) Cherrilyn: Most dogs aren’t allowed up ⟨pause⟩ upstairs.





Cherrilyn: Yeah I mean ⟨pause⟩ dog hairs rise anyway so
Fiona: What do you mean, rise?
Cherrilyn: The hair ⟨pause⟩ it rises upstairs.
I mean I, you know friends said it was, oh God I
wouldn’t allow mine upstairs because of all the
⟨pause⟩ dog hairs!
Oh well ⟨pause⟩ they go up there anyway.
Fiona: So, but I don’t know what it is, right, it’s only a few
bloody hairs! (BNC file KBL:4196–4206)
The dialogue in (1.4) is an excerpt from a conversation regarding dogs (which
we will consider in more detail in Chapter 6), and whether or not they should
be allowed in certain parts of the house, particularly upstairs. This overarch-
ing content is something that most people who have a moderate knowledge of
English could determine in a few seconds after first seeing the text. However,
the interpretation process is complex, and accounting for it involves explain-
ingmany diverse phenomena:We need to explain howwemanage to interpret
the contextual meaning of words, which is sometimes—as in the case of rise
in (1.4)—ambiguous, and we need a theory for how words are combined to
express propositions. However, we also need to account for how utterances
make sense in relation to other utterances. This includes things like anaphor
resolution—howdowedefine, for example, towhom“they” in “Ohwell ⟨pause⟩
they go up there anyway” refers?
We also need to explain how speakers make inferences that are necessary
for the dialogue to cohere. For example, how does Cherrilyn’s utterance about
what her friend said serve to address Fiona’s clarification requestWhat do you
mean, rise? And how do we relate Fiona’s final utterance So, but I don’t know
what it is, right, it’s only a few bloody hairs! to the rest of the dialogue?
Traditional semantics tends to ignore the complexity demonstrated above
and instead treats language in terms of sentences which are generated via a set
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of rules pertaining to an ideal speaker, and the context-free truth conditions of
these sentences (Montague, 1973; Kratzer and Heim, 1998).
In pragmatics the truth-conditional accounts of meaning are extended to
things like presupposition and implicature. In more recent approaches some
of these problems are addressed and to some extent resolved, in the sense that
context is taken into account whenmeanings are interpreted. However, typical
dialogue features such as non-sentential utterances (Fernández and Ginzburg,
2002), cross-person compound contributions (Howes, 2012), and disfluencies
(Clark and Fox Tree, 2002) are still largely ignored. So, if we are going to anal-
yse language as it appears in dialogue, it would entail additional complexity.
For example, some dialogue contributions are in fact non-sentential, a fact that
has been noted by philosophers such as Wittgenstein (1953) as well as by lin-
guists doing data driven research (Fernández and Ginzburg, 2002; Schlangen
and Lascarides, 2003; Fernández et al., 2007).
Moreover, research in psychology as well as Conversation Analysis (CA) has
established that dialogue participants easily interpret and produce incomplete
utterances, that is, utteranceswhich are interrupted orwhere the speaker stops
mid sentence (Goodwin, 1979; Altmann and Kamide, 1999). Since conversation
is such a essential part of language use, trying to understand how language
works without taking dialogue phenomena into account means we will not
have a complete picture.
1.1.1 Dialogism
One interesting aspect of the excerpt in (1.4) is that the dialogue does not run
completely smoothly. Cherrilyn says something that Fiona obviously does not
understand, and so Fionamakes a clarification request. The fact that we as lan-
guage users sometimes fail to correctly interpret an utterance provides some
clues towhat it is thatwedowhenour interpretation is actually successful.How
wemanage to set the conversation straight again, howwe correct ourmistakes,
is revealing.
One of the approaches to linguistics that emphasises the importance of
dialogue is the dialogical tradition originating in the ideas of Bakhtin (1986).
The umbrella of dialogism covers various types of research, philosophical as
well as empirical. Common traits in dialogical research are contextualism and
interactionism. Contextualism means that contexts are always viewed as rel-
evant, and in fact a primary factor in communication. Interactionism means
that dialogue, considered as a kind of interaction between agents, is central
to the understanding of how language works. One aspect of this is a focus on
features typical of dialogue like repairs, corrections and co-constructed sen-
tences.
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Linell (1998, 2009)—one of the most recent representatives of the dialogis-
tic tradition—contrasts the dialogistic and the monologistic view, which (in
the case of linguistics and similar fields) is characterised by a conception of
interaction as secondary in the understanding of communication. Linell con-
cedes that a certain amount of monologistic analysis is necessary in linguistic
research, as in other research. However, he is skeptical of the reductionism in
formal theories. The risk, according to Linell, is that theories which do not pay
sufficient attention to the interactive aspect of language, tend to give their users
a distorted picture of how language actually works.
Since the late nineties, however, a branch of formal semantics has emerged
which takes interaction as its point of departure, and in fact shares many
assumptions about the nature of language with dialogism. One notable rep-
resentative of this line of research is Ginzburg, who has been developing his
program—notably in his book The Interactive Stance (Ginzburg, 2012)—over
the last decades.
1.1.2 Dialogue Semantics
Influenced by insights fromphilosophy, artificial intelligence and conversation
analysisGinzburg (2012) hasdevelopedKoS, a semantic frameworkwhich com-
bines insights from Conversation Analysis and dynamic semantic approaches
like Discourse RepresentationTheory (drt, Kamp, 1981; Kamp and Reyle, 1993)
and SegmentedDiscourse RepresentationTheory (sdrt, Asher andLascarides,
2003; Lascarides and Asher, 2008).
KoS offers a way of accounting for misunderstandings and miscommunica-
tion using dialogue gameboards (dgb) cast in ttr—a type theory with records
first introduced by Cooper (2005b,a, 2012)—to represent the development of
the dialogue participants’ information states through the course of a dialogue.
One of the fundamental assumptions underpinning any type of dialogue
semantics is that structure in language is to a great extent created through
interaction—aviewpointwhich formal dialogue theories likeKoShave in com-
mon with Conversation Analysis. Many of the phenomena addressed in work
in the KoS spirit involve issues that are relevant to this kind of structure, such
as questions, interjections and non sentential utterances, repair and context.
Out of these issues, the ones that are most obviously related to enthymemes
and topoi are dialogical structure-creating phenomena and context.
In theories of rhetorical relations such as Rhetorical Structure Theory (rst,
MannandThompson, 1986, 1988) and sdrt (Asher andLascarides, 2003) a fine-
grained taxonomyof rhetorical relations has beenproposed, of whichmany are
not dialogical per se, even though they do occur in dialogue. Examples of such
relations are background, narration and contrast.
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The approach taken in this book can be said to be a version of KoS. However,
the formal details are closer to ttr as it appears in the work of Cooper (2012,
2016) and Breitholtz and Cooper (2011). We will take a closer look at some of
the relevant similarities and differences in Chapters 3 and 4.
1.2 Micro-rhetorical Linguistics
The interest in “imperfect” language use is something that Ginzburg and Linell
have in commonwith Paul Hopper. In his paper Linguistics andMicro-Rhetoric:
A Twenty-First Century Encounter, (Hopper, 2007), he argues that grammar is
essentially an abstraction of the way we string together prefabricated frag-
ments and fixed phrases, and that grammaticality as well as deviations from
grammaticality can usually be explained by our tendency towards efficiency
in communication—which is emphasised in rhetoric. Hopper argues that the
interactive perspective with its focus on language as situated in time and space
brings the disciplines of linguistics and rhetoric closer together:
… in fact (usage based) linguistics is nothing but themicro-endof rhetoric
Hopper (2007) p. 236
Hopper argues that a micro-rhetorical analysis would differ from the type of
analysis usually applied in traditional rhetoric—if we want to find out things
about words and phrases rather than debates, speeches and their contexts
and effects, we have to look at smaller bits of language like utterances or
short episodes. The linguistic phenomena which Hopper is interested in are
mainly syntactic, like the case of apo koinou (or pivot) constructions, some-
times found in natural data. Apo koinou is a construction where one con-
stituent serves as the end of one grammatical sentence and the beginning of
another, for example “That’s what grabs their attention most is adverts” (Hop-
per, 2007).
However, if we apply amicro-rhetorical perspective to other areas of linguis-
tics, there seem to be other language phenomena which are to some extent
addressed in rhetoric, often from a different perspective than that applied to
the same phenomena in linguistics. In semantics and pragmatics for exam-
ple, the notion of inference is essential. In semantics we study inferences like
presuppositions, which derive from themeanings of particular words and con-
structions. For example the word “again” in a sentence such as “I lost the book
again”, triggers the presupposition that the speaker has lost the book before.
This is due to the meaning of “again”, and not context dependent.
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Other types of inferences, like conversational implicatures, are to a great
extent dependent on context and on the assumption of some general expec-
tations we have about communication. Inferences are also central in rhetoric.
In fact, the art of rhetoric is much focused on how to lead an audience tomake
particular inferences, and thereby become convinced of the point which the
speaker wishes to communicate.
In rhetorical theory the enthymeme is the type of evidence, or proof, which
relates to reasoning and making inferences. In the early eighties, Jackson and
Jacobs (1980) suggested that enthymemes are related to conversational prac-
tices that we use continuously when we talk and communicate in other ways.
They argue that the rhetorical enthymeme is derived from more general prin-
ciples of communication and interaction. While this seems likely, it is never-
theless the case that the connection between inferences and conversational
phenomena such as turn-taking and preference structure has not been a focus
in linguistics. Inferences like implicature and presupposition are mainly stud-
ied in philosophy of language and pragmatics, while conversational practices
and contextualised languageuse ismainly consideredby conversation analysts.
However, in rhetoric there is a focus on the inferential quality of language in
use as well as on how we should use this quality to our advantage, that is, how
we should employ inferences to make the communication run smoothly in a
particular context.
It seems to us that the rhetorical perspective has not been considered
enough in linguistics although it could contribute to the understanding of
inference, coherence and other phenomena in dialogue and other types of
linguistic communication. Thus, we aim in this work to look more closely at
enthymematic reasoning and how it plays out in dialogue. In Section 1.6wewill
state our aim inmore detail, but let us first take a closer look at the concepts of
enthymeme and topos.
1.3 The Aristotelian Enthymeme
1.3.1 Aristotelian Rhetoric
Aristotle’s Rhetoric was intended as instruction on the art of public speaking,
but in fact it is also a comprehensive introduction to a number of aspects of
linguistics which are relevant to the study of linguistic interaction. It does
not deal with logic, but with the logic-like type of reasoning which frequently
occurs in dialogue and other types of discourse. Aristotle’s Rhetoric also dis-
cusses emotions and their causes and effects, as well as cognitive aspects of
language and style. Thus Aristotelian rhetorical theory actually combines ele-
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ments of what we would today call the pragmatics, psycholinguistics and soci-
olinguistics of dialogue.
For a modern day researcher who looks to the classics, it is important to
know whether one is motivated by an interest in historical reconstruction, i.e.
in trying to understand a text in its historical context and interpreting its origi-
nal meaning, or in attempting to seek inspiration from the insights of classical
theorists. Since our aim here is to use our interpretation of some Aristotelian
notions to contribute to contemporary theories of dialogue semantics and
pragmatics, this work is clearly a case of the latter. Therefore we will just give a
brief account of the social and cultural context of the Rhetoric, and of the con-
cepts of enthymeme and topos as they occur in renditions of Aristotle’s text.1
Aristotle’s Rhetoric was written as a guide for students of rhetoric in a con-
text where the ability to speak well in public was important to any free citizen.
There were no professional lawyers or prosecutors, so anyone who wanted to
take a case to court or who was summoned to court to meet an accusation had
to stand up and speak for himself (for amore detailed account, see Corbett and
Connors, 1999). Also, in a democracy like Athens where ordinary people with-
out much insight into public matters and state affairs were allowed to vote, it
was essential for anyone aspiring to a political career to master the art of per-
suasion by referring to the likelihood of possibilities rather than to knowledge
and facts alone. In the Rhetoric, book one, chapter one, section eleven, Aristotle
explicitly states the importance of tapping into common beliefs and opinions
when dealing with a crowd, rather than presenting the audience with facts and
strictly logical reasoning:
Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible with
some audiences; rather, it is necessary for pisteis (proof) and speeches as
a whole to be formed on the basis of common beliefs.
Rhet I 1.11
1.3.2 The Syllogism and the Enthymeme
Apart from the importance of adjusting the arguments to the audience, Aristo-
tle claims that rhetoric should not (as it had in previous rhetorical handbooks)
focus on external matters such as the different parts of a speech and in which
order they should appear in the discourse, but rather on logos, reasoning (Rhet.
I 1.9), which is also the aspect of rhetoric which is most relevant to our discus-
sion.
1 All citations of the Rhetoric refer to Kennedy’s translation (Aristotle, ca. 340B.C.E./2007).
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Before we look further at Aristotle’s view of rhetorical reasoning, let’s say
something about his view of the related field of logic. First, it is important to
remember that Aristotelian logic is not equivalent to modern, formal logic,
although it has been pointed out that the differences are perhaps less pro-
nounced thanwhatwas thought to be the case in the early 20th century (Smith,
2012). One essential difference, however, is that while modern logic is formu-
lated by means of artificial languages, Aristotle dealt only with natural lan-
guage.A central concept in theAristotelian theoryof deduction is the syllogism.
In the Prior Analytics Aristotle defines it as
An argument (logos) in which, certain things having been supposed,
somethingdifferent fromthe things supposed results of necessity because
these things are so
Pr An I 1.24b 18–20
The phrase “certain things having been supposed” refers to the set of premises,
and, being in the plural, “the things supposed” indicates, according to Keyt
(2009), that there must be more than one premise. In rhetoric, the correlate of
the deductive type of proof, the syllogism, is the enthymeme.The conclusion of
an enthymeme does not—in contrast to that of a syllogism—need to follow of
necessity. Nor is there a need for the set of premises to consist of more than one
premise. These are formal requirements, but there are also some other ways in
which syllogisms andenthymemesdiffer,mainly having todowith subjectmat-
ter.While logical arguments should deal with general statements, enthymemes
deal with particular cases. Thus, while in logic you argue for or against a general
claim about the world, in rhetoric you seek to persuade someone of something
regarding a particular case.
In (1.5) we see an example of a syllogism, where the conclusion necessarily
follows from the premises. In (1.6) on the other hand, the conclusion depends
on a notion that if someone has done somethingwhich is considered bad, then
that person is likely to also have done less bad things. As Aristotle puts it: “if the
greater thing is true, then the lesser is also, for people strike their fathers less
than their neighbours” (Rhet. II 23.4).
(1.5) Socrates is a man
All men are mortal
Socrates is mortal
(1.6) x had beaten his father
x has also beaten his neighbour
10 chapter 1
Presenting an argument based on implicit premises is possible since the
members of an audience—just like people who partake in a conversation—
have knowledge and beliefs regarding the world around them. In this case
Aristotle expected the audience to recognise, based on experience and previ-
ous input, that it is more common and a lesser crime to beat your neighbour
than your father, so when they hear that someone is known to have beaten his
father, they may find it quite reasonable that he is also guilty of beating his
neighbour, if such charge has been made against him.
1.4 Topoi—theWarrants of Enthymemes
In order to be efficient, an enthymeme needs to draw on some commonly
recognised notion that “fills in” the information that is lacking in the set of
premises. This notion Aristotle refers to as the topos of the enthymeme. Some
topoi may be applied to various subjects, while others are specific to a particu-
lar subject. An example of a general topos is the topos of the more and the less,
of which Aristotle says
… to form syllogisms or speak enthymemes from this about justice is just
as possible as about physics or anything else, although these subjects dif-
fer in species.
Rhet I 2.21
An example of a general type of topos is that of opposites, on which the
enthymeme in (1.7) is based.
(1.7) a. … to be temperate is a good thing, for lack of self-control is harmful
(Rhet II 23.1.)
b. lack of self-control is harmful
to be temperate is a good thing
The enthymeme in (1.7) draws on the idea that since self-control and lack of
self-control are opposites, the opposite of what is true of self-control is true of
lack of self-control. Alternatively, and more generally, if two things are oppo-
sites, the opposite of what is true of the first must (or is usually) true of the sec-
ond. This example shows that the common notion of Aristotelian enthymemes
as syllogisms with one hidden or silent premise, is not always correct. Strictly
speaking, enthymemes based on the topos of opposites seem to require a set of
additional premises to constitute a reasonable argument to an audience.
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1.4.1 Topoi in Linguistics
The concept of topos is essential in the theory of argumentation presented by
Ducrot (1980, 1988), to an extent in collaboration with Anscombre (1995). The
theory is based on the idea that between two utterances U and Vwhere one of
them is an assertionor a suggestion, exhortation, etc. and the other an assertion
which functions as a support for the first, there is always a link which sanctions
the interpretation of U and V as an argument. For example, imagine a situation
where two people are at the cinema trying to decide which film to see. One
of them utters (1.8), where (1.8b) is clearly a reason for the suggestion made in
(1.8a).
(1.8) a. A: Let’s not see a drama
b. A: I’m too tired
According to Ducrot a dialogue contribution like (1.8) exploits a link which
sanctions the interpretation that the drama genre should be avoided by tired
people. This link could be the idea that dramas are complex and cognitively
challenging compared to other genres. This seems reasonable and something
that most adults would recognise, if not agree with. A link like this is referred
to by Ducrot and Anscombre as a topos.
Ducrot (1988) argues that topoi are notions which are common, that is they
are assumed or taken for granted in a community, even before the conversation
in which they are employed takes place. Topoi are also gradual, that is if I say
“it’swarm today, let’s go to thebeach”, the topos—thatwarmweathermakes the
beach an attractive destination—ismore true thewarmer it is, and less true the
less warm it is. A consequence of this would be that an enthymeme evoking a
topos may be more or less convincing, depending on the context of utterance.
Topoi are also general in the sense that one topos can be employed in var-
ious arguments, in various situations. The opposite, that different topoi may
be employed in similar situations, is also true. Anscombre (1995) argues that
when we say Give a coin to the porter, he carried the bags all the way here, there
is an obvious connection between the first and second proposition expressed
in the utterance. However, the connection between “carrying luggage” and “get-
ting a tip” is not linguistic, it’s the common place principle that work should
be rewarded, which is generally recognised, if not agreed upon in all situations.
Interestingly, argues Anscombre, there are other, equally acceptable, principles
whichwould lead to an opposite conclusion, such as principles that porters get
paid to carry luggage already, and you should not get a tip for doing your job.
Anscombre also makes the important observation that topoi, contrary to
logical rules, do not constitute a monolithic system. Instead the system of
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topoi consists of principles which may be combined in different ways, like log-
ical rules, but which may be inconsistent if combined in a specific situation.
Anscombre (1995) suggests that this is because topoi are part of ideology, ways
inwhichwe perceive theworld, and ideologies are notmonolithic. Therefore, a
principle like opposites attract and birds of a feather flock together may co-exist
not only in one community, but in the set of topoi of one individual, and be
applicable in different contexts.
1.4.2 Topoi as Cultural Indicators
The idea of a dichotomy of beliefs in episteme and doxa goes back to Plato. On
the Platonic view, episteme is knowledge about the world of forms (world of
ideas), while doxa represents our beliefs about the world of perception.
The concept of doxa has been connected to rhetoric in an interesting way.
Rosengren (2002) argues that doxa is in some respects amore relevant concept
than episteme: The difference, as Rosengren sees it, between traditional epis-
temology and the doxology he argues in favour of, is that while epistemology
is concerned with (universally) true beliefs, doxology is concerned with what
is held to be true, appropriate or right in a certain context—in other words—
which topoi are applicable in that context. To be aware of what is consistent
with the doxa—the topoi—of a certain community could thus be more rele-
vant for a speaker constructing arguments than the beliefs which are actually
true—it is possible to construct convincing arguments from false beliefs just as
well as from true ones.
The technique of adapting your arguments to the beliefs of the audience is
well established in rhetorical theory, and Rosengren argues that rhetoric can
be seen not only as a tool for forming arguments which are persuasive to a cer-
tain audience in a certain context, but also as a tool for finding out what the
speaker and the audience of a discourse believe to be true (or, in the case of
the audience, what the speaker believes they believe to be true), right and just.
Rosengren follows Perelman and Olbrechts-Tycteca (1969) in declaring that
the topoiwhich a speaker’s arguments drawon to some extent define theworld
view of the speaker and the addressee. Rosengren (2002, p. 87), argues that in
this terminology, it is possible to describe different societies by describing the
topoi which are dominant within these societies. In the context of dialogue
modelling, this would mean that modelling the topoi available to an agent is
a way of modelling that agent’s take on (a limited part of) the agent’s socio-
cultural context.
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1.5 Linking Enthymeme and Topos
To conclude the discussion about the view of enthymemes and topoi in previ-
ous literature, we should say something about the role they play in discourse
and in relation to each other.
Enthymemes are units of discourse that may simultaneously serve many
purposes. Enthymemes convey propositions that are not explicit in the dis-
course. They do this by requiring underpinning by topoi for an acceptable
interpretation. The pragmaticmeaning conveyed by an enthymeme in relation
to a listener depends on which topos the listener accesses in the interpretation
process.
In (1.9) President Bush, in his “State of the Union” address 2005, argues that
Americansmust join together to save social security, since the system is headed
towards bankruptcy (the enthymeme ε below). This argument is underpinned
by a topos (τ below) that if a certain state of affairs is beneficial or good, it
should be safeguarded. The argument also depends on a premise that social
security is a good thing.
(1.9) a. “… we must join together to strengthen and save Social Security”
(Bush, 2005 State of the Union par. 16).
“[Because] Social Security will be paying out more than it takes
in … by the year 2042, the entire system would be exhausted and
bankrupt.” (Bush, 2005 State of the Union par. 19).
the social security system is heading towards bankruptcy
we must save social security
b. ε =
something worth keeping is heading towards destruction
it must be saved
c. τ =
If we accept the validity of τ in (1.9c), and (at least) the premise that social
security is something worth keeping, the conclusion of ε in (1.9b) follows
by necessity. It is thus possible to accept the topos, but not the premises
that make the enthymeme an instantiation of the topos, and thus reject the
enthymeme.
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1.6 Aim and Outline of This Book
In this chapter we have described a number of dialogue features where enthy-
mematic structure seems to play a role. Examples of such features are sense-
making and coherence in language use. These questions are at the heart of
pragmatics, and much of what we refer to here as “enthymematic reason-
ing” is discussed in theories of implicature, such as Gricean and neo-Gricean
approaches (Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000) and Relevance Theory (Sperber and
Wilson, 1995; Carston and Hall, 2012). Some of the processes described in this
book are also accounted for in other theories. However, while theories of impli-
cature account formany of the principles of pragmatic reasoning, they still rely
heavily on inferential processes which are not defined in the theory. Drawing
on principles such as the principle of relevance and Gricean maxims we can
make predictions about the existence of implicated conclusions, but we can-
not make any precise predictions about the nature of these conclusions given
a certain situational context and background. The theory presented here can
make such predictions, which makes it possible to use in implementations of
pragmatic inference.
We also considered a number of approaches to linguistics which we believe
share many theoretical and methodological assumptions. All of these—dia-
logism, KoS and the micro-rhetorical perspective—focus on accounting for
phenomena which are common in dialogue. Coherence in conversation can-
not always be accounted for by theories of anaphora and other phenom-
ena treated in dynamic semantics. We often express ourselves elliptically, en-
gage in clarification, and repair our utterances. Adopting a theoretical stand-
point where these features are relevant parts of language rather than non-
standard features, means among other things that context and pragmatic pro-
cesses must be integrated, or at least possible to integrate, in any linguistic
theory.
Enthymematic reasoning relies heavily on context, and often interacts with
dialogue features such as clarification and ellipsis. Our aim is thus to formulate
a theory for how enthymemes and topoi play a role in dialogue, in a framework
that allows for a rich account of context as well as integration of dialogue fea-
tures such as repair and clarification.
In the remainder of this book we will first, in Chapter 2, look at a number
of linguistic phenomena discussed in the literature which are in various ways
related to enthymemes. In Chapter 3 we will give a brief introduction to ttr
and information statesmodelled as gameboards, and sketch a gameboard anal-
ysis of some simple dialogue examples involving enthymematic reasoning. In
Chapter 4 we will go into the types of information states in more detail and
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extend the model by introducing update rules to account for interpretation of
dialogue contributions involving enthymemes and topoi. In Chapter 5 we will
consider how dialogue participants draw on topoi in inventing enthymemes
and how the production and interpretation of enthymemes are related to par-
ticular conversational games. In Chapter 6 we will look at some applications
of our theory, considering issues like non-monotonic reasoning and lexical dis-
ambiguation. Finally, in Chapter 7, we will present our conclusions and discuss
remaining problems and future work.
© Ellen Breitholtz, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004436794_003
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chapter 2
Enthymematic Reasoning and Pragmatics
2.1 Introduction
There is an obvious connection between on the one hand enthymematic rea-
soning and topoi, and on the other pragmatic phenomena like implicature,
presupposition and different types of discourse relations. In this chapter we
will briefly discuss the relation between rhetorical reasoning drawing on topoi
and such phenomena.
First, in Section 2.2wewill look at presupposition (Strawson, 1950; Stalnaker,
1974; Karttunen, 1974), moving on to Grice’s account of conversational implica-
ture (Grice, 1975) in Section 2.3. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we are still concerned
with inference, considering the approach to implicature taken in Relevance
Theory (Sperber andWilson, 1995), and the anti-inferentialist viewof inference
presented in Recanati (2004). In Section 2.6 we will consider sense-making of
longer strandsof discourse andhowweassign rhetorical relationsbetween sen-
tences or utterances.
Wedonot claim that this account of topics related to enthymemes and topoi
is exhaustive. It would probably be possible to fill a bookwith a relevant discus-
sion on the relation between enthymemes and implicature alone. However, we
hope that this chapter will give an overview and answer some questions, while
also raising many new ones.
2.2 Presupposition
The classic, semantic, definition of presupposition is that it is an inference
which survives embedding under negation (see for example Strawson, 1950).
Stalnaker (1974) argued against the notion of semantic presupposition and
diagnostics such as the negation test, in favour of a pragmatic analysis. In (2.1a)
and (2.1b) we see Stalnaker’s definition of semantic and pragmatic presupposi-
tion respectively.
(2.1) a. … a proposition that P presupposes thatQ iff Qmust be true in order
that P have a truth-value at all (Stalnaker, 1974 p. 48).
b. … something like the background beliefs of the speaker—proposi-
tions whose truth he takes for granted, or seems to take for granted,
in making his statement (Stalnaker, 1974 p. 48).
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An example of an utterance that would carry a presupposition according to
the definition in (2.1a) is (2.2), which presupposes that there is a queen of Eng-
land; this needs to be true for the sentence to be true or false.
(2.2) A: The queen of England is bald.
The presupposition of (2.2) would be the same regardless of which of the defi-
nitions in (2.1) we use. However, the pragmatic definition would include other
types of inferences too, which would not fall under presupposition according
to the semantic definition in (2.1b). Let us consider one of the examples from
Chapter 1, repeated in (2.3):
(2.3) The bride is pregnant, so I might drop by in the wee hours!
The example in (2.3) conveys the enthymeme in (2.4).
(2.4) the bride is pregnant
I might drop by in the wee hours
According to Stalnaker’s definition in (2.1b), (2.4) carries a (pragmatic) presup-
position that a pregnant bride is a reason for a wedding party to end early. This
indicates that topoi sometimes are pragmatic presuppositions. However, this is
not very specific, since pragmatic presupposition seems to encompass a whole
array of ways of communicating implicit meaning. The example in (2.4), for
example, is similar to that given by Grice (1975) to illustrate the notion of con-
ventional implicature:
(2.5) a. S: He is an Englishman. He is, therefore, brave (Grice, 1975).
b. Conventional implicature: If someone is an Englishman, he is brave.
Grice claims that the word therefore in (2.5a) gives rise to the conventional
implicature in (2.5b). From a micro-rhetorical point of view, we can see (2.5a)
as an enthymematic argument that a particular person will be brave since he
is an Englishman, based on a topos that if someone is an Englishman then that
someone will be brave.
So, we have established that topoi may function as pragmatic presupposi-
tions, and that some topoi could also be categorised as conventional impli-
catures. However, a topos cannot be the exact same thing as a conventional
implicature, since some enthymemes lack a lexical item that conventionally
implicates a particular structure between its constituents. Let us consider,
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for example, (2.6), an authentic dialogue example originally used by Walker
(1996). The turn in the excerpt consists of two utterances produced by the same
speaker1A—the speaker—and B—the addressee—are two colleagues on their
way to work. They meet up somewhere along the way and continue their walk
together. This is something they often do, and they are thus both familiar with
the surroundings as well as with the physical goal of the walk.
(2.6) A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street. It’s shorter.
For this turn tomake sense to an addressee, theywould have to assume that the
speaker presupposes some kind of link between Walnut Street being shorter
and the suggestion to walk along Walnut Street. However, since there is no
specific word in (2.6) which warrants this assumption, this link cannot be a
conventional implicature. Instead it seems to be the case that the rhetorical
structure of (2.6)—and thereby part of its meaning—depends on the dialogue
participants already having access to a notion that a route being short is a rea-
son for choosing that route. In micro-rhetorical terms we would say that this
notion is a topos, which may also be a subtype of a more abstract topos having
to do with convenience, efficiency, etc.
2.2.1 Accommodation
The process of adding a presupposition (semantic or pragmatic) to the dis-
course model is usually referred to as accommodation. This phenomenon was
discussed by Stalnaker (1974) and Karttunen (1974), but the termwas coined by
Lewis (1979).
Lewis illustrates the notion of presupposition accommodation with the
example (2.7), where (2.7a) is ok but (2.7b) seems odd.
(2.7) a. Fred has children, all Fred’s children are asleep.
b. All Fred’s children are asleep, and Fred has children
The reason for this, argues Lewis, is that the proposition All Fred’s children are
asleep presupposes that Fred has children. Thus, the belief that Fred has chil-
dren is already integrated in the discourse model for speaker and addressee
alike, and adding it a second time is redundant.
1 The term utterance is sometimes defined as a string of words produced by a speaker while
said speaker is holding the floor.We will use the term turn to refer to such a unit, and reserve
utterance for units that convey an atomic proposition, something like what Schlangen (2005)
refers to as intentional units.
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The presupposition in (2.7) is a semantic presupposition triggered by the
possessive Fred’s children, but Lewis’ definition of presupposition accommo-
dation in (2.8) seems to include any type of pragmatic presupposition.
(2.8) If at time t something is said that requires a presupposition P to be
acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then—ceteris
paribus and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into exis-
tence at t (Lewis, 1979 p. 340).
This means, for example, that if nobody in the discourse context objects when
a speaker utters (2.6), the assumption of a link between the route being short
and the advantage of choosing it will be accommodated in the conversation.
However, if someone says something like “What do you mean shorter—why
would we want to choose the shortest route?”, this is evidence that the pragmatic
presupposition—or topos—has not been accommodated in that speaker’s dis-
course model. Stalnaker (1998) points out that in order for accommodation to
work a speaker cannot expect controversial assumptions to be accommodated,
and quotes Heim (1992):
One may explicitly assert controversial and surprising things (in fact one
should) but to expect one’s audience to accept them byway of accommo-
dation is not good conversational practice.
In rhetorical terms we could say that it is not wise to choose an enthymeme
which is not already associated with a suitable topos that the addressee has
access to, or that evokes a topos which is acceptable to the audience.
Lewis shows that the principle of accommodation applies to several linguis-
tic phenomena, such as definiteness, modal expressions, etc. To that list we
would like to add topoi—whena toposwhich is necessary for an enthymematic
argument tomake sense is added to the discoursemodel—and enthymemes—
whena topos in the resources of an agent causes her to assign an enthymematic
structure to the discourse.
In this section we have shown that topoi are included in Stalnaker’s wide
definition of pragmatic presupposition. In addition to this, in some cases topoi
are to be considered conventional implicatures, in the sense of Grice (1975).
Whether a topos is conventionally implicated or not depends on whether the
enthymematic structure is established bymeans of lexical items signaling that
the speaker assumes a causal relation between the premise and conclusion of
the enthymeme.
There is a distinctly rhetorical dimension to accommodation of presuppo-
sitions as well as accommodation of other phenomena, in that it may allow
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content to be smuggled into the discourse and trick hearers into accepting—or
at least not objecting to—things they would reject if they were said explicitly.
We suggest that we could talk about accommodation of both topoi (as types of
pragmatic presuppositions) and enthymemes (argumentative structure). We
also suggest that the notion of “surprising” or “controversial” presuppositions
which Stalnaker (1998) and Heim (1992) argue should not be left to accommo-
dation according to good conversational practices, are presuppositions which
cannot be identified as belonging to a topos that is acceptable by the agent in
question.
2.3 Conversational Implicature
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature is an attempt to systematically
describe how it is possible for language users to convey (and mean) more—
or something different—than the truth-conditional content of an utterance.
Grice (1975) distinguishes between what is said and what is implicated.What is
said corresponds to the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance and what is
implicated to what a speaker conveys by uttering a certain string of words in a
certain context, assuming (though perhaps not aware of) the principle of coop-
eration elaborated as fourmaxims of rational and efficient communication. In
the exchange in (2.9) below, from Grice (1975), B’s reply that there is a garage
around the corner would not be very helpful if B knew the garage to be closed,
not to sell petrol, etc.
(2.9) a. A: I am out of petrol
b. B: There is a garage around the corner
A expects B’s utterance to be a relevant, truthful and complete reply, based on
backgroundknowledge andanassumption that B is being cooperative. Asmen-
tioned, Grice specifies the assumptions of the Cooperative Principle further in
the fourmaxims of conversation (paraphrased):
1 Quantity: Make your contribution informative enough, but do not say
more than is required.
2 Quality: Be truthful, or at least only say what you believe to be true.
3 Relation: Be relevant.
4 Manner: Be orderly, avoid ambiguity, etc.
By adhering to, or blatantly ignoring ( flouting) themaxims and the cooperative
principle, a speaker may express a lot more than the truth-conditional content
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of his/herutterance. So,Gricewould say thatwewould interpret (2.9b) as impli-
cating that the garage is open (or at least that the speaker believes this) due
to the maxim of relation, since the information that there is a garage around
the corner would otherwise be irrelevant. Let us now consider (2.10), which we
looked at in the previous section. In Gricean terms it could be analysed like
this:
(2.10) a. A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street.
b. A: It’s shorter.
c. Implicature:Walnut Street being shorter is a good reason for choos-
ingWalnut Street.
Due to the maxim of relation, we as language users want to interpret (2.10b) as
a relevant contribution. One way of doing this would be to interpret it as a rel-
evant reason for choosingWalnut Street. However, it seems to us that we need
something more than the Cooperative Principle and the maxims to get at the
correct implicature in (2.10).We can illustrate this by comparing (2.10) with the
similar dialogue (2.11):
(2.11) a. A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street.
b. A: It’s longer.
c. Implicature: ??
Now, by simply applying the cooperative principle and themaxims A’s conver-
sational partner B might be able to infer that (2.11b) is relevant in relation to
(2.11a). However, if B’s resources do not include a topos underpinning (2.11b) as
apremise in anargument for choosingWalnut Street—suchas longer routesare
better or it is preferable to spend longer time doing things—it would be hard for
B to arrive at a relevant interpretation. This is of course context dependent—
there are some things that we like spending as long time as possible doing, and
if walking is one of them, it is natural that a longer route is preferred. If B knew
that A is always interested in getting exercise, which of course a longer route
would provide in greater measure, B might also be able to derive the relevant
interpretation of (2.11). However, considering the notionsmost of us have about
comfort, efficiency, etc. (2.10) seems like less of a stretchunless the context is set
up in a specific way. So, even if themaxims tell us thatwe should try to interpret
contributions as relevant, true, etc., in order to do this we need some under-
pinning in the form of a pattern of reasoning—a topos—that fits in with the
contribution we are trying to make sense of. If we consider yet another manip-
ulation of our original example, this is even more clear:
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(2.12) a. A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street.
b. A: In the European Union, labour market conditions showed no
signs of improvement during 2013.
The contribution in (2.12b) is very difficult to make sense of in the context of
(2.12a), and would probably be taken as relating to an earlier utterance or as A
abruptly changing the subject (however, it cannot be excluded that it could be
interpreted as relevant under particular circumstances).
So, even though it appears thatweuse somenotions corresponding toGrice’s
principle of cooperation and relatedmaxims to interpet enthymemes, we need
access to some underpinning pattern or topos to actually arrive at an interpre-
tation. If we do not have access to relevant topoi, or if the contribution does not
contain enough information to point us in the direction of a relevant topos, we
have difficulty making a relevant interpretation. In cases like these we may get
additional information by making a clarification request. Imagine for example
a context of (2.9) where B would be totally unaware that you can buy petrol in
a garage. The dialogue in (2.9) could then play out as in (2.13):
(2.13) a. A: I am out of petrol
b. B: There is a garage around the corner
c. A: What do you mean garage—I need to buy petrol?
d. B: They sell petrol
e. A: Ah—ok!
To conclude, it seems that the principles suggested by Grice lead us in some
cases to infer that a speakermeans somethingmore thanwhat is said. However,
if we have access to relevant topoi we can understand not only that something
is implicatedbutwhat is implicated. If we, on the contrary, donothave access to
a topos that fits the discourse, it is difficult for us tomake sense of an utterance
where part of themeaning is conversationally implicated. Some conversational
implicatures can be accounted for by other means, for example scalar implica-
tures (Horn, 1984). However, in the case of relevance implicature for example,
we need something like a topos to produce and interpret contributions.
2.4 Relevance Theory
While the neo-Gricean developments of implicature theory have reduced the
maxims to a smaller set of communicative principles, Relevance Theory (Sper-
ber and Wilson, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2004; Carston, 2006) has replaced
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them with just one principle of relevance. Unlike the maxims, this principle is
not perceived as a communicative norm based on assumptions of cooperation
and rationality, but rather as a fundamental feature of human cognition.
Unlike Gricean pragmatics, which distinguishes between what is said—the
truth-conditional content of an expression—andwhat is implicated, Relevance
theory distinguishes between explicature and implicature, where explicature
refers to the explicit content of an utterance in a particular context. For exam-
ple, we would generally interpret (2.14a) as Jack and Jill being married to each
other rather than to other people. According to Relevance theory this is the
explicit, truth-evaluable content—the explicture—of the utterance, which is
arrived at through disambiguation, reference resolution and other pragmatic
processes.
(2.14) a. Utterance: Jack and Jill are married
b. Explicature: Jack and Jill are married to each other.
Meaning interpretation inRelevanceTheory is not perceived as something that
happens in steps where one step is executed after the other (primary and sec-
ondary processes). Instead, the interpretation process is seen as incremental,
and hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premises and implicated con-
clusions are developed in parallel. According to Sperber andWilson (2004) this
is an inferential process, i.e. if certain explicatures are assumed, certain impli-
catedpremises (intended contextual assumptions) and implicated conclusions
(implicatures) follow by necessity. This is illustrated very well by the example
in (2.15) (Sperber andWilson, 1995):
(2.15) a. Peter: Would you drive a Saab?
b. Mary: I wouldn’t drive ANY Swedish car.
c. Implicated premise: A Saab is a Swedish car
d. Implicated conclusion: Mary wouldn’t drive a Saab
In (2.15) the implicated conclusion (implicature) is that Mary would not drive
a Saab, based on the implicated premise that a Saab is a Swedish car. According
to Relevance Theory, this premise presents itself automatically due to the rele-
vance assumption—if a Saab were not a Swedish car, why would Mary answer
the way she did? However, if Peter thought that a Saab is a German car, the
implicated premise and conclusion might not be obvious to him, despite the
relevance assumption. And if a Saab were not, in fact, a Swedish car, and Peter
knew this, the relevance assumption alone would probably not be enough for
the interaction to run smoothly.
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The example in (2.15) is neat, since the relevance assumption seems to do
theworkunless oneof the agents involved in thedialogue lacks necessary back-
ground knowledge. However, in (2.16), an example taken fromCarston andHall
(2012), the situation is not as straightforward:
(2.16) a. Max: How was the party?
b. Amy: There wasn’t enough to drink and everybody left early
Here wewould probably infer the implicated conclusion that the party was not
a success, based on implicated premises that “people leaving early” and “lack
of drink” are associated with “dull party”. As previously discussed, given the
implicated premise in (2.15), the implicated conclusion follows by necessity.
However, in (2.16), this is not the case. For the implicated premises to necessar-
ily lead to the conclusion that the party was unsuccessful, they would have to
be universal rules. For example, the implicated premise “every party at which
there is not enough drink is unsuccessful” would, in any context, lead to the
conclusion that a particular party at which there was not enough drink was
unsuccessful. However, this seems unsatisfactory. Many would agree that a low
drink supply is acceptable as an explanation for why a party is unsuccessful,
but there might also be exceptions to this.
2.4.1 Relevance, Enthymemes andTopoi
Like Gricean and neo-Gricean theories of implicature, Relevance Theory pro-
vides an account forwhywe interpret utterances like (2.16b) as conveyingmore
than the truth-conditional content. However, bothGricean andRelevanceThe-
oretical accounts require some underpinning for the implicated inferences.
The theory thatwe propose accounts for the nature of the implicated premises,
and also for how implicated conclusions are generated. For example, let us con-
sider (2.16) in terms of enthymematic reasoning.
(2.17) there wasn’t enough drink at the party and everyone left early
the party was not a success
Rather than viewing this enthymeme as an incomplete argument requiring a
set of implicated premises which necessarily lead to the implicated conclu-
sion, we suggest that the enthymeme is underpinned by more general topoi,
licensing the proposition of the antecedent as an acceptable reason for the
proposition of the conclusion. The topos that parties at which there is too little
to drink are unsuccessful does not hold in all cases, but, if we agree with it, we
would probably also agree that it is more acceptable themore it fits in with the
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situation at hand. That is, if there is almost nothing to drink at a party, it is very
likely for the party to be unsuccessful. This is a good example of what Ducrot
(1988) refers to as the graduality of topoi (see Section 1.4.1).
The second topos invoked here is one linking “bad party” to “guests leaving
early”. This might not be a rule that specifically concerns parties and guests,
but rather one whose gist is that if people do not like something, they tend
to leave—people vote with their feet. We agree with the view that there are
implicit premises indialogues suchas (2.16), and that these to somedegreehave
to be anticipated by the speaker and accommodated by the listener. However,
we believe that these implicit premises are not precise, but rather an instanti-
ation in the dialogue situation of one or more general topoi.
2.5 Anti-inferentialism
Unlike the Relevance Theoretical view, the anti-inferentialist (Recanati, 2001,
2004) view of pragmatic meaning in context attributes many aspects of utter-
ance meaning to non-inferential processes. On this view interpretation of an
utterance happens in two steps—via primary pragmatic processes and sec-
ondary pragmatic processes, where the primary processes correspond roughly
toRelevanceTheory’s concept of explicature.However, thedistinguishing char-
acteristic of primary pragmatic processes is that they do not require the prior
identification of some proposition. They are not conscious, since a “normal”
language user is unaware of the processes through which the context-free
meaning is enriched to fit the situation. Primary pragmatic processes may be
bottom up, i.e. they are linguistically mandated, or top down, i.e. they are con-
textually driven. Recanati (2004) lists four different types of primary pragmatic
processes:
– Saturation:Mandatory, linguisticallymotivateddisambiguatione.g. anaphor
resolution. (Bottom up)
– Free enrichment: The sentence She tookout the keyandopened thedoorwould
generally be interpreted in a way such that the key that was taken out was
the key used to open the door. Usually, free enrichment corresponds to the
specification of some expression in the utterance by making it contextually
more specific.
– Loosening:Whena concept is usedmore generally than the literal interpreta-
tion allows, for example, in the utterance the ATM swallowed my credit card,
the aspects of swallowing that the speaker refers to are more general than
what we connect with actual swallowing by a living creature.
– Semantic transfer: In the utterance The ham-sandwich left without paying,
the ham-sandwich refers to the person who ordered the ham-sandwich—
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not to the dish itself. I’m parked out back does notmean that the personwho
performs the utterance is parked out back but that his or her car (or other
vehicle) is.
The anti-inferentialist take on interpretation is characterised by the belief that
all pragmatic processes which are necessary to arrive at a truth conditional
interpretation are perceived as being non-inferential. Of the different types
of primary processes mentioned above, all except saturation are contextually
mandated (top-down), and these are the ones that interest us most. Recanati
proposes that “interpretation is as direct as perception” in these cases, and
instead of looking to logic to explain for example enrichment, he turns to asso-
ciationbetween suitable schemata (Rumelhart, 1980) or frames (Fillmore, 1982)
and context free utterance meaning in order to explain how we interpret con-
textual meaning.
The concept of schema has been around in cognitive science since the sev-
enties at least, and can be described as a system for organising knowledge (or
beliefs). Recanati (2004) sketches a picture of how schemata play a role in
interpretation: An expression activates a cognitive schema, which is basically a
connection between two (or more) semantic values that says that these values
fit together. As an example, Recanati considers (2.18).
(2.18) John was arrested. He had stolen a wallet
Recanati attributes the reference resolution in (2.18) to the fact that (most of
us) have access to a schema where “stealing” and “being arrested” are linked.
Rumelhart (1980) describes the internal structure of a schema as the script of
a play where actors who can fill the different roles of a play in different rendi-
tions correspond to variables which can be associated with different aspects of
the schema on different instantiations.
2.5.1 A Rhetorical View of Anti-inferentialism
We consider (2.18) as an enthymematic argument where the conclusion is that
John was arrested, and the premise that he stole a wallet, as seen in (2.19).
(2.19) John had stolen a wallet
John was arrested
This enthymeme is underpinned by a topos linking stealing to getting arrested,
as seen in (2.20).
(2.20) If someone steals something, they get arrested
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The topos in (2.20) is a warrant for the enthymeme in (2.19), since (2.19) is
easily recognisable as an instantiation of (2.20).
In many ways a theory of topoi such as the one in (2.20) is compatible with
the anti-inferentialist view that knowledge and beliefs are organised in terms
of schemata and frames, making up the cognitive resources available to a lan-
guage user, based on the experiences of that individual. Like the theorywe pro-
pose, anti-inferentialism emphasises the importance of context and cognitive
resources for meaning interpretation. However, topoi—as they are tradition-
ally perceived in rhetoric—tend to be less domain specific than schemata. This
means that one topos could be relevant to one particular association within
a schema but irrelevant to—or even inconsistent with—another association
within the same schema. Also, one topos may be relevant to, or fit into, several
schemata in different domains.
Recanati makes a point of primary pragmatic processes being associative
rather than inferential. He defines these processes as being as automatic as
perception and non-conscious for the “normal” language user engaged in inter-
action, while inference to Recanati is something that the normal language user
consciously reasons about. However, there seems to be some evidence that a
process which is conscious for an individual at one point in time can be non-
conscious at some later point in time. For example, Swedish speaking students
of Frenchmay at first have to think carefully every time they choosewhich form
of a verb to use, due to the fact that Swedish verbs, unlike French, are not con-
jugated by person. After a while this process will be quicker and less conscious,
and eventually, as the students learn to master the language, it becomes more
or less automatic.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) describe the acquisition of skills in terms of five
stages, where stage five (highly competent) involves a lot of tacit knowledge
and routinised behaviour, while stage one (beginner) involves almost exclu-
sively conscious reasoning. From this view point, if it were true that all enrich-
ment which is necessary to reach the contextualised, fully enriched, truth-
conditional content of any sentence, were associative (automatic) it would be
difficult to explain language learning.
It would be possible to argue that anti-inferentialist theory is not about lan-
guage learning, it is an account of the interpretation processes of a fully compe-
tent speaker of a language, so this objection is not relevant. However, wewould
like to argue that evena fully competent languageuser continues to incorporate
new interpretations of expressions and is frequently faced with new types of
contexts in which old (and new) expressions are to be interpreted—language
change does not only happen between generations—it happens continuously,
and the language of an individual develops and changes during the course of
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the individual’s life. While we remain agnostic regarding the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying different types of pragmatic interpretation, we want to be
able to account for associative as well as inferential reasoning. Both convey
enthymematic structures in discourse, and both must be warranted by some-
thing like topoi.
2.6 Discourse Coherence
We are interested in pieces of discourse where two propositions are related in
the sense that they convey an enthymematic argument underpinnedby a topos
or a set of topoi. We argue that this type of relation contributes to coherence.
In this section, we look at enthymemes and topoi in the context of coherence
in dialogue and rhetorical relations.
Before we look at specific theories accounting for coherence, we will say
something about the phenomenon as such. Generally, coherence is taken to
mean how a discourse, text or conversation, “sticks together”, and coherent
refers to the property of being interpreted as belonging to the same unit. Leth
(2011) suggests that the minimal requirement for coherence is relation. This
means that when a number of discourse units are put in the same context, or
considered in the same context, relations between these units are automati-
cally generated in the minds of the agents involved.
On a general level, the reason for this would be that we try to relate utter-
ances or other linguistic units to each other in some meaningful way as soon
as we encounter them. Thereby we also assign a possible discourse relation
between these units. The view that our cognition is constantly seeking to cre-
ate coherence, and that virtually any two constituents in discourse could be
interpreted as coherent under the right circumstances, seems reasonable and
is supportedby experimental evidence showing that dialogueparticipants tend
to interpret non-authentic insertions in online dialogue as meaningful contri-
butions (Healey et al., 2018). However, this does not tell us how an agent creates
coherence between linguistic units, nor does it predict towhat degree a linguis-
tic contribution would be seen as relevant in a particular context. In the next
two subsections, we will briefly consider two approaches to coherence, which
in different ways try to elucidate these problems.
2.6.1 Conversation Analysis
In Conversation Analysis (CA, Sacks et al., 1974), organisation of discourse is
defined in termsof adjacencypairs—pairs of functionally relateddialogue con-
tributions by two different speakers—and sequences. Each sequence revolves
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around a base adjacency pair conveying the basic action performed in the
sequence. A minimal sequence consists of one adjacency pair, for example a
greeting followed by another greeting by an interlocutor. However, sequences
are often longer than one adjacency pair. Bymeans of the example below, Sche-
gloff (2007) illustrates how a sequence may be expanded with one or more
inserted sequences. The context of the dialogue is a girl asking her boyfriend
if she can borrow a gun for an assignment in drama class. The first part of the
base adjacency pair is B’s utterance in lines 9–10, which is not resolved until J
utters the second part of the base adjacency pair in line 93.
(2.21) 9 B: ’n I was wondering if you’d let me borrow
10 your gun.
11 (1.2)
12 J: My gun?
13 B: Yeah.
…
93 J: Yeah, you can use’t.
94 (0.4)
95 B: .hh Ca:n?
96 J: Yeh-
In between these turns at talk, there are several sequence expansions (Couper-
Kuhlen and Selting, 2017) consisting of adjacency pairs. Some of these expan-
sions are themselves nested. In addition to the functional relation within adja-
cencypairs, such as question-answer, request-acceptance, etc., topic is also seen
as contributing to coherence. Typically, the topic does not shift between the
first and second part of a base adjacency pair, and conversely, there is often a
topic shift between sequences.
2.6.1.1 A Micro Rhetorical Perspective on CA
Even though there is often correspondence between the beginning and end
of sequences and topic shift in conversation, there are cases where the con-
nection is less clear (Schegloff, 2007). For example, the topic of an adjacency
pair within a sequence expansion might not be the same as the overall topic
of the sequence, that is, of the base adjacency pair. Take for example (2.22),
an exchange within the long sequence expansion between line 9–10 and 93 in
(2.21):
(2.22) 82 J: You a good- (.) uh::: (1.8) a- actress?
83 (1.0)
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84 B: No: heheheh?
85 (0.5)
86 J: Th’n how d’ju come out to be A:nnie.
It is not obvioushow the topic of (2.22) is related to theoverall topic of (2.21), the
base adjacency pair. This is true of many sequence expansions. There is often a
topical link to the previous adjacency pair, but it is not always obvious. In some
cases, in order to identify an utterance as the second part of an adjacency pair
or the first part of a sequence expansion, rather than as an actual change of
topic, a topos is required warranting the interpretation. In (2.22) the question
whether B is a good actress or not is on topic in virtue of a topos connecting
playing the leading role andbeing a good actor.However, for this adjacency pair
to be on topic in relation to the base adjacency pair, more topoi are required.
Even in cases where two turns at talk are clearly related, they often involve
the assumption of topoi either to be present in the minds of the interlocu-
tors, or be possible to infer from the context. Due to the ethnomethodological
approach to interaction taken by CA, which discourages assumptions of things
that are not explicit in the discourse, this is to a great extent ignored in CA.
One example where a topos is needed to explain coherence, is the excerpt in
(2.22). The functional coherence between lines 82 and 84 is obvious. However,
the topical connection to the rest of the dialogue is not clear until we see the
follow-up question in line 86. The subsection in (2.22) conveys an enthymeme
like the one in (2.23):
(2.23) B is not a good actress
it is surprising that B is playing Annie
This enthymeme is underpinned by a topos saying that if someone plays the
lead, they are a good actor. Without this assumption, the relevance of the first
part of the adjacency pair in line 82, to the first part of the subsequent adja-
cency pair in line 86, is not clear. Most of the time, the topoi underpinning
a dialogue, by warranting its enthymemes, are so obvious to a conversational
participant that they do not require conscious reasoning. However, they still
contribute to coherence. Adding enthymemes and topoi provides a more gen-
eral theory of coherence in dialogue than one only drawing on adjacency pairs
and sequence organisation.
2.6.2 Rhetorical Relations
Work within CA offers many insights to how individual utterances in dialogue
relate to each other, thereby contributing to coherence. However, there are
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few attempts at generalising these insights to a theory of coherence that could
be used to make predictions regarding interpretation and production of lan-
guage.
CA is typically devoted to conversation, and is not concernedwith coherence
in other types of discourse. In contrast, theories of rhetorical relations aim at
a generalisable theory of coherence which applies to many types of discourse,
and is based on content rather than turn taking patterns.
We are particularly interested in Segmented Discourse Representation The-
ory (sdrt, Asher and Lascarides, 2003), since it—in comparison to e.g. Rhetor-
ical Structure Theory (rst, Mann and Thompson, 1986, 1988)—does not only
focus on written text but also considers dialogue data.
A basic premise of sdrt is that rhetorical relations between sentences or
utterances are sometimes necessary in addition to compositional or dynamic
semantics to fully interpret discourse. According to Asher and Lascarides
(2003), traditional dynamic semantics (KampandReyle, 1993;Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1991)—although capable of handling many coherence phenomena—
doesnot adequately handle rhetorical relations, nor thephenomenaaccounted
for by rhetorical relations alone. Some of these phenomena are bridging infer-
ence, lexical ambiguity and conversational implicature. In this section we will
look at some of the rhetorical relations postulated in sdrt, and consider how
they relate to enthymemes and topoi.
The different types of rhetorical relations or discourse relations in sdrt
are not based on rhetorical—or functional—criteria alone, but on a combi-
nation of rhetorical quality and other properties like tense, mood and dis-
course order. Apart from the division into main rhetorical relation types—
such as elaboration, narration and explanation—there is also a separate divi-
sion of relation types into content-level relations, text-structuring relations,
cognitive-level relations, divergent relations, and meta-talk relations. Some
relation types have subtypes, and these subtypes may also belong to differ-
ent groups. However, this fine-grained division is not relevant to us at this
point, and we will settle for distinguishing between relatively coarse-grained
categories. Above all, we are interested in the two types of relation which are
most easily associated with enthymemes—result and its counterpart explana-
tion.
In (2.24) we see an example given by Asher and Lascarides (2003, p. 463),
where two utterances are linked by the rhetorical relation result.
(2.24) a. John pushed Max.
b. He fell.
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The relation between (2.24a) and (2.24b) is based on a notion of causation,
and the order of discoursematches the temporal order inwhich the events take
place. In (2.25) (Asher and Lascarides, 2003, p. 463) the situation is reversed. As
in (2.24), the reasoning relies on a notion of causation. However, in this case the
order of events does not match the discourse order, and the relation between
(2.25a) and (2.25b) is thus explanation, not result.
(2.25) a. Max fell.
b. John pushed him.
Theunderlying reasoning in the two cases is similarlywarranted, and thediffer-
ence between the relations is the order of the constituents. This is reflected in
the logical forms of the axioms postulated in sdrt as underpinning the inter-
pretations of the rhetorical relation result between the constituents of (2.24),
and explanation between those of (2.25).
In (2.26), the underlying reasoning is different from that warranting (2.24)
and (2.25).
(2.26) a. Max fell.
b. John helped him up.
The discourse order and temporal order match, and (2.26a) and (2.26b) are
clearly related in the sense that helping someone up is something you might
do if they have fallen, but Max falling is not causing John to help him up, it is
merely a reason for Max being in need of being helped. This discourse is an
example of the rhetorical relation narration, which relates two propositions
only if the event described by the first proposition temporally precedes that of
the second (see also (2.29), below).
As language users, our intuition about (2.26) is that that Max’s falling pre-
cedes John’s helping him up. In the case of (2.25), on the other hand, the intu-
ition is that the falling happens after, and is caused by, the pushing.
Asher and Lascarides argue that rhetorical relations are necessary to capture
the disctinct temporal content of (2.26a) and (2.26b), and that these relations
are not derived from domain knowledge alone. They say, with regard to the
example in (2.26):
If “pushings typically cause fallings” were part of domain knowledge, one
might use it to construct the right logical form, but this proposition seems
quite implausible and hence not part of domain knowledge.
Asher and Lascarides, 2003 p. 7
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Instead, Asher and Lascarides suggest that we infer a causal link in virtue of
the presence of a rhetorical link between the twopropositions. This raises a few
questions: Firstly, is it really implausible that some notion that pushings cause,
typically cause, or may cause fallings, is part of domain knowledge? Secondly,
how do we as agents interpreting (2.25b) know that we are supposed to infer a
causal link and not, for example, a narrative link?
2.6.2.1 Enthymemes, Topoi and Rhetorical Relations
With regard to (2.24) and (2.25), we may say that while the classification of the
discourse relation as either result or explanation depends on the order of the
sentences, the two examples convey the same enthymeme. If we accept the
relations between the sentences in (2.24) and (2.25) as result and explanation
respectively, we also have to accept that it was John who caused Max to fall by
pushing him. We can see this discourse as expressing an enthymematic argu-




In order for a proposition to work as an explanation, there there must be an
acceptable warrant. In the case of (2.27), we have access to some cognitive
resources concerning pushings and fallings, among them a rule of thumb say-
ing that a common/possible/potential relation between pushings and fallings
is that pushings cause fallings.
Now, this is not necessarily a rule based on probabilistic reasoning about the
real world, but rather a salient notion that speakersmay relate to the activity of
pushing. Basically, it says that when falling occurs in the context of pushing, we
are licensed to assume that the pushing caused the falling. We would say that
the discourse in (2.27) evokes a topos like the one in (2.28):
(2.28) push(x,y)
fall(y)
This topos underpins the enthymeme in (2.27), and helps us accommodate the
appropriate discourse relation.
We argue that some discourse relations are clearly related to enthymemes,
as they contain somekindof claimor conclusion, aswell as a constituentwhich
serves as support for that claim or conclusion. But what about those relations
that lack a causal link between utterances—are they unrelated to enthymemes
and topoi? Consider the discourse in (2.29) Asher and Lascarides (2003, p. 462):
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(2.29) a. Max came into the room
b. He sat down
c. He lit a cigarette
Asher and Lascarides present (2.29) as another example of narration. This dis-
course relation is defined in terms that distinguishes it from, for example, con-
tinuation. Narration holds between (2.29a) and (2.29b), and between (2.29b)
and (2.29c). These relations do not seem to be enthymematic—that someone
enters a room is not a reason for that person sitting down, neither is sitting
down an explanation for lighting a cigarette. There is no enthymematic argu-
ment in this discourse in need of a warrant. However, there is still some kind
of expected progression in (2.29).We would probably have a harder time inter-
preting a discourse like (2.30) as coherent:
(2.30) a. Max sat down
b. He came into the room
c. He lit a cigarette
Another problem arises when the content of a sentence is difficult to place in
the same space and time as that of another sentence for world-knowledge rea-
sons. For example, if (2.29b) had been He dived into the Caribbean sea, rather
than He sat down, the interpretation of the discourse as linked by narration
would be less obvious. This indicates that some principles of world knowledge
are underpinning narration, elaboration, continuation, etc. as well as explana-
tion and result. We believe that this knowledge could be modelled in terms of
topoi.
We fully agree with the perspective presented in sdrt in that a rhetorical
element is necessary to fully capture the content of causal discourse relations,
like explanation and result. Asher and Lascarides reject domain knowledge as
a direct means of deciding which rhetorical relation we are dealing with in a
particular discourse, since the principles which we draw on can often not be
considered defaults which are true for the most part. For example, it is not the
case that pushings normally result in fallings. However, we would like to argue
that domain related resources in the form of topoi can supply an appropriate
logical form to underpin a causal or consequential relation in discourse.
Discussing evidence for cognitive foundations for rhetorical relations, Asher
and Lascarides refer to research according to which at least causal relations
seem to help interpreters understand texts better (Flower and Hayes, 1980;
Meyer and Freedle, 1984—referred to in Asher and Lascarides, 2003, p. 450).
Since causal relations are what enthymemes are based on, this seems to sup-
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port the view that enthymemes help us structure discourse in a coherent way.
Asher and Lascarides claim that the discourse relations in sdrt have semantic
contents that relate to “fundamental conceptual categories by means of which
we organise our beliefs”, for example causation, sequencing, and part/whole.
These categories could be seen as supertypes of more specific topoi, somewhat
reminiscent of Aristotle’s “common topoi”—topoi that may be used to under-
pin arguments within all domains.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter we have explored how enthymemes and topoi relate to a num-
ber of theories within pragmatics and philosophy of language. We noted that
although pragmatic inferences are consistent with general principles like the
maxim of relevance and assumptions of rationality and cooperation, these
principles are not always enough to predict the actual inferences a language
usermakes in a given situation. Nor do they explain how a dialogue participant
determines what contribution to make in order for an interlocutor to arrive at
a particular conclusion. In response to this, we have sketched a picture of how
enthymemes and topoi contribute to pragmatic processes by providing struc-
ture (enthymemes) and warrants (topoi) for reasoning.
We suggested that we could talk about accommodation of both topoi and
enthymemes. Interpreting a discourse where the rhetorical structure is not
explicit, a salient topos—one which by the language user is easily associated
with the discourse situation—may be adopted as an underpinning for the dis-
course. Drawing on this topos the language user can accommodate an appro-
priate enthymeme, or some other type of rhetorical relation, which provides
structure to the discourse. The discourse in (2.25) is an example of this.
Secondly, we may have an explicit enthymematic structure actually present
in the discourse, as in Grice’s example of a sentence giving rise to conventional
implicature, (2.5a). In cases like this the structure already points to a topos,
or at least at some instantiation of a topos, and the topos is thus more easily
accommodated. However, in cases like this we can still expect the dialogue to
be disrupted if we force a dialogue participant to accommodate a topos which
is alien to him, or not salient in the situation.
We agreed with the anti-inferentialist view of cognitive resources underpin-
ning pragmatic processes. However, we opposed the idea that these processes
are either entirely associative, automatic and unconscious (as Recanati claims
of primary pragmatic processes) or entirely inferential (as is claimed in Rel-
evance Theory). Instead we argue that when dialogue participants make use
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of topoi which are established in the cognitive resources of the other dialogue
participants, the pragmatic interpretations are more associative in nature, and
when the dialogue participants are forced to accommodate novel or unex-
pected topoi, the process is mainly inferential. We suggested that topoi might
be a good way of warranting not only enthymematic discourse relations, but
also non-causal relations such as narration.
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In the previous chapterswe have looked at enthymematic arguments and topoi
in the context of pragmatics and interactional linguistics. We have seen that
rhetorical reasoning is intimately related to the kind of inferences that are
the focus in pragmatics, and that the usage of enthymemes exploits founda-
tional principles of interactional linguistics such as dialogicity and grounding.
However, although we have demonstrated the relevance of the enthymeme
in interactive linguistics, we have not yet presented a theoretical framework
which may be used for precise analyses of enthymematic reasoning.
In this chapter we will work our way towards a more detailed account of
enthymemes and topoi and the role they play in interaction. First, we will dis-
cuss some concepts which are important for the subsequent analysis, and then
we will move on to look at some examples. We will take as our point of depar-
ture an information state update approach as described by Larsson and Traum
(2000) and Larsson (2002), including questions under discussion (qud), as
developed by Ginzburg (1994, 1996, 1998), Cooper et al. (2000) and Ginzburg
(2012).Wewill look at howwe can account for various types of examples involv-
ing enthymemes and topoi. Our analysis will especially focus on the different
types of accommodation which are necessary for dialogue participants to be
able to draw on rhetorical resources made up of sets of topoi.
The formal framework we will use is ttr, a type theory with records Cooper
(2005a, 2012, 2016).1 ttr is a rich type theory, which has been successfully
employed to account for a range of linguistic phenomena, including ones par-
ticular to dialogue (Cooper, 2005b; Ginzburg, 2012; Cooper and Ginzburg, 2015;
Lücking, 2016).
1 The reference Cooper (2016) refers to an unpublished stable draft, dated 2016-11-30. When
needed, wewill refer to a later draft, accessed 2020-06-29, as Cooper (2020). See bibliography
for URLs.
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3.2 Using ttr to Analyse Interaction
There are several reasons for choosing ttr for dialogue modelling. Cooper
(2005b) shows how important aspects of semantic theories such as drt (Kamp
and Reyle, 1993), situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983), and work in
the Montague tradition (Montague, 1973) may be cast in ttr. This means that
the various problems that these theories were designed to solve may be solved
within a single framework. Thus, choosing ttr for the account presented here
means we can relate enthymemes and topoi to the issues addressed in these
important semantic theories.
Ginzburg (2012) points out that ttr (like other rich type theories) has the
advantage of being able to handle utterances as well as utterance types, which
is crucial for analysing meta-communicative aspects of interaction. This is
a great advantage for us as we are sometimes simultaneously interested in
the meaning conveyed by a particular utterance and the role which that type
of utterance plays in an enthymematic argument. The ttr notion of sub-
typing is also important for our account of how we employ topoi in differ-
ent kinds of enthymemes through operations like restriction, generalisation
and composition. In ttr we have a convenient way of doing this since we
have record types—structured types where we can easily add and remove
fields.
Another advantage of ttr is that it offers a way to formally account for nat-
ural language without employing the concept of possible worlds. Ranta (1994),
Cooper (2005a), Larsson (2011), Cooper and Ginzburg (2012), Fine (2012), Lap-
pin (2013, 2015) and Chatzikyriakidis (2014), among others, point out problems
with possible-worlds accounts of meaning. These objections are of a philo-
sophical and semantic as well as a computational nature. The computational
issuesmight not be immediately relevant to us, but theywould be relevant if we
wanted to take our analysis further and implement aspects of it in a dialogue
model, for example.
3.2.1 Some Basic Concepts of ttr
ttr is based on the fact that humans (and animals) perceive the world in
terms of categories or types. Not only do we have the ability to classify things in
the world as individuals (corresponding to entities)—which could in itself be
seen as typing—but also to categorise them as being of particular types. The
identifying of individuals as individuals (individuation) as well as the typing is
relative to the physical and cognitive prerequisites of the perceiving agent as
well as environmental factors. For example, a human watching a tree from a
distance might have no problem identifying it as an entity and recognising it
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as being of the type Tree, while an ant never gets the macro-perspective that
enables the human to perceive the tree as one entity. The ant might instead
be able to identify ridges in the bark of the tree as obstacles that need to be
overcome in order to reach the anthill. Thus it is not only the conditions of
the agent that limits its ability to identify entities and type them, it is also the
properties of the objects themselves. The likelihood of an agent typing some-
thing in a particular way is related to factors such as what the agent can do
in relation to the object. These relations between agents and objects are often
referred to as affordances (Gibson, 1977). For a detailed discussion about the
way perception and the world is seen as connected to types in ttr, see Cooper
(2016).
In formal terms, we can describe the judgement that a particular object, a,
is of a certain type T, as a : T. In ttr the basic type of objects such as humans,
animals and things, corresponding to entity or e in Montague semantics (Mon-
tague, 1973), is Ind, the type of individuals.
Basic types in ttr are types which are not constructed from other objects
in the theory. Examples are Ind for individuals and Real for real numbers. One
way to construct more complex types is to use predicates. From predicates we
can construct ptypes. A ptype consists of a predicate and its arguments, for
example see(a,b), “a sees b”. Objects which belong to ptypes are for example
events and states. If a type, for example T1, is realised, there is something of
type T1. We say that this object is a proof or witness of T1. The existence of
some particular object a of type T1 is a proof that there exists something of
type T1.
In order to represent complex situations which potentially involve many
ptypes and individuals, as well as othermore general types, we use record types.
A record type is a structure of pairs of labels and types. The same letters that
are often used as individual variables in other systems—x, y, etc.—are used as
labels associated with the type Ind, and the label c with different subscripts is
used for constraints on the type of situation represented by the record type. In






The object to which the label ‘x’ points in (3.1) is of type Ind, and there are two
constraints on the type of situation, that this individual is a dog (cdog : dog(x))
and that it runs (crun : run(x)). In addition to record typeswealsowant tobe able
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to talk about situations that are witnesses of record types. We represent such
objects as records. A record is a structure where the labels are associated with
values rather than types. The label and the value are separated by an equals
sign. In (3.2) we see a record representing one particular situation. This situa-
tion is of the type in (3.1) if all the values are of the appropriate types (a : Ind,






Let us assume that we want to talk about a type of situation where a particular
dog—Spot—runs. We can do that by making a field in our record type mani-
fest. This means that we let a label be associated with both a value and a type,
as illustrated in (3.3).
(3.3)
x = Spot : Ind
cdog : dog(x)
crun : run(x)
3.2.2 Subtyping in ttr
Record types in ttr offer a structured way of representing subtyping, which
can be used—among other things—to account for how speech situations
relate to each other. A type T1 is a subtype of T2 (T1 ⊑ T2) just in case for any
a, a : T1 implies a : T2, no matter what is assigned to the basic types and ptypes
(Cooper, in prep, p. 39). For a record type T1 to be a subtype of another record
type T2, there cannot be any label-type pairs in T2 which do not exist in T1, and
there can be nomanifest field in T2 that is absent in T1. For example, the record
types in (3.4b), (3.4c) and (3.4d) are all subtypes of the record type in (3.4a).
The record type in (3.4d) is also a subtype of the record types in (3.4b) and
(3.4c). The record types in (3.4b) and (3.4c) are not in a subtype relation to one
another, since (3.4c) involves amanifest fieldwhich is not present in (3.4b), and
(3.4b) involves a label-type pair that is absent in (3.4c).
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c. x = Spot : Ind
cdog : dog(x)
d.
x = Spot : Ind
cdog : dog(x)
crun : run(x)
For an in-depth introduction to records and record types including formal def-
initions, see Cooper (2005b), Cooper (2012), Cooper and Ginzburg (2015) and
Cooper (2016).
3.2.3 The Dialogue Gameboard
Now that we have introduced basic types like Ind, ptypes, record types and
records, we will move on to howwe do dialogue semantics in ttr.Wewill start
out as simply as possible and add new features along the the way. To model
the information states of dialogue participants, we will employ the concept of
dialogue gameboards (dgb). Following others—most famously Wittgenstein
(1953)—Lewis (1979) used the metaphor of language use, particularly conver-
sation, as a game. Lewis claimed that the development of a conversation can be
seen in termsof a score analogous to that of a game like baseball. In baseball the
score consists of numbers, the number of strikes, runs, etc. In a language game
the score is made up of sets of moves, questions, presuppositions, commit-
ments, and other linguistic features which are relevant in the discourse. Lewis
also introduced the idea of a scoreboard which keeps track of the progress of
the dialogue.
The dgb is Ginzburg’s take on the scoreboard approach to dialogue analysis
(Ginzburg, 1996, 1998, 2012; Ginzburg et al., 2010; Cooper and Ginzburg, 2012)
and an important feature of his theory of dialogue semantics—KoS—which
has been developed over the last couple of decades.
However, in this bodyof work there areno suggestions regardinghow tohan-
dle enthymematic arguments or topoi. Since our main objective is to account
for the role enthymemes and topoi play in dialogue, we do not commit to any
particular setup of the dgb from previous literature. However, the model we
present here is influenced by previous work in terms of the layout of the dgb.
We suggest a version of the dgb which includes enthymemes and topoi, and
accounts for how they may interact with each other and with various contex-
tual and co-textual factors. For background on gameboard semantics in ttrwe
recommend the literature referred to above, particularly Ginzburg (2012) and
Cooper (2016).
Following Cooper (2016) we will treat the information state of a conversa-
tional participant as a record, and the dialogue gameboard that represents the
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type of this information state as a record type. This means that the structures
we will deal with usually represent the types of particular information states
rather than the information states themselves. Thus the dialogue gameboard
of an agent A is a type of agent A’s information state.
We are interested in how conversational and contextual features are intro-
duced and integrated in the discourse model. Our focus is particularly on how
individual agents draw on individual (and sometimes distinct) resources. The
examples in this section will therefore be described and analysed using sepa-
rate gameboards for each agent, representing the types of their respective infor-
mation states. Ginzburg (1998), Larsson (2002), Ericsson (2005), and Ginzburg
(2012) all choose this approach.
Larsson and Traum (2000) suggest the possibility of one gameboard depict-
ing an objective take on the development of the dialogue, corresponding to a
God’s eye perspective on the state of the dialogue, rather than the context as
perceived by the speakers themselves. However, such a notion of context does
not help us handle dialogue features like misunderstanding, repetition, clarifi-
cation, etc.To capture suchphenomenawemust have separate representations
for the respective information states of individual dialogue participants, cap-
turing something that more resembles the common ground assumed by each
dialogue participant.
The concept of common ground (Stalnaker, 1978; Clark et al., 1991; Clark,
1996) is usually taken tomean the things that are taken for granted by an agent
as being shared with the other agents involved in conversation, or, to be more
precise, the thingswhich this agent behaves as if he took for granted, andwhich
are in some way relevant in the interaction. Thus, the concept of common
ground is similar to the information we display on the shared part of the dia-
logue gameboard.
We see the information state of a dialogue participant as comprising two
types of information—the kind that the dialogue participant takes to be shared
in the context of the conversation, and the kind that he takes to be private.
Therefore we keep the basic divide between private and shared which we find
in Larsson (2002), Ericsson (2005) and Ginzburg (2012). Let us say for example
that the type of an agent’s private information state is Tp and the type of the
same agent’s shared information state is Ts, then, in (3.5), we have the type of
that agent’s information state.
(3.5) private : Tp
shared : Ts
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3.2.3.1 Agenda
The type associated with the label ‘shared’ is a record type representing the
agent’s take on what is shared information in the dialogue situation. That is,
what has in some way been referred to in the dialogue, or what is necessary to
integrate in the information state for a dialogue contribution to be interpreted
in a relevant way. For example, although a toposmay be of central relevance in
the dialogue, it does not appear on the gameboard as part of an agent’s shared
information state until it has been made explicit, or until something has been
said which has caused it to be accommodated. Similarly, the type associated
with the label ‘private’ is a record type representing the agent’s take onwhat he
himself believes but might not be known by other dialogue participants.
We start out by introducing the most basic features of the gameboard and
their functions, starting with the fields that belong to the private section of the
gameboard.We represent the intention of an agent to make a specific move in
terms of a private agenda. The kind of objects that would be on an agenda in
the information state of a dialogue participant are dialoguemoves that the dia-
logue participant intends to make in the dialogue. Since we want to be able to
account for an agenda involvingmore than onemove, wewill eventuallymodel
the type of the agenda as a list of move types. For now however, it suffices to let
the agenda be of a, as yet unspecified, type Tag.
(3.6)
private : agenda : Tag
shared : Ts
3.2.3.2 Project
The agenda is related to the field ‘project’, which we introduce under ‘shared’.
The term is inspired by Linell’s (2009) concept of communicative project, which
is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s language game. On Linell’s account, a com-
municative project is a jointly accomplished communicative action, typically
carried out over several utterances. Linell relates it to the notion of communica-
tive activity, as described in Allwood (2000), in that a communicative activity is
a comprehensive communicative project tied to a socio-cultural situation type.
Another related concept is that of conversational genre, used for example
by Ginzburg (2010), to, among other things, account for relevance in dialogue.
The concepts of genre and activity are similar, but differ in the perspective from
which they are defined. For Ginzburg, a genre is defined by issues that are typ-
ically raised in a conversation of that genre. In Allwood’s theory an activity
type is characterised by the goals and roles that are associated with it. Thus,
genre seems to be more of a linguistic category according to which conversa-
tions may be analysed, while activity is not necessarily a linguistic category—
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even though most social activities involve linguistic behaviour. The concept of
activity can thus be used to predict events that give rise to particular types of
conversations.
We perceive activity types as part of agents’ resources, where they are rep-
resented as types of re-occurring sequences of events.2 which aim to fulfil the
same type of goal. Each instance of an activity also often follows a recognis-
able pattern. Examples of distinguishable activities are board meeting, din-
ner conversation, medical consultation, etc. The event types that make up the
sequences which constitute an activity can be more or less obligatory, both
in terms of the type of events and in terms of the order in which the events
occur. These eventsmay themselves be described in terms of sequences of sub-
events, that is, communicative projects. For now we will not get into details
about the formal representation of the project, but simply represent it as a
type Tpr.
When we think of a project that is to be jointly carried out, we do not nec-
essarily specify which dialogue participant is supposed to be responsible for
carrying out specific parts of the project. For example, if Kay and Sam are deco-
rating their newhouse, the project of agreeing onwhere to place a specific arm-
chair does not necessarily contain information about who is supposed tomake
what move. Correspondingly, the project is associated with one or more con-
versational games specifying the type of moves that different agents involved
in the game are allowed to make in relation to each other (provided they keep
playing the game), regardless who the agents are. For example, if one dialogue
participantmakes a suggestion, the other should evaluate and respond.Wewill
leave these games aside for themoment, and return to themwhenwe consider
updates of the dialogue gameboard in Chapter 5.
For the purpose of accounting for our data it is sufficient to consider the
communicative project as somethingwhich is perceived as shared information
by all dialogue participants. However, there is no reason in principle why we
could not expand the ‘private’-field to include private communicative projects
to represent “hidden agendas”, etc.
3.2.3.3 Questions under Discussion, Latest Move, and Commitments
Apart from ‘project’, we will consider three additional fields under ‘shared’ on
the dialogue gameboard—Questions under Discussion (‘qud’), Latest Move (‘l-
m’) and Commitments (‘com’) The items on ‘qud’ represent questions which
2 Following Fernando (2006) and Cooper (2016), we will formalise sequences of communica-
tive events as strings of events. We will return to this in Section 5.3.
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have been raised in the dialogue, explicitly or implicitly.We will give a detailed
account for how we model questions later on. For now we will use the short-
hand Tq to represent the type associated with the label ‘qud’.
The term facts used by Ginzburg is associated with truth and falsity, which
might not necessarily be desirable in the context of accounting for the progress
of a dialogue—dialogue participants may believe something to be true which
is false, and theymay knowingly accept untrue things “for the sake of the argu-
ment”. Larsson (2002) and Ericsson (2005) emphasise the aspect of mutual
agreement by introducing commitments instead of facts. We will use commit-
ments (‘com’) for propositions that have been grounded in the dialogue. For
the time being we refer to the type associated with ‘com’ as Tcom. The type
associated with ‘l-m’ is a record type featuring information such as speaker,
move type, utterance content, etc. However, for now we refer to this as a
type Tl-m.
The figure in (3.7) shows a dialogue gameboard where the shared field has
been further specified as described above. In the next section, we will define
the types of the various fields in the dgb in the course of analysing a simple
dialogue.
(3.7)






3.3 Analysing a Simple Dialogue
Let us now explore the possibilities of the gameboard by considering the sim-
ple dialogue between agents A and B in (3.8).
(3.8) a. A: Do you have the time?
b. B: It’s three thirty.
This dialogue is made up of a standard question-answer sequence without
repairs, clarifications or the like. Let us first consider A’s initial information
state. A wishes to find out what time it is, which causes an agenda item to be
added to her dgb.
As we have previously seen, manifest fields allow us to let a label be asso-
ciated not only with a type but with an object of a type. For example, a : T1
46 chapter 3
means that objects associated with the label “a” are of type T1. If we have such
an object, for example the child Sam, wemay say that a = Sam : T1 . However, if
we want the object associated with the label to be a type, for example a record
type which includes some information about Sam, the type of this type is Rec-
Type, the type of record types.We will represent projects and commitments as
record types, and hence we take Tpr and Tcom to be RecType.
The objects that could go on the agenda are types of moves that an agent
is intending to make in an interaction, and we represent these as record types.
However, since a dialogue participant may well plan more than one move in
advance, we want the object on the agenda to be a list of record types where
each type corresponds to one type of move. We call the type of a list a list
type (Cooper, 2016, p. 267). If an object is a list of record types—for example
T1 and T2—it is of the type list(RecType). We write this as [T1, T2] : list(Rec-
Type).
The type of A’s initial information state can be seen in (3.9). The type on the
agenda is a record type representing the type of move that is employed when
asking about the time. We refer to this type using T with a subscript providing
a rough description of the function of such move.
(3.9) IS 1 (A)






When A has uttered (3.8a), the move realised by this utterance is added to the
‘l-m’ field of the dgb, and the first item on the list on the agenda is taken off
(which in this case means that we have an empty list on the agenda). We see
the type of A’s information state after the utterance of (3.8a) in (3.10):
(3.10) IS 2 (A)






We assume that the updates directly following the uttering of (3.8a) are iden-
tical for agents A and B. Integrating the lates move of type Task-time results in
enthymemes in dialogue 47
updates of ‘project’ and ‘qud’. A and B both expect their interlocutor to recog-
nise that an utterance like (3.8a) aims at initiating a project to find out the time.
Agent A is obviously awareof this project at anearlier stage, but doesnot expect
it to be shared until a move of type Task-time is made. Likewise for the update of
‘qud’—the question Ttime? that is pushed onto ‘qud’ can be expected to be sim-
ilar for any speaker of English, given the content of (3.8a). To make it possible
to track more than one question under discussion, ‘qud’ is set up as a list in a
similar way to the agenda, so Tq = list(Question). Thus, at the point when ‘l-m’,
‘project’ and ‘qud’ have been updated, the dgb of agent B is identical to that of
A. We see this gameboard in (3.11):
(3.11) IS 3 (B)
private : agenda = [] : list(RecType)
shared :
project = Tfind_out_time : RecType
qud = [Ttime?] : list(Question)
l-m : Task-time
com : RecType
Next, B’s information state is updated with an item on the agenda representing
the next move he intends to make in the dialogue, that is answering the ques-
tion under discussion by telling Awhat time it is, and thereby also carrying out
the communicative project at hand.
(3.12) IS 4 (B)
private : agenda = [Ttell_time] : list(RecType)
shared :
project = Tfind_out_time : RecType
qud = [Ttime?] : list(Question)
l-m : Task-time
com : RecType
Amove of the type on B’s agenda (Ttell_time) is carried out by his saying (3.8b). At
this point, a commitment that the time is three thirty is integrated on the dgbs
of both dialogue participants. The interlocutors now expect it to be common
ground that the time is three thirty (unless, of course, there is reason to believe
that B is not telling the truth).
The agenda item is therefore taken off his dgb and ‘l-m’ is updated for both
agents. In addition, the question on ‘qud’ is resolved, and thus popped off, and
the project is carried out. The final information state in this mini-dialogue (for
both participants) would thus be of the type in (3.13):
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(3.13) IS 5 (A and B)
private : agenda = [ ] : list(RecType)
shared :
project : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
l-m : Ttell-time
com = Tthree_thirty : RecType
3.4 Introducing Enthymematic Reasoning on the dgb
A simple question-answer exchange like the one in (3.8) can be handled with
the gameboard features we have introduced so far. Let us now turn to a slightly
more complex sequence and see if these features are still enough, or if there
are some aspects of the interaction that we cannot capture if we stick to the
current set up of the dialogue gameboard. The example in (3.14) depicts a situ-
ation where a person A asks another person B where he wants to go and then
informs himof a suitable route. However, B does not seem convinced this is the
optimal route and so asks for a reason why this particular route is preferable. A
provides a reason, and B explicitly accepts.
(3.14) a. A: Where do you want to go?
b. B: I want to go home
c. A: Let’s take the bypass!
d. B: Why the bypass?
e. A: It’s shorter
f. B: OK.
This dialogue, thoughmade up, containsmany characteristics of conversation,
such as questions (Where do you want to go?, Why the bypass?) and feedback
(OK).
Let us imagine a situation where A is B’s designated driver (or a dialogue
agent in a speech interface for a gps). Thus, we assume that some communica-
tive project aiming at deciding where to go and how to get there is initially on
dialogue participant A’s dgb.We refer to the type of this project asTplan_route and
represent it as a record type, but as in the previous section we will not worry
about exactly what that record type looks like just yet. Let us assume that this
project has caused an update of A’s agenda so that it contains an item speci-
fying the next type of move which A intends to make in the dialogue. We will
refer to thismove type asTask_destination. In (3.15) we see A’s gameboard before any
utterance has been made.
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(3.15) IS 1 (A)
private : agenda = [Task_destination] : list(RecType)
shared :




In (3.16) we see B’s dgb before any utterance has been made. We assume that
B has a similar idea about the communicative project at hand. B’s communica-
tive project is thus of the same type as A’s. Let us also assume that B expects A
to make the first move in the dialogue, for which reason B’s agenda is initially
empty.
(3.16) IS 2 (B)
private : agenda = [] : list(RecType)
shared :




In (3.17)we see A’s information state just after having asked thequestion “where
do you want to go?”, (3.14a). The move type Task_destination is taken off the agenda,
and a corresponding move appears on ‘l-m’. A question, which we refer to as
Twhere_to? is pushed onto ‘qud’.
(3.17) IS 3 (A)
private : agenda = [] : list(RecType)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [Twhere_to?] : list(Question)
l-m : Task_destination
com : RecType
After A’s first utterance B’s information state is also updated similarly to A’s
information state above. After this update, the question on ‘qud’ results in a
move type Treply_go_home to appear on the agenda. In (3.18) we see the type of B’s
information state at this point.
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(3.18) IS 4 (B)
private : agenda = [Treply_go_home] : list(RecType)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [Twhere_to?] : list(Question)
l-m : Task_destination
com : RecType
When B makes the utterance “I want to go home”, (3.14b), Treply_go_home is taken
off the agenda, along with the question on ‘qud’. The field ‘l-m’ is updated with
Treply_go_home, and the commitment that B wants to go home, TB_wants_home is inte-
grated. In (3.19) we see B’s dgb at this stage in the conversation.
(3.19) IS 5 (B)
private : agenda = [] : list(RecType)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
l-m : Treply_go_home
com = TB_wants_home : RecType
3.4.1 Topoi as Resources for Inventing Arguments
Thus far the dialogue proceeds according to the principles we introduced in
the previous question-answer exchange. Now we want a move type with the
content propose route or similar to appear on A’s agenda. If we imagine the sit-
uation being such that there is only one available route which leads “home”,
this exchange would be similar to the previous ask-for-time exchange. How-
ever, as the dialogue in (3.14) is set up, we can assume that there are a number
of possible routes and that the choice made is largely dependent on prefer-
ences.
Since preferences vary between agents and contexts, we may think of the
principle supporting a particular preference not as an absolute rule but as a
topos. Let us say, for instance, that there are three possible routes in the sce-
nario in (3.14). We may refer to them as the bypass, the bridge route and park
lane. The bypass is the shortest route, park lane is the cheapest (since it is not
a toll road), and the bridge route is most scenic. We assume that an individual
engaged in the conversation has access to three topoi that may be drawn on in
arguments regarding which of the three routes to choose, as seen in (3.20):3
3 In classical rhetoric there is usually a division between deliberative rhetoric, that is arguing
forwhat should be done, and forensic rhetoric, where arguments concernwhat has happened
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(3.20) τshorter: “If you choose between routes, choose the shortest one”
τscenic: “If you choose between routes, choose the most scenic one”
τcheap: “If you choose between routes, choose the cheapest one”
A dialogue participant who has access to these three topoi about preferences
for routes, and (unlike the situation in (3.14)) wishes to make the argument
that the bridge route is the preferable route, may thus suggest the bridge route,
provide the premise that it is most scenic, and expect this enthymeme to be
accepted based on the topos τscenic, as seen in (3.21):
(3.21) the bridge route is the most scenic (τscenic)
let’s take the bridge route
3.4.1.1 Private and Shared Topoi
Topoi may thus be drawn upon to invent arguments. The invention of an argu-
ment based on a topos can happen before a suggestion ismade. In the dialogue
in (3.14) this would involve dialogue participant A, perceiving that agent B
wants to go home, evaluating the possible routes and their qualities in rela-
tion to available topoi. A then suggests the route that is most advantageous in
relation to themost salient topos. On this scenario, the topos underpinning the
argument is already clear to the speaker before the suggestion of route ismade,
and the agent may choose to explicitly include a reason for the suggestion, for
example “Let’s take the bridge route, it’s the most scenic”, in her utterance. It
is also possible, of course, that the suggestionmade was selected by chance, or
for a reason the speaker does not want to be known. In such case the reasoning
about salient topoi may come after the suggestion.
In short, it may be the case that the topos on which the argument is based
is the one the speaker believes most persuasive to an interlocutor—not the
topos that the speaker herself finds most convincing. In our present scenario,
for example, if A were to suggest a scenic—but longer—route without jus-
tifying it, B might think that she has no idea what she is talking about and
that she is suggesting a route at random. If she, on the other hand, were to
say -Let’s take the bridge-route—it’s more scenic!, B might accept the proposal
in a particular case Corbett and Connors (1999). In the former of these, the conclusion of the
enthymematic argument is typically an imperative, in the second it is a declarative. The same
topos canbedrawnon to underpin any argument, and themodeof the consequent is amatter
of the enthymeme, not the underpinning topos. However, at this point we will assume that
the consequents of these topoi themselves involve imperatives.
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even if he himself would have preferred the bypass on the grounds of it being
the shortest possible route.
Because of this double use of topoi—on the one hand they influence our
suggestions and givings of reasons, on the other we count on them being
shared in discourse—we introduce private topoi, for producing and evaluating
claims, proposals, suggestions, etc., and shared topoi for keeping track of the
topoi a dialogue participant counts on being jointly accessible in a conversa-
tion.
B’s statement that he wants to go home (3.14b) adds a move type Tpropose_route
to A’s agenda. To know which route to suggest, A must match one of the avail-
able routeswith themost convincing reason for proposing a route. The relevant
topoi in A’s resources tell her that a good reason for proposing a particular route
is that it is faster than other available routes. Her resources make it apparent
that this reason for proposing a route is in fact many times more likely to be
accepted than other possible reasons. For example, she might find a topos say-
ing “if you are choosing between routes, choose the shortest one” (τshorter in
(3.4.1)). Intuitively, we may think of topoi as functions from one situation to
a new type of situation. For example, if we have a situation where a choice is to
be made regarding routes, we can predict a type of situation where we should
choose the shortest one.
Eventually, we will model topoi as functions which return types. For nowwe
will use variables based on the letter τ.We also say for now that the type of topoi
is Topos. Being the most salient topos for A, τshorter is integrated on A’s private
dgb, and she proposes a route accordingly: (3.22) represents A’s information
state just before she utters (3.14c), “Let’s take the bypass”.
(3.22) IS 6 (A)
private :
agenda = [Tpropose_bypass] : list(RecType)
topoi = τshorter : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
topoi : list(Topos)
l-m : Treply_go_home
com = TB_wants_home : RecType
When A has suggested the bypass, B’s gameboard is updated as in (3.23).
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(3.23) IS 7 (B)
private :
agenda = [] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
topoi : list(Topos)
l-m : Tpropose_bypass
com = TB_wants_home : RecType
B does not know anything about the bypass, and thus he does not know which
of the accessible topoi that may be used to evaluate the proposal. He decides
to elicit a reason by asking aWhy?-questionTask_why_bypass, and a question for the
reason to choose the bypass is added to the agenda, asked, and pushed onto
‘qud’. In (3.24) we see B’s IS when he has just asked the question, but it has not
yet been resolved.
(3.24) IS 8 (B)
private :
agenda = [] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [Twhy_bypass?] : list(Question)
topoi : list(Topos)
l-m : Task_why_bypass
com = TB_wants_home : RecType
3.4.2 Introducing the Enthymeme under Discussion
After B has asked A for a reason for choosing the bypass, A has to consider a
reason which would make proposing a route acceptable. In principle, this rea-
son may or may not match the private topos she herself had for proposing the
bypass.However, if we assume that A adheres to themaximof quality, the topos
underpinning the reason she presents in support of her suggestion is identical
to the topos used for inventing it. Drawing on this topos, a move type reply is
added to the agenda.
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(3.25) IS 9 (A)
private :
agenda = [Treply_bp_shorter] : list(RecType)
topoi = [τshorter] : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [Twhy_bypass?] : Question
topoi : list(Topos)
l-m : Task_why_bypass
com = TB_wants_home : RecType
To keep track of the enthymemes which are explicit in or can be construed
from the dialogue, we introduce an enthymeme under discussion (eud) field.
In some ways the concept of eud is parallel to that of qud. However, where
questions tend to be resolved during the course of a dialogue, enthymemes are
rather collected, compared and evaluated. For example, you might accept an
enthymeme in principle, but present another enthymeme which you for some
reason consider more important in the context.
After the utterance It’s shorter (3.14e), the response is taken off A’s agenda
and a corresponding move appears on ‘l-m’. The question is resolved and an
enthymeme stating A’s suggestion and her justification for that suggestion is
pushed on ‘eud’. Also, since A presents the argument “We should choose the
bypass since it is shorter”, she expects a topos underpinning that argument
to be shared after her utterance. Topoi warranting enthymemes in the dia-
logue appear on the ‘shared’ part on the dgb under ‘topoi’. (3.26) represents
A’s information state after she has uttered (3.14e). Note that the field ‘com’ is
also updated. The notation T1 + T2 is used to indicate that the record type rep-
resenting the commitments in the dialogue includes the commitments T1 and
T2.
(3.26) IS 10 (A)
private :
agenda = [] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
eud = [εbypass_shorter → take_bypass] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τshorter] : list(Topos)
l-m : Treply_bp_shorter
com = Tbypass_shorter + TB_wants_home, : RecType
Wenowwant to look at how A’s reply is integrated in B’s gameboard. B happens
to have the same rhetorical resources as A regarding short routes, and he there-
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fore recognises τshorter as underpinning the enthymeme suggesting the bypass,
and this appears in his information state as well. If we assume that B accepts
the suggestion if he accepts the reason for making the suggestion, the plan to
take the bypass is also added to commitments.
(3.27) IS 11 (B)
private :
agenda = [] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)
shared :
project = Tplan_route : RecType
qud = [] : list(Question)
eud = [εbypass_shorter → take_bypass] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τshorter] : list(Topos)
l-m : Tassert_bp_shorter
TB_wants_home +
com = Tbypass_shorter + : RecType
TA_and_B_will_take_bypass
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have sketched an account of dialogue involving enthyme-
matic reasoning. We described the information state update approach to dia-
logue and introduced a basic version of ttr, a rich type theory that conve-
niently let us include contextual features in update rules for dialogue. We
also looked at how subtyping in ttr can be used to account for relations
between concepts and speech situations.We then described the general archi-
tecture of the dgb, and introduced a number of features which enable us
to include enthymemes and topoi in a gameboard analysis of dialogue. We
returned to the idea of accommodation of enthymemes and topoi introduced
in Chapter 2, and presented an informal gameboard analysis of these phenom-
ena.
We showed the progression of the information state update of the partici-
pants in our example dialogues, but not the actual update rules. The purpose
of this is to introduce the idea of information state update in connection to
enthymematic reasoning. In Chapter 4 we will present a more developed for-
mal account including update rules. In Chapter 5 we will return to the issue
of communicative projects and conversational games and provide an account
of how these features contribute to the development of the dialogue and how
they interact with enthymemes and topoi.
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chapter 4
Analysing Enthymematic Dialogue
In the previous chapter we sketched a picture of the role enthymemes and
topoi play for dialogue updates. In this chapter we will move on to consider
how the dgb is updated. In a dialogue model, situations where enthymematic
reasoning occurs are characterised by the sequence of update rules that is
required to bring about the progression of the dialogue. In addition to update
rules, we also assume an update algorithm that controls in which order rules
may be applied. However, we will not go into this in detail, but instead in
the rules define the conditions for when an agent is licensed to apply that
rule.
Wewill look at some examples and analyse them gradually introducing new
concepts anddescribing for eachupdate how the relevant features of the game-
board and the necessary update rules work. This way we hope to make clear
howwe perceive the various features of the gameboard in terms of types, while
elucidating some points regarding the dynamics of enthymemes and topoi in
this kind of interaction.
4.1 Enthymeme Elicited byWhy?
On a rhetorical view of dialogue, the topoi in the resources of an agent may
be drawn on to invent and interpret different kinds of enthymemes. When we
talk about how things are, we sometimes use arguments to back up our claims
or to give sufficient explanations for the state of affairs reported in our asser-
tions.
In (4.1)wehave an example of an interactionwhere an assertion is backedup
with a premise so that the two moves by speaker Amake up an enthymematic
argument. The premise of the enthymeme is elicited by the why-question in
(4.1b). In this way the argumentative structure ismade explicit—Sam is in hos-
pital because he is sick. (4.1) is a slightly altered version of an example from
the British National Corpus discussed and analysed by Schlöder et al. (2016),
who argue that a why-question following an assertion is likely to elicit a rea-
son for the content expressed in the first utterance being the case, rather than a
reason formaking the statement. Inmany contexts, if the relevance of an utter-
ance is not clear, it is more intuitive to ask “why are you saying that?”, “what do
youmean?” or similar, rather than a bare “why?”. However, there are exceptions
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to this, see for example Gregoromichelaki and Kempson (2015). Regardless of
whether a why-question is factive (addresses the facts of a proposition made)
or meta-communicative (addresses an interlocutor’s reason for saying some-
thing), the reply to thewhy-questionmust evoke a recognisable topos. If it does
not, there is nowarrant for the response as a support or explanationof the state-
ment preceding the why-question.
(4.1) a. A: Sam’s in hospital.
b. B: Why?
c. A: He’s sick.
In our analysis of (4.1) we omit several steps that would be necessary if wewere
modelling this dialogue for example for the purpose of implementation. Since
we aremostly concerned with the rhetorical aspects of the dialogue, we ignore
at this point the machinery adding new move types to the agenda and other
updates pertaining to the private field of the dgb.Wewill start at the point just
after A has uttered (4.1a), and the utterance “Sam’s in hospital” is thus already
integrated as the latestmove on the dgb.Wewill refer to the type of the shared
information state when (4.1a) has just been integrated as Tinitial.





x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =




Since an information state potentially involves a wide range of information,
and the types that we manipulate do not necessarily include all of this infor-
mation, types of actual information states such as Tinitial involves at least as
many constraints as the record types we take as our point of departure when
updating the dgb. Thus Tinitial is a subtype of the record type to the right in
(4.3). It is underspecified in terms of the fields present, for example, it lacks all
private features of the dgb. Also, the previous move made in the interaction
is not specified in terms of the content of that move, and the ‘qud’-field does
not provide any information about any questions already under discussion in
the dialogue. We will use a dot notation to refer to paths in record types. For
example, if s : Tinitial, we can refer to “Sam” in (4.3) using the notation ‘s.sh.l-
m.e.ctnt.x’.
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In (4.2) the label ‘sh’ (for ‘shared’) is associated with a record type including
the labels ‘l-m’, representing the latest moves, and ‘qud’, representing questions
under discussion. (For reasons of space we will replace the label ‘shared’ with
‘sh’ and ‘private’ with ‘pr’ where necessary.)
Since we do not know anything about the conversation prior to this excerpt,
we are, at this initial state, agnostic about any previous moves. We say that the
label ‘qud’ is associated with the type “list of questions”, and the label ‘l-m’ with
a record type with the fields ‘prev’ and ‘e’, where ‘prev’ contains information
about previous moves. How many previous moves should be included on the
dgb, that is, how many turns are in fact accessible to a dialogue participant
is an empirical question. However, for the short dialogues we are considering
here there is no need to limit the number of previous moves. In each type rep-
resenting an information state, ‘shared.l-m.e’ contains information about the
very latest move made.
4.1.1 IntegrateWhy?
Our first update rule thus concerns the update of B’s information state where
a why-question is pushed onto ‘qud’ given the assertion “Sam’s in hospital” in
(4.1a).
Now B may choose to move on in the conversation accepting that Sam is
in hospital or to address A’s assertion for example by questioning it or by
asking a follow up question. Let us assume now that B intends to make a
factive why-question investigating the reason for Sam being in hospital (the
reasoning behind this intention we will leave aside for the time being). Fol-
lowing Schlöder et al. (2016), we will think of why-question as requests for rea-
sons.
On a rhetorical view, an acceptable reason for Sam being in hospital would
be one warranted by a recognisable topos. This is the case even if the why-
question is notmeant to inquire into the validity of the claim, but rather to find
out the reason for Sam being in hospital. If the reply to the question would be
something like “He is such a nice guy”, wemay speculate that the answer would
not be accepted. The reason for this is that there is probably no topos readily
available to any of the participants in this dialogue to be recognised as under-
pinning for the enthymeme “Sam is in hospital because he is such a nice guy”.
However, we could imagine contexts where the utterance would make perfect
sense; theremight be a story about Sam having intervened in a fight, since he is
a nice guy, and therefore ended up having to undergo hospital treatment. How-
ever, on this scenario, the reply to the first questionwould probably be followed
up by yet another question inquiring into why Sam being a nice guy is a reason
for his being in hospital.
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It is important to emphasise that it is certainly not possible for a linguis-
tic theory to predict which topoi are acknowledged or acceptable within a
community or to a specific individual. However, it is possible to predict how
reasoning in a particular situation may play out given the agents’ access to a
particular set of topoi.
In more technical terms, an enthymeme can be regarded as a function
from a record of a particular type (corresponding to the antecedent of the
enthymeme, in this case “Sam is sick”) to a type corresponding to the conse-
quent of the enthymeme, in this case “Sam is in hospital”. A why-question is
obtained by abstracting over Tantecedent yielding a function from an antecedent
type to an enthymeme.We see such a function in (4.3).
(4.3) λt : Type ⋅ λr : t ⋅ Tconsequent
When provided with an answer to the question, we may apply this function to
a type Tantecedent (corresponding to the answer to the why-question):
(4.4) λt : Type ⋅ λr : t ⋅ Tconsequent (Tantecedent) = λr : Tantecedent ⋅ Tconsequent
At the point in the dialogue when B has uttered the why-question, we need
an update function which allows A to integrate the question on her dgb. This
includes interpreting the question, that is, forming a hypothesis of what aspect
of theprevious utterance the “why?” relates to.This functionmust take an infor-
mation state which, like (4.2), meets the requirement of having an assertion on
‘shared.l-m.e’, andupdate it so that theupdated latestmove is thewhy-question,








e : assert(x, y, ctnt)
x = A : Ind








e : ask(x, y, ctnt)
x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
qud = [(λt : Type ⋅ λr′ : t ⋅ r.sh.l-m.e.ctnt) | r.sh.qud] : list(Question)
In (4.5) we see the function fwhy_assert. It can be applied to an information state
of the type where the very latest move, ‘sh.l-m.e’, is associated with a move of a
type where an individual A asserts something to an individual B.
In the result type of the function the label ‘l-m’ is associated with a type
where the move type that was on ‘l-m.e’ in the previous information state is
now on ‘lm.prev’, and the label ‘e’ is associated with a why-question regarding
the content of the previous move.
In (4.5) we also observe some list operators, namely ‘|’ and ‘fst’, which is a
function from a list to the first element of that list. Thus ‘fst(sh.qud)’ represents
the first element on the list of questions on ‘sh.qud’. The “pipe” (or “cons”) oper-
ator, ‘|’, takes an element and a list and puts that element first in the list.
fwhy_assert can be applied to a record of the type in (4.2). However, the result
of this operation includes the relevant updates brought about by the function
application, but not any information about other dialogue features that might
be present in the original information state (in this case of type Tinitial). For
example, Tinitial could include information about previous moves, other ques-
tions that have not yet been resolved, commitments, etc. In order to incorpo-
rate the new information with the old we need to asymmetrically merge Tinitial
and the type obtained through the application of fwhy_assert to an information
state of type Tinitial.
4.1.1.1 Asymmetric Merge
As explained above, in order to obtain the type of the updated information
state, the result of applying an update rule will have to be combined with the
type of the initial information state. Cooper (2016) refers to this operation as
asymmetric merge. For types which are not record types, for example ptypes,
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the asymmetric merge of two types T1 .∧ T2 results in T2. This means that for
record types, any label that occurs in both T1 and T2 will after an asymmetric
merge be associated with the type which that label is associated with in T2.
Labels which occur only in one of the record types will be associated with the
same type in T1 .∧ T2 as in one of the original types T1 or T2. If we look at
our example, the type we get when we apply the function fwhy_assert to the ini-
tial information state, sinital, is a type T ′, which has the same fields as the result
(range) type of the function fwhy_assert. However, this type is not necessarily the
typeof theupdated information state since the typeof sinitialmayhavehadmore
information in it.
To obtain the type of our updated information state, we must combine the
type of the information state at the start of the update, Tinitial, and the result
type of the function application,T ′, so that everything that is on the gameboard
before the update carries over to the new information state. In (4.6) we see the
asymmetricmerge of Tinitial andT ′, resulting in the type of A’s information state
after the application of rule fwhy_assert to sinitial (where sinitial.sh.qud=rest), that is,







x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =










e : assert(x, y, ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =




e : ask(x, y, ctnt)
x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
qud = [λt:Type ⋅ λr′: t ⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)







e : assert(x, y, ctnt)
x = A : Ind
x = B : Ind
ctnt =




e : ask(x, y, ctnt)
x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
qud = [λt : Type ⋅ λr′ : t ⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
| rest] : list(Question)
4.1.2 Integrate EnthymemeWhy?
After having interpreted B’s utterance “why?” in (4.1b), in order to reply, Amust
decide what kind of answer to give. For now we will not discuss the reason-
ing behind this answer, and skip straight to the point where B is interpreting
and evaluating it. We will do this in steps starting at a point when A’s reply in
(4.1c) is integrated on ‘l-m.e’ on the dgb. Since the rhetorical structure of the
reply in relation to the initial assertion is made explicit by the why-question,
an enthymeme under discussion is also integrated on the shared dgb. B then
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checks his resources for a topos warranting the enthymeme, and accommo-
dates this topos. We will discuss accommodation of topoi further in section
4.2.5.
Let us now consider the type of B’s information state just after A has uttered
(4.1c), as seen in (4.7). Let us call this type T3.







x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =





x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
e :
e : assert(x,y,ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =
x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
: RecType
qud = [λt:Type ⋅ λr:t ⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
| rest] : list(Question)
Now, as we discussed in the context of (4.4), an enthymeme elicited by a why-
question can be considered as the result of applying the question to its answer.
In this case the enthymeme under discussion is the why-question applied to
the assertion “Sam is sick”, as seen in (4.8).
(4.8) λt : Type ⋅ λr:t ⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
( x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
) =
λr: x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
A function for integrating an enthymeme after a factive why-question takes an
information state where the third-to-latest move (‘sh.l-m.prev.prev’) and the
latest move (‘sh.l-m.prev’) are assertions, and the question under discussion is
a why-question, and returns a type of state where there is an enthymeme on










x = A : Ind




x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
e :
e : assert(x,y,ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt : RecType
qud = [λt : Type ⋅ λr′ : t ⋅ l-m.prev.prev.e.ctnt] : list(Question)
⋅
sh : eud = [r.sh.qud(r.sh.l-m.e.ctnt)] : list(Enthymeme)
Wewill now consider the result of applying fintegrate_enthymeme_why to a record s3 of
type T3 (shown in 4.10).
(4.10) fintegrate_enthymeme_why(s3) =
sh : eud = [ λr:
x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
] : list(Enthymeme)
In (4.11) we see the type of B’s information state after the application of
fintegrate_enthymeme_why and an asymmetric merge with T3.








x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =





x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
e :
e : assert(x, y, ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =
x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
: RecType




x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
] : list(Enthymeme)
4.2 Coordinating on Topoi
In the previous section (4.1), we have looked at how an enthymeme under
discussion is integrated on the dialogue gameboard as the result of a Why-
question. In this section, we will look at various ways in which dialogue par-
ticipants can coordinate on the topoi underpinning enthymemes in dialogue.
4.2.1 Integrating Topos
Let us return to our example (repeated here for convenience).
(4.12) a. A: Sam’s in hospital.
b. B: Why?
c. A: He’s sick.
The enthymeme “Sam is in the hospital since he is sick” is now part of B’s infor-
mation state, meaning that he has interpreted (4.12c) as given by A as a reason
for the content of utterance (4.12a). There are (at least) two goals associated
with the utterance (4.12c): First, A wants B to recognise the reason given as
somethingwhich is relevant in relation to (4.12a). Second, shewants B to accept
66 chapter 4
it as an explanation or support of the assertion (4.12a). For the first goal to be
achieved, B must have access to a topos warranting the enthymeme. In other
words: The interpretation of an enthymeme by an agent is much facilitated if
the agent has access to a warranting principle which is more generally appli-
cable than the enthymeme conveyed in the discourse. Consider the following
example:
(4.13) a. A: I am hungry.
b. B: Have a piece of fruit!
The type of situation where the speaker is hungry is a subtype of a type of sit-
uation where someone is hungry. Also, a situation where the speaker is having
a piece of fruit is a subtype of a type of situation where someone eats some-
thing. Thus, a topos that provides a warrant for the dialogue in (4.13) could be
somethig like “if you are hungry, you should eat something”.
Likewise, the enthymeme “Sam is sick, therefore he is in hospital” is under-
pinned by a topos associating being sick with being in or going to hospital. In
(4.14a) we see the enthymeme “Since Sam is sick, he is in hospital”. In (4.14b)we
see the topos drawn on to interpret the enthymeme (“Ìf someone is sick, they
are in hospital”).
(4.14) a. λr: x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ ch : in_hospital(r.x)
b. λr: x : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ ch : in_hospital(r.x)
A key idea in our theory is that enthymemes conveyed in discourse are often
specifications of more generally applicable topoi. For example, the utterance
“Kitty likes milk, she is a cat” conveys the enthymeme “Kitty is a cat, therefore
she likes milk”. This enthymeme is a specification of a topos saying that if x
is a cat, then x likes milk. In this case the specification amounts to the topos
being restricted to concern just the individual Kitty, but a specification could
also involve adding constraints to the type of situation towhich an enthymeme
or a topos applies, the antecedent- or domain type of the function.
In the formal account, the notion of specification is linked to subtyping (see
Section 3.2.2). The requirements for an enthymeme ε to be a specification of a
topos τ, is that the antecedent type of ε must be a subtype of the antecedent
type of τ, and the result of applying ε to any record (representing, for exam-
ple, a situation) must be a subtype of the result of applying τ to the same
record.
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(4.15) Assuming topos τ = λr:T1 ⋅ T2 and enthymeme ε = λr:T3 ⋅ T4, ε is a spec-
ification of τ, i.e., specification(ε,τ) is witnessed, iff T3 ⊑ T1 and for any
r, ε(r) ⊑ τ(r).
It should be emphasised that the perceived relation between enthymemes and
topoi is relative to the agents involved in dialogue—dialogue participants can
disagree about whether a given enthymeme is a specification of a particular
topos. For an enthymematic dialogue contribution to be interpreted correctly,
it is important that the enthymeme is recognisable as a specification of a topos
for that topos to be evoked in the discourse. From a rhetorical point of view, to
maximise persuasion, the toposmust also be acceptable to the audience in the
context where it is being evoked.
When interpreting an enthymeme, an agent compares the topos they have
on private on the dgb to the enthymeme. If the agent recognises the enthy-
meme as a specification of the private topos, the topos is loaded onto the
shared dgb as the topos believed by the interpreting agent to underpin the
enthymeme. In (4.16), we see the update rule fintegrate_topos. When applied to an
information state including both a private topos and an enthymemewhich is a
specification of that topos,1 it returns a type where the private topos has been
integrated in the shared dgb.
(4.16) fintegrate_topos =
λr:







c1 : in(t, r.private.topoi)
c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)
Wewill call the type of B’s information state before the update of shared topos
T4.
(4.17) T4 ⊑ pr : topoi = [λr: x : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ ch : in_hospital(r.x) ] : list(Topos)
1 We use abstraction over e to introduce conditions on information states whose witnesses are
not part of the information state proper.
68 chapter 4
The shared part of T4 is identical to that in (4.11). To update ‘shared topos’,
we apply fintegrate_topos to an information state s4 of type T4, and a record that
witnesses that the first enthymeme in ‘shared.eud’ is a specification of a topos
in ‘private.topoi’, resulting in a type T5 shown in (4.18).
(4.18) T5 = sh : topoi = [λr: x : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ ch : in_hospital(r.x) ] : list(Topos)
After having asymmetrically merged T4 with T5 we get the type of the updated
information state, seen in (4.19).
(4.19)
pr : topoi = [ λr:
x : Ind
cs : sick(x)








x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =





x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
e :
e : assert(x,y,ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt =
x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
: RecType




x = Sam : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ x = Sam : Ind
ch : in_hospital(x)
: list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [ λr:
x : Ind
cs : sick(x)
⋅ ch : in_hospital(r.x) ] : list(Topos)
4.2.1.1 Understanding and Accepting Arguments
The update rule just presented, fintegrate_topos, represents the process of an agent
recognising a topos and assuming that it is indeed this topos on which the
speaker is basing her argument. It should be emphasised that this does not
necessarilymean that the agent agrees with or accepts the assertionmade (the
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conclusion of the argument), butmerely that she recognises it as underpinning
the enthymeme.
There is a difference between interpreting an enthymeme in a coherent way
and agreeing to the claim or propositionmade, as illustrated by the example in
(4.20):
(4.20) a. Child: Can I go swimming?
b. Father: No, we just had lunch.
c. Child: But dad, swimming after meals is actually not harmful!
The child in the previous example accommodates a topos presumably under-
pinning the father’s argument, namely the notion that it is dangerous to swim
after meals (which research has shown to be false). In order to correctly inter-
pret the enthymeme the child must be familiar with this notion. However,
this does not mean that she agrees with it. The two levels of interpretation of
enthymemes we will focus on here are understanding and acceptance. By the
former we mean that the agent in question has access to a relevant topos, by
the latter that the interlocutor accepts the enthymeme and tentatively accom-
modates a topos based on the enthymeme. However, none of these actually
mean that the interpreting agent agrees with the conclusion or that she agrees
that the topos holds and is relevant in the context. Still, as is the case with
presupposition accommodation, if the dialogue continues after the accom-
modation of a topos without any questioning from the interlocutor, we can
only assume that the interlocutor agrees, at least for the time being. Obvi-
ously, issues, questions, enthymemes and topoi may be raised and reraised
at any time. Those points in discourse where reraising occurs are often inter-
esting, as topoi are often made explicit in such contexts. This also gives the
interlocutors an opportunity to coordinate to make sure that they draw on
the same topos when interpreting an enthymeme. In the next section we
will look further at what happens when interlocutors draw on different topoi
to underpin enthymemes in the discourse, and how they resolve such situa-
tions.
4.2.2 Topoi fromUnderspecified Enthymemes
In the previous section we considered how a why-question can be seen as
eliciting an enthymeme. If this enthymeme matches a topos available to and
accepted by the agent posing the question, chances are that he or she will
be satisfied with the reply. Arguably, the assumption in such cases is that the
underpinning of the argument, the topos, is similar in the information states
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of the conversational participants. However, it is also possible that two agents
involved in dialogue accommodate different topoi which both satisfy the crite-
ria for underpinning a particular enthymeme. This kind of mismatch of topoi
may go unnoticed in cases where consensus is reached. After all, if interlocu-
tors agree, there is often no reason to argue about the rationale for agree-
ing.
In this section, we will look at a dialogue example where it is made explicit
that the speaker and the listener interpret an enthymeme drawing on different
topoi. This snippet of dialogue is taken from a radio program where discus-
sion alternates with music. The interviewee is Swedish hip hop artist Petter,
and much of the dialogue relates to the songs being played in the music sec-
tions. Just before the dialogue in (4.21) a tune by ametal band has been played.
Petter is being asked for his opinion of the song.
(4.21) a. P: Metal was actually the reason I started doing hip hop
b. P: … because I hated metal
c. J: Oh, I thought you were going to say something completely differ-
ent!
This example is interesting since it provides evidence that dialogue partici-
pant J reasons incrementally about the enthymeme P is producing. In fact, P’s
utterance canbe seen as an incomplete enthymeme—there is something about
metal that made Petter start doing hip hop.We think of this as the antecedent
type of the enthymeme being underspecified. Intuitively, this means that there
is no readily available topos warranting this enthymeme.2 We can think of
the utterance in (4.21a) as describing a situation where the music genre metal
occurs, leading to a situation where the speaker starts practicing music of the
hip hop genre. Thus, the enthymeme is a function of the type seen in (4.22).We
refer to this enthymeme as εreason.
(4.22) εreason = λr:
T = Music : Type
x = metal : T
z = Petter : Ind
c1 : relevant(T)
⋅ y = hiphop : r.T
c2 : do(r.z, y)
2 As pointed out previously regarding the relation between enthymeme and topos, underspec-
ification is context relative. It is not inconceivable that therewould be a toposwarranting this
enthymeme in a particular context.
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There might be several topoi accessible to J which could be drawn on to
underpin the enthymeme in (4.22). Judging from J ’s utterance she is surprised
by P’s assertion that he hatedmetal.We cannot say exactly in which way Petter
hatingmetal is “completely different” fromwhat J expected. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that she expectedmetal being the reason for P starting to
“do” hiphop being due to some positive quality of metal or some positive rela-
tion between him andmetal. Thus, a possible topos could be one saying that if
two things are of the same type, and something positive is associated with one
of them, that thing may cause someone to “do” the other thing. From a logical
point of view this principle is, of course, shaky at best. However, it still seems to
be fairly productive in everyday argumentation. Think of examples like “Karate
got me interested in Kung Fu”, etc. We see a formalisation of this topos, τsimilar
in (4.23).





c2 : like(z, x)
⋅ y : r.T
c3 : do(r.z, y)
In the previous sectionwe introduced the rule integrate topos, (4.16), for adding
topoi to the shared field of the dgb. According to this update rule, a particular
enthymeme justifies the loading of a topos onto the dgb if the enthymeme is
a specification of the topos. We defined that as meeting two conditions. First,
the domain- or antecedent part of the enthymeme must be a subtype of (i.e.,
more specific or identical to) the corresponding part of the topos. Secondly, the
result of applying the enthymeme to a record r must be a subtype of the result
of applying the topos to the same record.
If we compare τsimilar and εreason, we see that the domain type of εreason is not a
subtype of the domain type of τsimilar, since it lacks the constraint c2: like(z, x).
The first requirement for applying the update function fintegrate_topos (see (4.16))
is thus not met.
However, since dialogue participants sometimes do accommodate topoi
based on underspecified enthymemes, we want to be able to model how topoi
maybe integratedbasedon less strict requirements. In order todo thiswe intro-
duce an additional update rule fintegrate_topos′. This rule says thatwemay integrate
a topos on the shared gameboard if the application of the first enthymeme on
the list of enthymemes under discussion (wemay call thismax-eud, parallel to
Ginzburg’s (2012) terminology for qud) to any r, is a subtype of the application
of the topos to r, and there is no accessible topos where the rule fintegrate_topos
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applies. In other words: if there is no accessible topos that is a more general
version of the enthymeme, look for a topos of which the enthymeme is a more
general version.We talk about this kindof enthymemeasunderspecified in rela-
tion to the topos. In (4.24) is a more precise definition of the concept of an
underspecified enthymeme.
(4.24) Assuming topos τ = λr:T1 ⋅T2 andenthymeme ε= λr:T3 ⋅T4, ε is anunder-
specification of τ, i.e., underspecification(ε,τ) is witnessed, iff T1 ⊏ T3
and for any r, ε(r) ⊑ τ(r).
Since the domain type of εreason includesmanifest fields which are notmanifest
in the domain type of τsimilar, εreason is not underspecified with regard to τsimilar.
However, we are always allowed to generalise enthymemes by removing the
values of manifest fields (making manifest fields non-manifest) in the domain
type. We may also remove entire fields of the domain type as long as nothing
in the result type depends on the removed field.
If we generalise εreason by removing the values of x and z, we obtain the
enthymeme in (4.25):





⋅ y = hiphop : r.T
c2 : do(r.z, y)
We may now finally apply the rule for integrating topoi on the shared dgb
based on an underspecified enthymeme— fintegrate_topos′.
(4.26) fintegrate_topos′ =
λr:







c1 : in(t, r.private.topoi)
c2 : underspec.(fst(r.shared.eud), t))
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.private.topoi] : list(Topos)
τsimilar is on J ’s private gameboard at the start of the operation to integrate it on
her shared gameboard. For now, let us not care about exactly how this topos
got selected to the private gameboard, let us just assume that the private game-
board holds a depository of topoi that the speaker finds salient in the context.
analysing enthymematic dialogue 73
Furthermore,we assume thatwehave s1 representing J ’s information state, and
e1 imposing conditions as in (4.27):
(4.27) a. s1 :
pr : topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos)
sh :
eud = [ εmetal_reason] : list(Enthymeme)












c5 : reason(z, c4, x)
b. e1 :
t = τsimilar : Topos
c1 : in(t,[τsimilar])
c2 : underspec.(εmetal_reason, t))
(4.28) fintegrate_topos′(s1)(e1) =
λr:






c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : underspec.(fst(r.sh.eud), t))
⋅
sh : topoi = [ e.t | r.private.topoi] : list(Topos) (r1)(e1) =
sh : topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos)
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To obtain the type of the updated information state for J, we do an asym-
metric merge of the type of r1 and the result type, as seen in (4.29).
(4.29)
pr : topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos)
sh :
eud = [ εmetal_reason] : list(Enthymeme)












c5 : reason(z, c4, x)
.∧
sh : topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos) =
pr : topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos)
sh :
eud = [ εmetal_reason] : list(Enthymeme)












c5 : reason(z, c4, x)
This update of J ’s information state reflects that she is reasoning incrementally,
and has a preconception about P’s reasoning based onwhat he has said this far.
In situationswhere dialogue participants know each other verywell and/or the
context allows it, participants may well infer topoi based on underspecified
enthymemes, which turn out to be exactly the ones intended by the speaker.
Furthermore the possibility of asking follow-up questions and other types of
feedback make it efficient to reason based on underspecified enthymemes in
situations where the stakes are not too high.
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To summarise this section so far, we may say that when trying to interpret
an enthymeme, a dialogue participant first tries to access a topos that serves
as underpinning for the enthymeme. Most obviously this means a topos which
is a bit more general than the enthymeme. However, if no such topos is acces-
sible to the dialogue participant, he may tentatively integrate another topos
accessible on his private gameboard, if this topos is similar to—but actually
more specific than—the enthymeme under discussion since the antecedent
part involves more constraints.
4.2.3 Re-raising Topoi
When we engage in conversation we normally try to interpret underspecified
or implicit content drawing on information already introduced on the shared
dgb. This is the case with for example resolution of anaphora. Thus we would
want an algorithm for applying update rulesmeant to pick out a topos to under-
pin the enthymeme currently under discussion, to first apply the rule freraise_topos
which looks for a suitable topos which is already part of common ground, that
is already present on the dgb, and not until that fails, apply the rules described
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 which look into the conversational participant’s pri-
vate depository of salient topoi.
The rule in (4.30) says that if the information state has a topos on ‘shared.to-
poi’ supporting themax-eud (themost recently conveyed enthymeme), we are
licensed to update that information state so that the topos in question ismoved
to the top of the list of topoi.
In (4.30), we use a function μ. If b is a list and a ∈ b, the function μ applied to
b, μ(a, b), moves a to the top of list b regardless of what position a has had pre-
viously. The use of ordered lists for topoi present on the shared dgb captures
some aspects of salience. When a new topos is added it is always placed at the
top of the list. This entails that the list of topoi is connected to the chrono-
logical order in which the topoi were added to the discourse model. However,
this order may change if a topos which is already integrated on shared topoi is
reraised in the conversation.
(4.30) freraise_topos =





c1 : in(t, r.shared.topoi)
c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = μ(e.t, r.sh.topoi) : list(Topos)
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4.2.4 Re-evaluating Topoi
In everyday conversational settings we tend to make inferences without hav-
ing, in a logical sense, adequate evidence. For this reason dialogue participants
sometimes need to reevaluate the principles onwhich they base their interpre-
tations of enthymemes.
As we move on to the final part of Petter’s utterance, (4.21b), we are faced
with precisely this problem—the enthymeme which is now first on the list
of enthymemes under discussion does not match the topos first on the list of
shared topoi. The reason for this is that when integrating (4.21a), J integrates
the enthymeme εreason in (4.31a), and accommodates a topos underpinning this
enthymeme, τsimilar.When encountering (4.21b), J learns that in fact P had a dif-
ferent enthymeme in mind, εreason’ in (4.31b). The intuition here is that the new
enthymeme requires a new topos to be added to the dgb.
(4.31) a. εreason = λr:
T = music : Type
x = metal : T
z = Petter : Ind
c1 : relevant(T)
⋅ y = hiphop : r.T
c2 : do(r.z, y)
b. εreason’ = λr:
T : Type
x = metal : T
c1 : relevant(T)
z = Petter : Ind
chate : hate(z, x)
⋅ y = hiphop : r.T
c2 : do(r.z, y)
The only difference between the two enthymemes is that the antecedent type
of εreason’ includes one constraint, chate, which is not present in εreason. εreason’ is
thus a specification of εreason.
In 4.2.2 we discussed what it means for an enthymeme to be a specification
of a topos andwhat itmeans for an enthymeme tobe underspecified in relation
to a topos. There are situations—such as the present one of J trying to make
sense of P’s utterance—where the enthymeme seems to be incompatible with
the topos at the top of the list of ‘sh.topos’ (max-topos). Here the enthymeme
εreason’ says that since P hated metal, he started doing hip hop, and the topos
τsimilar says that if someone likes something that personmight also get involved
in other, similar, activities. The antecedents of εreason’ and τsimilar include con-
cepts that wewould probably want tomodel asmutually exclusive, namely like
and hate. The formula in (4.32) is our version of ameaning postulate, and reads
“T1 precludes T2”, that is there is no situation which is both of type T1 and of
type T2.
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(4.32) If x : Ind
c : hate(x)
= T1 and x : Ind
c : like(x)
= T2 then T1 ⊥ T2
The only topos on the list of shared topoi at the point where J has just inte-
grated εreason’ is such that the max-eud cannot be a specification of it, nor can
the topos be a specification of the max-eud, since ε_reason’ ⊥ τsimilar. Thus the
conditions for applying freraise_topos are not fulfilled. So,wemoveon to once again
applying rule fintegrate_topos. A topos that would work here would be one captur-
ing the notion of “the lesser of two evils”, τl_t_e. The idea of this topos is that if, in
a particular context or situation, you have two things to choose from and one
is bad, you pick the other one.






c2 : hate(z, y)
⋅ e : start_doing(r.z, r.x)
We assume thus, that J ’s information state when she has integrated εreason’ is of
the type in (4.34).
(4.34) TJ ⊏
private : topoi = [τl_t_e] : list(Topos)
shared :
eud = [εreason′, εreason] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τsimilar] : list(Topos)
Since the application of update rule freraise_topos fails in this situation, we move
on to apply fintegrate_topos to the information state sJ of type TJ.
(4.35) fintegrate_topos(sJ) =
shared :
eud = [εreason′, εreason] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τl_t_e, τsimilar] : list(Topos)
4.2.5 Accommodating Resource Topoi
In his classic paper Scorekeeping in a language game, Lewis (1979) argues that
if you “say something that requires a missing presupposition, that presupposi-
tion will straight away spring into existence”. Lewis refers to this phenomenon
as accommodation (See also Karttunen, 1974 and Stalnaker, 1974).
When a speaker makes an utterance like that in (4.36), the claim—that the
rollersmust be carefully lookedafter since they are of muchhigher quality com-
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pared to the kind that is normally used—presupposes a topos warranting high
quality as a reason for the rollers being well looked after. This topos could be
something along the lines of “if something is valuable, it should be well looked
after”. The topos must, if we accept the enthymeme conveyed, be integrated
on the shared dgb. We may refer to this integration as a kind of accommoda-
tion.
(4.36) A: I’m going to take a, a roller ⟨pause⟩ these are very expensive, very
classy rollers.
A: ⟨cough⟩ Much higher quality than the bioprinting [sic] rollers that
we may be used to using.
A: And therefore they must be carefully looked after.
(BNC: F77 341–343)
However, in the case of presuppositions, it is clear from the triggering sentence
exactly what is presupposed. In the case of an accommodated topos, it is clear
only that some topos is drawn on to warrant the enthymeme in the discourse.
Above, we have considered two ways of updating shared topoi on the dgb—
fintegrate_topos (4.16) and fintegrate_topos′ (4.26), which move a topos from an agent’s
private dgb and integrate it on the shared dgb—and freraise_topos which finds
an appropriate topos on the shared dgb and moves it to the front of the list of
shared topoi.
In addition to the types of accommodation mentioned, there are other pos-
sible types of topos accommodation. First, adding a topos to the shared dgb
which is not part of the depository of private salient topoi (corresponding to
the list on ‘private.topoi’) but must be retrieved from long term memory (we
refer to this depository as the agent’s rhetorical resources). Another type of
accommodation is when a conversational participant does not have access to
a topos which matches the enthymeme currently under discussion, and tenta-
tively construes one based on the enthymeme under discussion.
In a situation such as (4.36), if a dialogue participant is not aware of the prin-
ciple “costly/high quality things should be taken care of”, he might integrate a
topos such as “if a roller is expensive it should be taken care of” or, more gen-
erally, “if an artefact is expensive it should be taken care of”. This topos may
then be tentatively added to the resources of the individual, and eventually—
if reinforced in further interaction—be considered a reliable topos.
The first of these scenarios, where a topos is available in the long term
memory of the dialogue participant (shown in (4.37)), we refer to as
fintegrate_resource_topos.
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(4.37) fintegrate_resource_topos =
λr:








c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)
We also need a rule to account for cases where the enthymeme is underspeci-
fied. We see such a rule in (4.38).
(4.38) fintegrate_resource_topos′ =
λr:








c2 : underspecification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)
In all of the cases above we would say that accommodation occurs, if we take
accommodation to mean integration of a pragmatic inference on the shared
dgb. However, in the scenario above, where a dialogue participant tentatively
adds a topos to the gameboard based on the enthymeme under discussion, we
not only accommodate a topos, we also add something to our resources that
was not there before. This kind of topos accommodation will be discussed fur-
ther in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.3 Summary
In this chapterwe first lookedat an examplewhere the enthymematic structure
ismade explicit by awhy-question.We considered howwhy-questions relate to
enthymemes and how answers to questions can be evaluated based on how the
enthymemes conveyed relate to accessible topoi.
We also considered an example where dialogue participants interpret the
same enthymemedrawing on different topoi. To accommodate this type of dia-
logue event we extended our set of rules. We also had to make adjustments to
the order in which rules are applied, i.e. the update algorithm.
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One reason that dialogues can develop in the way described above is that
speakers use enthymemes which are underspecified in relation to the topos
drawn on. In our case the first enthymeme is underspecified in relation to the
topos based on which J interprets it, as well as in relation to the topos that P
seems to have in mind. It may well be argued that there is a preference for the
first interpretation, and P is thus being deliberately misleading in first present-
ing an underspecified enthymeme. Note that we have defined underspecified
enthymemes, but which topoi that may be conceived of as appropriate under-
pinning for any particular enthymeme is an empirical question. It is possible
that an enthymemewhich is underspecified according to our definition, would
easily convey the intended enthymeme in a particular context, and vice versa.
We have focused on the issue of underspecified enthymemes and how they
can still be used to accommodate particular topoi. However, in the discus-
sion of evaluation of topoi in relation to the enthymeme under discussion,
we made some simplifying assumptions. For example, we might want to intro-
duce rules that remove enthymemeswhich include premises which are incom-
patible with more recently added enthymemes. Some of these issues will be
addressed in the next two chapters.
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chapter 5
Participating in Enthymematic Dialogue
Thus far we have focused on how a theory of enthymemes and topoi con-
tributes to semantic and pragmatic interpretation of dialogue. In this chapter
we will focus more on how agents engaged in conversation produce dialogue
contributions drawing on topoi which they themselves have access to, as well
as other dialogue participants’ capacity to identify enthymemes and underpin-
ning topoi. First, we will consider the link between enthymemes and cognitive
load. We will discuss the notion of redundancy in dialogue in the context of
Walker’s (1996) research on so called information redundant utterances (irus),
and how we perceive these utterances as serving to add new information to a
discourse situation by pointing to specific topoi.
We will discuss how enthymematic arguments are embedded in conver-
sational games associated with speech act types such as assertion, sugges-
tion, request, etc. We will also consider how we can model the invention of
enthymematic arguments, as well as how an enthymematic relation may be
accommodated based on accessible topoi.
5.1 Enthymemes and Cognitive Load
5.1.1 Information Redundancy in Dialogue
A significant feature of natural language—particularly dialogue—is econ-
omy. This has been noted by many scholars in the fields of pragmatics and
discourse studies, and given rise to some of the well known and generally
accepted theories previously discussed in this book. Walker (1996) mentions
the second part of Grice’s (1975) maxim of quantity, as an example of a gen-
erally assumed redundancy constraint, that is, the notion that commu-
nicative contributions should not be redundant with regard to informational
content.
This maxim, “do not make your contribution more informative than re-
quired”, has oftenbeen interpreted as “make your contribution as short as possi-
ble”, resulting in all utterances whose content may be deduced from context or
retrieved frommemory being considered irus.Walker (1996) argues that irus
are often not redundant at all (thus actually adhering to themaxim of quantity
rather than violating it). Rather, irus serve to help lower the cognitive load of
an interlocutor interpreting a dialogue contribution. For example, in (5.1), the
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second part of the utterance is informationally redundant in the sense that the
other dialogue participant is likely to be aware of who is president.
(5.1) A: Clinton has to take a stand on abortion rights for poor women.
A: HE’S THE PRESIDENT (Walker, 1996, p. 188)
The second part of the utterance above provides the non-redundant informa-
tion that the fact that Clinton is president is the reason the speaker thinks that
he has to take a stand on abortion rights for poor women. As we will demon-
strate, many of the utterances that Walker refers to convey enthymemes and
are underpinned by topoi.
According toWalker the principle of avoiding redundancy, which has often
taken precedence in work on dialoguemodelling and overshadowed other fac-
tors affecting communicative choice, is based on four assumptions about dia-
logue:
(5.2) a. Unlimited working-memory: everything an agent knows is always
available for reasoning;
b. Logical omniscience: agents are capable of applying all inference
rules, so any entailment will be added to the discourse model;
c. Fewest utterances: utterance production is the only process that
should be minimised;
d. No autonomy: assertions and proposals by agent A are accepted by
default by agent B.
Walker presents corpus data inwhich agents frequently violate the redundancy
constraint, indicating that the fewest utterances assumption is not correct—
sometimes other aspects of communication are more important than econ-
omy.
Walker’s analysis leads her to formulate three main functions of irus:
(5.3) a. To provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understand-
ing and acceptance.
b. To manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants
by making a proposition salient.
c. To augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences
are licensed.
Walker also discusses experiments, which were designed according to the
results of the corpus study. These experiments show that irus do indeed con-
tribute to mitigating the effect of an agent’s resource limits.
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Let us now take a look at one of Walker’s examples of an iru.1 The context
of this excerpt is two colleagues walking to work. They are both familiar with
the surroundings and the routes available.
(5.4) a. A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street
b. A: It’s shorter (Walker, 1996, p. 188)
It is known to A that B knows that Walnut Street is shorter, so by the redun-
dancy constraint A should only have said (5.4a). Walker claims that (5.4b) is
considered an iru based on the assumption of unlimited workingmemory, i.e.
that all knowledge and information an agent has access to is equally available
at all times. Walker hypothesises that the mentioning of the well-known fact
that Walnut Street is shorter is a way for A to ease B’s cognitive load. Another
example is (5.5),which is an excerpt of a discussionabout individual retirement
accounts.
(5.5) a. A: Oh no, individual retirement accounts are available as long as you
are not a participant in an existing pension.
b. B: Oh I see. Well […] I do work for a company that has a pension.
c. A: Ahh. Then you’re not eligible for [the tax year of] eighty one.
(Walker, 1996, p. 187)
Walker’s analysis of this example is that (5.5c) is considered an irubasedon the
assumption that agents are logically omniscient, since Bwouldhave to apply an
inference rule to conclude (5.5c). The function of A’s stating (5.5c) is, according
to Walker, to augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences
are licensed.
5.1.2 A Rhetorical Approach to IRUs
A difficult question in this context is how to decide when to add an iru and
when not to. Some redundancymay help relieve the workingmemory of a dia-
logue system user or a participant in human-human conversation, while too
much information will only increase the cognitive load. We will discuss how
a rhetorical perspective may be of use in this balancing act, and suggest that
enthymemes, underpinned by topoi, may provide a model for analysing these
utterances.
1 This example has been discussed previously in the context of conventional and conversa-
tional implicature, Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
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Wewould like to suggest a way of looking at irus which elucidatesWalker’s
ideas about their function, and offers an alternative to the four assumptions of
the redundancy constraint. The three functions of irus inWalker’s study have
in common that they aim to lead the listener to a certain conclusion, either by
supporting a belief the listener already has, or by directing, or even redirect-
ing, the attention of the listener. In other words, irus are rhetorical. Examples
(5.4) and (5.5) are both illustrations of this. The fact that (5.4b) is considered
redundant according to the redundancy constraint seems to reflect not only
the unlimited working memory assumption, but also the assumption that dia-
logue participants do not have a will of their own in the sense that they by
default accept assertions and proposals by other agents. In fact, it is the rela-
tive autonomy of B thatmakes it possible for him not to accept A’s proposition.
By providing a reason for choosing Walnut Street, A performs a rhetorical act
that potentially increases the likelihood that the suggestionwill be accepted by
B.
Example (5.5) also indicates that A wants to make sure that B draws a spe-
cific conclusion. It seems likely that A, if she did not find it of some importance
that B draws the conclusion (5.5c), might not bother to make the inference
explicit—B could still be expected to make the inference. However, for B to
do that would not necessarily make him logically omniscient—the assump-
tionWalker (1996) claims to be the reason for considering (5.5b) an iru—just
capable of making some inferences.
Interestingly, many of Walker’s examples of irus and their respective ante-
cedents constitute structures similar to that of an enthymeme.Thementioning
of one carefully chosenpremisedirects the attentionof the listener in thedirec-
tion that the speaker wants, and makes the listener a bit more likely to accept
the proposition presented in the conclusion. The enthymeme might of course
serve to persuade or evenmislead a listener, but the samemechanism can also
make it easier for a conversational participant to accept an honest and con-
structive proposal made by another agent. This would be helpful when quick
decisionsneed tobemade, orwhendemandingparallel activities require atten-
tion.
Let us go back to the colleagues walking to work. Example (5.4) above could
easily be analysed within a rhetorical framework. Mentioning (5.4b) could be
a way for A to point to the argument about the shortest route, perhaps because
they are running late. There could be other reasons towalk alongWalnut Street,
perhaps that it is more quiet. Amight know that B usually prefers a busy street,
but that she does not particularly like to walk, which would make the short-
argument more persuasive. If they were not in a hurry, and A wanted them to
walk along Walnut Street because it is nicer to walk along a quiet street than
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a busy one, A would probably say ‘Let’s walk along Walnut Street. It’s quieter’
thus validating her suggestion.
However, it is also possible that A would want to walk along Walnut Street
for some reason that she does not want B to know about. So, by providing the
premise “it’s shorter”, Amakes it easier for B to interpret the suggestion to walk
along Walnut Street in the intended way, that is, associated with particular
inferences and not with others. The provided premise may or may not point
to a genuine reason of A’s for suggestingWalnut Street. However, it is also pos-
sible that A, by supplying the premise, is merely externalising her own way of
thinking, not considering B’s mental states. For a discussion on externalised
inference, see Pickering and Garrod (2004), Mills and Gregoromichelaki (2010)
and Gregoromichelaki et al. (2011).
So, giving the premise “it’s shorter” points to an argument drawing on cer-
tain topoi, withoutwhich the utterancewould be difficult tomake sense of. The
“hidden premise”, i.e. the premise that B adds to the argument, would be some-
thing that makes sense in the context, having to do with for example time (as
above) or effort (we don’t want to walk longer than necessary). The additional
premise is necessary in order to make the enthymeme fit with the relevant
topos.
A rhetorical perspective that uses enthymematic arguments as an explana-
tory model for how information is given and withheld, would be based on a
different set of assumptions about dialogue than those Walker formulates as
the basis of the redundancy constraint. Thuswepropose four rhetoricallymoti-
vated principles as an alternative to the four principles of economy in dialogue
in (5.2):
(5.6) a. Limitedworking-memory: suggestionshelp agents to reacha certain
decision
b. Logical capacity: agents are capable of applying some inference
rules, some entailments will be added to the discourse model;
c. Utterance production: should be balanced so as to maximise per-
suasion
d. Autonomy: assertions and proposals by agent A are not accepted by
default by agent B, and different agents may or may not share goals
and intentions.
As humans we need reasons to validate propositions we are presented with.
We know this intuitively—it is difficult to complete a task if we are just pre-
sented with single pieces of information that do not seem to be connected.
The same conclusion can be drawn based on different premises, and we often
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want to know which argument the speaker is referring to before we accept a
proposition. There are situations where the standard way to instruct is by sin-
gle utterances (or orders), such as in the military, or in other contexts where
the roles are very well defined, and the modus operandi of the activity well
rehearsed, such as in surgery.
We agree withWalker’s conclusion that irus serve to ease cognitive load in
differentways.We also suggest that the reason for this is that the enthymematic
structure helps the recipient of the iru tomake up hermind, or correctly inter-
pret an utterance. If the iru provided links the assertion or suggestionmade to
a toposwhich the recipient finds acceptable she ismore likely to agreewith the
proposition.
5.2 Enthymemes and Dialogue Context
In the previous chapter we discussedwhat we could call assertion enthymemes,
like the one in (5.7).
(5.7) Anon 3: themonarchy are non political ⟨pause⟩ and therefore, when
they choose to speak it’s usually out of a genuine concern for
that problem. (BNC: FLE 233)
In (5.7) the speaker claims that when (representatives of) themonarchy speak,
it is out of genuine concern, supporting this claim with another claim, that
they are non-political. Whether or not this is perceived as an accessible, rel-
evant and acceptable argument by other conversational participants depends
partly on to what extent they find that it is consistent with a relevant topos.
This enthymeme seeks to establish a certain take on what the world is like.
However, reasoning in dialogue is often reasoning towards an action or deci-
sion. Enthymemes in arguments like (5.4) for example, consist of a conclusion
or consequent part which conveys a speech act like request or exhortation.
They belong to what Aristotle called deliberative rhetoric, which is commonly
found in political discourse (Corbett and Connors, 1999).
The goal of deliberative discourse is to convince someone to carry out (or not
carry out) a future action. In the context of politics this could be things like go
towar, extend thepublic transport systemof a city, or cut taxes.However, every-
day conversations alsooften involvedeliberativediscourse. Conversational par-
ticipants have to decide things like who to invite to a party, which car to buy,
which restaurant to go to, or which film to see. In the context of deciding, inter-
locutors present arguments to each other. Also, many of the tasks for which we
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want to use dialogue systems are linked to advice giving, instructing etc. where
the point of the system is to advise users based on assembled information and
considerations of the context.
In the rest of this chapter we will focus on action-directed enthymemes
embedded in a machinery of conversational games, taking as our point of
departure the excerpt presented previously in (5.4). We will suggest how con-
versational games can be used tomove a dialogue forward and how the kind of
conversational gameyouchoose to carry out a communicativeproject is related
to the rhetorical force of the enthymeme conveyed.
Let us now consider (5.8).
(5.8) A: Let’s walk alongWalnut Street.
A: It’s shorter.
In (5.8) speaker A uses an enthymematic argument to communicate to another
dialogue participant B that they should chooseWalnut Street rather than other
possible routes, and that the reason for suggesting Walnut Street is that it is
shorter than other options. We see this enthymeme in εshorter in (5.9)—a func-
tion from a situation of a type whereWalnut Street is shorter than some alter-
native, to a type of situationwhere A and Bwalk alongWalnut Street. Note that
we cannot know the exact nature of the enthymeme in terms of the number of
features present, for example the number of routes available to A and B.
(5.9) εshorter = λr:
x =W.St. : Ind
y = other_route : Ind





c4 : in(z, w)
⋅ e : walk_along(r.w, r.x)
Using an enthymeme like the one in (5.9) is essentially a conversational strat-
egy for carrying out a communicative project. In Chapter 3 we discussed the
gameboard feature “project” and how we relate it to “communicative activity”.
When an activity is carried out, it is made up of a number of projects, the
goals of which are ideally fulfilled during the course of the interaction. For
example, the activity type “medical consultation” typically includes a num-
ber of projects which need to be carried out, such as establishing the patient’s
symptoms, diagnosing the patient and explaining to the patient howhis condi-
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tion should be treated (Berbyuk Lindström, 2008). The activity “chatting with
neighbour while gardening” is less formal, and it is not strongly associatedwith
particular projects to be carried out in a specific order. However, if we were to
examine data from this activity, we would be likely to identify communicative
projects regarding things like current affairs, the weather, gardening, etc. This
does not mean that the agents involved in the conversation have anticipated
any of these projects, as would probably be the case in the medical consulta-
tion scenario.
Activity types also differ in terms of to what extent the roles are set or insti-
tutionalised. In the case of medical consultation, certain behaviour in the car-
rying out of a project is closely related to an activity role like “patient”. In many
activity types, however, activity roles donot play an important part for theorder
in which dialogue participants are expected to make their contributions. Nei-
ther do they always affect the type of contribution which we expect from a
particular dialogue participant. However, even in an informal activity there are
role related requirements for participating in the activity. For example, for par-
ticipating in an informal conversation between friends, you have to know the
other conversational participants, and the role “friend” comeswith certain obli-
gations like being honest, supportive and kind. However, assuming the role of
“friend” is not associated with a particular pattern of conversation, as is the
case when assuming the role of “doctor” or “patient” in a medical consultation
conversation.
5.3 Conversational Games
As we mentioned briefly in Section 3.2.3, we consider the carrying out of a
communicative project to be associated with a set of conversational games.
The notion of dialogue game is well established in research on dialogue and
is described for example in Carlson (1982) and Levin and Moore (1977). The
descriptions of dialogue games in the literature do not generally distinguish
between games that only lay down the rules for how to perform very gen-
eral communicative functions, and rules stating which sub-projects need to be
realised in order to carry out a communicative project.
Inspired by the string theory of events in work by Fernando (2006), Cooper
and Ginzburg (2015), and Cooper (2016) describe a conversational game as a
type of string of events where each event is (more or less) expected by the
agents involved in the realisation of the string. If T1 and T2 are types of events,
then, T1⌢T2 is the type of strings of events a⌢b such that a : T1 and b :
T2.
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On this view, it is not only conversational games that are perceived as
string types—activity, project and conversational gamemay all be described as
strings of events. On this view the distinction between a conversational game
and a communicative project is not structural. Rather, the difference is related
to the domain. An activity type is domain specific, that is it involves particu-
lar roles which are strongly associated with specific rights, obligations, etc. as
well as associated settings and artefacts. A communicative project tends to be
less domain specific—for example agreeing on something is a communicative
project which may occur in various activity types. However, the carrying out
of an activity of a particular kind often also requires specific communicative
projects to be carried out.
Conversational games, on the other hand, are more general and reflect con-
versational practices which are or could be part of most communicative activi-
ties, such as asking or replying to questions, backtracking, giving feedback, etc.
We define a conversational game as the minimal set of linguistic actions that
need to be performed in order to realise a communicative project—similar to
“speech act sequence” in van Dijk (1979). Examples of conversational games
could be “request game”, “suggestion game”, “clarification game” and “assertion
game”.
5.4 The Suggestion Game
A relevant game type in relation to the dialogue in (5.8), is the suggestion game.
In this section we will describe this game in terms of informal rules and condi-
tions which state what should be allowed within the game:
– The suggestion game is played by at least two players, though more players
are possible.
– The players have a shared project which they intend to carry out together.
– One of the dialogue participants makes a suggestion. For the sake of the
game it does not matter which player has made the first move. We refer to
whoever has done so as player 1.
– The suggestion by player 1 may optionally be followed by a motivation for
the suggestion, again by player 1.
– Another player (who is then player 2) responds to the suggestion by accept-
ing or rejecting the move. Note that this move does not necessarily have to
be an actual response. Depending on the level of grounding we are willing
to accept, abstaining from protesting might be enough to signal acceptance
of a given suggestion.
We could describe the suggestion game as illustrated in Figure 1.
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figure 1 The Suggestion game
The rules above would suffice to account for an interaction where Player 1
makes a suggestion φ to player 2, who responds by either accepting or rejecting
it. However, a general set of rules that would account for the suggestion game
would also have to allow for a less straightforward carrying out of the project
“deciding which route to take”. There could be questions, for example clarifica-
tion questions or questions regarding other aspects of the context (time, place
etc.) or the suggested route. Another possibility is that player 2 asks for a reason
for choosing the suggested route. This would be perfectly acceptable dialogue
behaviour, and players must be allowed, within the suggestion game, to move
into games of other types like the clarification game or the motivation game.
We see the ability to move between games as a general rule for all con-
versational games. This reflects the expectations we have when engaging in
dialogue—if you ask someone a question, you know that it is likely that you
will get a reply. However, we can still account for dialogue behaviour which
does not conform to one particular game, since we allow dialogue participants
to introduce new games—and even new projects—andwe also allow dialogue
participants not to play the game.
So, wewant ruleswhich allow for the suggestion game to be played in a num-
ber of different ways, including detours into other games. But let us leave that
aside for the moment, and just consider the possibilities realised in (5.8). If we
want to represent this dialogue in terms of updates of information states, we
need rules handling not only the explicit moves represented in Figure 1, but
also tacit updates of the dgb. Tacit moves within a game represent inferences
and other internal processes. We will now have a look at some of the updates
of A’s and B’s dgb throughout (5.8).
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5.5 Analysing a Suggestion Dialogue
5.5.1 Initial Tacit Moves
Since the notion of conversational game is linked to the acceptable moves in
a conversation, rather than to the concrete results which conversational par-
ticipants hope to get out of the interaction (as in the case of a communicative
project) we introduce a new field—games—onto the gameboard.
In order to start a conversation, an agent searches her resources for a con-
versational strategy (a conversational game) to carry out the project. In case
of the dialogue in (5.8), where one dialogue participant suggests to another
which route they should take to work, a relevant game type is the suggestion
game just described in Section 5.4. It is not until the first move is made and
the conversational participants thus consider it shared information that this
is the game which is being played, that the game appears on the shared game
board.
At the beginning of the interaction the dgb of dialogue participant A is
empty apart from the field ‘project’, which we assume to be shared since the
necessity of picking a route is obvious to both A and B in the context. As we
remember fromChapter 4, a communicative project is a limited task or activity
which is being carried out at least to some extent bymeans of communication.
We represent a project as a type of event to be brought about by a number of
agents. In (5.10) we see the type of a decision project, TDecisionProject. A1, …, An are
dialogue participants and Issue the thing that is to be decided upon.
(5.10) TDecisionProject = e : decide ({A1, …, An}, Issue)
For the purposes of this dialogue, only one communicative project needs to
be carried out. However, by letting the type of project on the dgb be list(Rec-
Type), we are also able to model several projects to be carried out one after the
other to fulfil some complex goal (linguistic or other).Wewould also be able to
account for projects suddenly appearing in the information states of dialogue
participants due to sudden events, such as “find shelter from the rain”.
(5.11)
private : RecType
shared : project = [ e : decide({A, B}, route) ] : list(RecType)
(5.11) shows the type of the speaker, A’s, information state at the beginning
of the interaction in (5.8). For now we are interested only in the information
state of dialogue participant A, not that of the listener, dialogue participant B.
“Route” represents the issue of which route to take, in (5.8).
92 chapter 5
The first update of the dialogue gameboard is an update of ‘private games’,
that is the repository of conversational games which are salient with respect to
a dialogue participant in a given context. Before we move on to how we want
to represent this update in ttr, let us have a look at the nature of projects and
games in terms of types.
As illustrated in (5.10) we perceive a project as a record type representing
the type of an event where a number of individuals (in this case A and B),
jointly perform some action (in this case making a decision) regarding some
non-decided-upon issue. In this case, the issue which is being deliberated is
which route to take to work.
Wemay think of the development of a conversation as a finite state automa-
ton where the arrows leading from one state to another correspond to the lin-
guistic moves of the conversation, as represented in Figure 1. Instead of focus-
ing on the states between themoves, we could focus on the sequence of moves
themselves when defining a conversational game. We would then get a string
of move types. The type in (5.12) for example, is of strings of moves comprising
the type of suggestion game, TSuggestionGame,—a suggestion by player 1 followed
by an optional motivation by player 1, followed by a response (acceptance or
rejection) by player 2. We represent move types as record types. A game of the
type in (5.12) is made up of a suggestion, followed by an optional motivation
by the dialogue participant who made the suggestion, followed by a response
(either an accept- or a rejectmove) by the other player.2
(5.12) TSuggestionGame= e : suggest(player1) ⌢ e : motivate(player1) ⩽1⌢
e : respond(player2)
The notation e : motivate(player1) ⩽1 means that the suggestion move is fol-
lowed by at most one motivation move (⩽1). One could argue that a suggestion
might be followed by more than one move motivating the suggestion, and it
would of course be possible to alter ⩽1 to ⩽2 or ⩽3 depending on how many
motivation moves the model should allow. The string in (5.12) represents the
type of a suggestion game on an abstract level—from this type we learn the
2 In Chapter 4, we represented move types as ptypes constructed from three-place predicates,
such as suggest(x, y, ctnt), where x is the speaker, y is the addressee and ctnt is the content.
In this chapter, we will sometimes use one-place predicates like suggest(x), where x is the
speaker, to represent a slightly more abstract move type (where addressee and content are
left unspecified). We will also use yet more abstract move types like Suggest which do not
specify any arguments. Onemay think of these types as related in a subtype hierarchy, so that
for example suggest(x, y, ctnt) ⊑ suggest(x) ⊑ Suggest.
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sequence of move types involved and the relation between the roles that are
necessary to play the game. However, in order for the game to work as a motor
in the dialogue driving the updates, we need to assign the roles of the game to
the individuals present in the context. For example, the playerwho initiates the
game by making a suggestion has to be distinct from the player who acknowl-
edges that suggestion.
5.5.2 Rules for Updating Private Games
There are at least two different scenarios which would lead to an update of pri-
vate games. First, there is the type of situation where the presence of a project
on the dgb causes an agent to search his long term memory for a strategy by
which to carry out that project, and load it onto the dgb. The second is when
there is already a game on private games that would suffice to carry out the
project. Assume for example that A has been thinking since he got out of bed
in the morning that he wants to passWalnut Street on his way to work. He has
beenmeaning to suggest it for a while (or maybe hoping that Bwill suggest it),
thus the suggestion game is activated on his private dgb.When A and B reach a
junction the issue of which route to take becomes necessary to address, and the
project appears on the shared dgb. In this case the only update necessary on
A’s dgb is to place TSuggestionGame first in the list of games, while B has to retrieve
the game from long termmemory and load it ontoprivate games. Asmentioned
in the previous chapter, the idea is that the update rules are combined with a
control algorithm selecting which rule to apply in a given context. In Figure (2)
we see a visualisation of the algorithm controlling the update of private games.
5.5.2.1 Update Private Games
We want the first rule fud_pr_games to apply in a context where an agent has a
project on her gameboard, but the game first on the list of private games is not
relevant to carry out the project. The agent is then licensed to either reraise a
game already on private games (but not first on the list) or to load a relevant
game from resources onto private games. Now, one question that arises here
is what it means to be a relevant game in relation to a particular project. One
way of describing this would be in terms of licences in an agent’s resources. If
an agent has in her resources a link between a type of project TP and a type of
game TG, she has a licence to carry out a communicative project of type TP by
means of TG, and may load it onto ‘private.games’ on her dgb.
Which types of games are relevant to carry out particular types of projects
is an empirical question. We think of the update rules licensing the carrying
out of a project by means of a particular type of game as reflecting the prag-
matic norms of a community. One way of modelling how an agent selects a
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figure 2 Update of private games
strategy—for example choosing between an indirect and a direct speech act—
would be to extend themodel with a probabilistic component (see for example
Eshghi and Lemon (2014)). However, in the limited model we are focusing on
here, we assume that we have access to only one type of gamewhich is relevant
to theproject at hand.Moreover, it seems tous that a limited set of project types
and game types would suffice to account for a large number of dialogue situa-
tions. Thus, for each project type we would introduce a set of postulates defin-
ing which games could be relevant to carry out a project of that type. We use
the notation “relevant_to(T1, T2)” to represent relevance of T1 in relation to T2.
When a communicative project appears on an agent’s dgb and the agent ini-
tiates carrying out the project there are, as mentioned above, two possibilities.
Either there is a game present in the private games field of the dgb bymeans of
which the project can be carried out, or there is not. In the first case wewant to
make sure that the appropriate game is moved up to the first slot on the list of
private games. In the second case, we want to pick an appropriate game from
the agent’s long termmemory, and place it first on the list of private games. The
update of ‘private.games’ thus consists of three rules: fud_pr_games for reraising a
game, fud_pr_games′ for uploading a game from resources, and—to complete the
update— finst_game. In an instantiated game the roles (player1, player2, etc.) are
assigned to dialogue participants from the point of view of the participant on
whose gameboard the instantiated game appears. Thismeans in the case of the
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suggestion game, that when A starts carrying out a decision making project by
initiating a game of type TSuggestionGame, she has also taken on the role of ‘player
1’ in that game. In every move type of the instantiated game on her dgb the
move to be carried out by player 1 will be assigned to SELF, the ones by player
2 to OTHER.
Even though instantiated games involve assignments of roles to dialogue
participants, we still want to be able to treat them as types. For this reason,
the type of games is a join type. A join type is a disjunction such that, for any
two types T1 and T2 you can form the join T1 ∨ T2. a : T1 ∨ T2 just in case either
a : T1 or a : T2 (Cooper and Ginzburg, 2012). This means that the type of games,
TGame, in our theory is a join of the types non-instantiated game, TNonInstGame and
instantiated game, TInstGame as defined in (5.13):
(5.13) a : TGame iff a : TNonInstGame or a : TInstGame
By defining the type of game as a join, we make sure that we can handle sit-
uations where, for example, something sudden and unexpected happens, and
dialogue participant needs to postpone the initiation of a game already on the




pr : games : list(TGame)
sh : project = [ TDecisionProject] : list(RecType)
⋅ λe: g : TSuggestionGame
c1 : in(g, r.pr.games)
⋅
pr : games = [μ(e.g, r.pr.games) ] : list(TGame)
In (5.14), fud_pr_games takes a situation of the typewhere there is a decisionproject
on ‘shared.project’ and, if there is a game of type TSuggestionGame on private games
in that record, the function returns a type of situation where that game type is
first on ‘private.games’. (See (4.2.3) on the function of μ.)
We think of the update rule fud_pr_games′, as seen in (5.15) as a function from an
information state where an agent has a decision project on her gameboard but
no gameof typeTSuggestionGameon the list of gameson ‘private.games’,3 to an infor-
mation state where the agent has a decision project on ‘shared.project’ and a
suggestion game first on ‘private.games’. In this case the game TSuggestionGame has
to be retrieved from parts of the agent’s resources which are external to the
dgb.




pr : games : list(TGame)
sh : project = [TDecisionProject] : list(RecType)
⋅ λe: g : TSuggestionGame
c1 : ¬in(g, r.pr.games)
⋅
pr : games = [e.g | r.pr.games] : list(TGame)
The functions in (5.14) and (5.15) are similar to the update functions discussed
by Cooper (2016, pp. 24–26). In order to obtain the required update of such a
function we need to apply it to the current information state—that is the infor-
mation state at the start of the update—of the agent whose information state
we seek to capture. Let us consider a scenario where agent A has previously
considered suggesting Walnut Street, but was distracted by an event which
the agent has just observed. This caused another conversational game, TGX, to
appear on the dgb. His initial information state is thus of the type in (5.16),
which we refer to as Tcurrent.
(5.16) a. Tcurrent =
pr : games = [TGX, TSuggestionGame] : list(TGame )
sh : project = [TDecisionProject] : list(RecType)
b. scurrent : Tcurrent
Before we apply the function we need to make sure that the type of the cur-
rent information state is a subtype of the domain type of fud_pr_games. We should
point out here that the type of the current information state might very well
have other fields such as a shared game, a latest utterance, shared beliefs, etc.,
and still be a subtype of the domain type of fud_pr_games.
In (5.17) we see the application of fud_pr_games to scurrent, followed by an asym-
metric merge (see Section 4.1.1.1) of the result of that function application and
the typeTcurrent of scurrent (as well as e1 witnessing the condition thatTSuggestionGame
is in scurrent.pr.games).
(5.17) a. fud_pr_games (scurrent)(e1)=
pr : games = [TSuggestionGame, TGX] : list(TGame)
b. Tcurrent .∧ pr : games = [TSuggestionGame, TGX] : list(TGame) =
pr : games = [TSuggestionGame, TGX] : list(TGame)
sh : project = [ e : decide({A1, A2}, Issue) ] : list(RecType)
5.5.2.2 Instantiation of Game
After an update putting a game which is a subtype of TSuggestionGame first on the
list of private games (either by fud_pr_games or fud_pr_games′), we need to instantiate
the game, that is associate the roles of the gamewith the players in this particu-
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lar situation. To do this we apply the function finst_TSuggestionGame to a record assigning
the values ‘SELF’ and ‘OTHER’ to the roles of the suggestion game.
(5.18) finst_TSuggestionGame =
λr: player1 : Ind
player2 : Ind
⋅ e : suggest(r.player1) ⌢ e : motivate(r.player1) ⩽1⌢
e : respond(r.player2)
For dialogue participant A in our current example this assignment would be
that in (5.19).
(5.19) r = player1 = SELF
player2 = OTHER














e : suggest(SELF) ⌢ e : motivate(SELF) ⩽1 ⌢
e : respond(OTHER)
The instantiated suggestion game would in this situation thus be TSuggestionGame-
Inst, as seen in (5.21):
(5.21) TSuggestionGameInst = e : suggest(SELF) ⌢ e : motivate(SELF) ⩽1⌢
e : respond(OTHER)
5.5.3 Updating the Agenda
An important aspect of the notion of conversational game is that players (con-
versational participants), by identifying an utterance as being part of a partic-
ular game, get an idea of which moves are likely to follow and what part they
should expect to play over the next few turns of the dialogue. In this sense con-
versational games may be seen as engines driving dialogues forward. Once a
game is loaded onto the gameboard and roles are assigned to individuals in the
context, an agent involved in a conversation can at any stage of the game look
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at her gameboard and know what options are available if she wants to keep
playing the game. Before the update of the agenda, agent A—if playing the sug-
gestion game—has on her private games the instantiated game TSuggestionGameInst
which we see in (5.22).
Now, we want an update rule that would load the first available move of the
gamewhich is to be carried out by SELF, onto the agenda.We have a set of rules
pertaining to the suggestion game that governs the dynamics of the agenda,
which is inherent in the suggestion game in (5.21). This set of rules is simi-
lar to that used to update the agenda in Cooper (2016). However, in Cooper’s
approach, there are rules pushingmoves onto the agendawhich are to bemade
by agents other than ‘SELF’. Since we have a conversational game specifying
what we expect of others and ourselves in the employment of that particular
game, we have chosen to use the agenda only for moves that are to be made
by the agent whose agenda they are on. The agenda is part of the ‘private’-field
of an agent’s gameboard, and is represented as a record type (move type). Each
move type has a label ‘e’ pairedwith one of a set of speech act types like Suggest,
Ask, Assert, etc. There are a number of constraints on such move types having
to do with the roles of the agents involved in dialogue, cactor. There could also
be more constraints. Further, there is a label ‘ctnt’ for content, which—after
the first update of the agenda—will not yet be associated with a specified con-
tent.
The first rule to be employed of the rules of the suggestion game is a “start-
ing rule” in (5.22), stating that if a player has an empty agenda and a suggestion
game on his private gameboard, he may, within the suggestion game, push a
suggestion onto the agenda. We refer to this rule as fupdate_agenda_suggestion.
(5.22) fupdate_agenda_suggestion =
λr: pr : agenda = [ ] : list(RecType)
games = [TSuggestionGameInst] : list(TGame)
⋅




The content of the move type that ends up on the agenda is unspecified.
fupdate_agenda_suggestion is applied to a record of the type in (5.23):
(5.23)
pr :
agenda = [ ] : list(RecType)
games = [TSuggestionGameInst] : list(TGame)
sh : project = [ e : decide({A, B}, route) ] : list(RecType)
participating in enthymematic dialogue 99
We apply the function in (5.22) to the current information state of the type
in (5.23), and asymmetrically merge the current state type with the result of
function application. In (5.24) we see the type of A’s information state after the







games = [TSuggestionGameInst] : list(TGame) )
sh : project = [ e : decide({A, B}, route) ] : list(RecType)
Thenext update rule providedby the conversational game (although this rule is
actually general and applicable to any conversational game) is a rule saying that
if we have an item on the agenda which is to be performed by SELF and whose
content is specified, that is, the label ‘ctnt’ has one specific value ([ctnt=T:Rec-
Type]), then the agent is allowed to make that move and push the next move
onto the agenda (we will get back to this rule soon). However, at the moment
the item on the agenda is not specified in terms of content—the label is just
typed RecType (ctnt:RecType). In order to add a content specific move to the
agenda, the agent needs to search her resources for relevant facts and ways of
reasoning about the situation and the project at hand.
5.5.4 Drawing onTopoi to SpecifyMove Content
So far in this chapter we have consideredmechanisms of things like speech act
sequences and turn taking. We will now move on to consider how a dialogue
participant may reason given the topoi which are available to him or her in
relation to a particular goal.
For example, let us assume that an agent is involved in a conversational game
according to which he is expected to make a suggestion regarding some future
action. One way for the agent to decide which suggestion to make, is to reason
based on the relevant topoi available to him.
There is evidence that the strong assumptions of intentionality associated
with, for example, Gricean pragmatics and Relevance Theory, sometimes do
not hold (Gregoromichelaki et al., 2011). Thus, conversational participants do
not necessarily reason about how their moves will be interpreted. Rather, rea-
sons for making specific claims, suggestions and other moves in conversation
are not always arrived at through conscious reasoning. In such cases a motiva-
tion or reason for the content of a claim or suggestion may be added post hoc,
if the agent is asked to motivate his actions.
However, there are contexts where claims or suggestions are arrived at after
planning involving conscious reasoning. This is important not least in the con-
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text of modelling a dialogue system. A dialogue system which has identified
that it is supposed tomake the first move in a suggestion game requires a struc-
tured way of choosing how this move should be specified. That is, which con-
tent it should have, based on the available possibilities. The suggestion made
should bebasedon reasoning thatmay also be accounted for.Thus, at this point
in the dialogue in (5.4), we assume that the agent is about tomake a suggestion
based on its role in the current interaction. However, we assume that the pre-
cise content of this suggestion is not yet specified.
5.5.4.1 Integrate Private Resource Topos and Belief
In order to be able to specify the content of the agenda, the agent must access
relevant information. The update we are looking for is an update of private
topoi and beliefs. This update rule should add information to the agent’s pri-
vate beliefs and topoi which is relevant to the project at hand. The relevance
of the project is slightly different here than for adding a private game to the
gameboard. In the latter case the relation between the project “decide(which
route to choose)” and the suggestion game clearly has more to do with the fact
that a decision is to bemade thanwithwhat the decision concerns. In contrast,
in the case of topoi and relevant beliefs it seems more likely that the choice of
topos is more domain specific. The simplest way of doing this is to have a rule
saying that if you have an information state that includes a particular project
P and an unspecified item on the agenda, then you can load a particular set of
topoi and beliefs onto the gameboard.
Before we move on to present a more detailed account of this update rule,
let us consider τshorter—representing a topos saying that if one route is shorter
than another, take that route. As in previous chapters we represent topoi and
enthymemes as functions from records to record types. The topos which is
loaded onto the ‘private’ field of A’s gameboard should capture the notion that
if we have a choice between a shorter route and a longer route, we take the
shorter one.
This rule of thumb is not absolute—a shorter route might takemuch longer
because of roadworks, or be associated with other unappealing features and
therefore not preferable. The agents involved in the situation might also for
some reason prefer a longer walk. In many cases however, the rule of thumb
that we should choose shorter rather than longer routes applies. Informally, we
can say that the domain type includes two routes of which one is shorter than
the other and one agent (or set of agents) who has to make a choice between
two routes of which one is shorter. The result type is the type of situationwhere
the agents walk along the shorter route. In (5.25) we see a suggestion of what
such a topos might look like.









cshorter_than : shorter_than(x, y)
cchoose_between : is_choosing_between(z, x, y)
⋅ e : take(r.z, r.x)
We think of beliefs in an agent’s long term resources as assumptions about the
world including, but not limited to, facts.Wemodel beliefs as record types. The
relevant belief in this casewould be thatWalnut Street is shorter than the other
possible route—let us call it Maple Street. We refer to this belief, represented
by the record type in (5.26), as TbWSt_s.
(5.26) TbWSt_s:
x =Walnut Street : Ind
y = Maple Street : Ind
cshorter_than : shorter_than(x, y)
Let us now look at the update rule for integrating topoi and beliefs on the pri-
vate dgb. We want the rule to apply when an agent has a move type on the
agenda which is not specified for content. The rule should capture what is a
context relevant way of reasoning. At this point the content of the item on the
agenda is not fully specified.Thus there is informationabout the functionof the
move that is to bemade (tomake a suggestion) while we do not know anything
about the content. The label ‘ctnt’ in the move type on the agenda is therefore
associated with the type ERec, whose only witness (the only thing that is of
that type) is the empty record. For a definition of the empty record, see Cooper
(2016, p. 47).















c1 : in(t, resources)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
belief : RecType
c3 : in(belief, resources)
c4 : relevant_to(belief, fst(r.sh.project))
⋅
pr :





The rule above in (5.27) says that if you have a move type on the agenda whose
content is of type ERec, and there is a topos in your resources such that it is
relevant to the project at hand (the first item on the list of projects, or max-
project followingmax-qud in Ginzburg’s terminology) and a belief such that it
is relevant to the project at hand, then you are allowed to integrate that topos
and that belief on your private dgb. We have ignored the possibility that the
integration of beliefs and topos might not be simultaneous and that just one
of them could be enough to underpin the specification of content of the next
move. For example, there might be cases where a topos alone is sufficient to
sanction a specification of the agenda. This would be the case for example if
one agent makes a suggestion and the other agent accepts, believing that peo-
ple usually have a good reason formaking a suggestion.This could possibly lead
to the other agent accepting without having taken any additional information
into account.
Though we are aiming at modelling the kind of updates that would allow an
agent to participate in a particular type of dialogue by accounting for the kind
of dialogue behaviour present in such a situation, we do not claim that our
model necessarily mirrors the cognitive procecesses that actually take place. It
seems likely that the topoi involved andother beliefs interact rather thanone of
them preceding the other. Thus we choose to represent both of these updates
in one rule. However, it would be possible to turn them into two separate rules
if one would wish to represent a dependency between beliefs and topoi where
the integration of one precedes the integration of the other.
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5.5.4.2 Integrate Private Topos
In the previous chapter, Section (4.2.1), we considered the integration of shared
topoi on the dgb. We suggested a pair of rules where one looks for relevant
topoi already on shared topoi (but not at the top of the list), and moves them
to the top of the list. If there is no such topos already on shared topoi, another
function looks in private topoi for a relevant topos and—if there is such a
topos—loads it onto shared topoi. In the situation we are currently consider-
ing, we might want to add a similar rule. This rule would search private topoi
for a relevant topos and—if such a topos is present—place it first on the list of






ctnt = ERec : RecType
] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)




c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
⋅
pr : topoi = μ(e.t, r.pr.topoi) : list(RecType)
5.5.4.3 Specify Content of Suggestion on Agenda
We have one more silent move left to account for before we reach the point
where a linguistic move is actually made, and that is an update of the agenda
where information in the dialogue participant’s private depository of salient
topoi and beliefs is used to add content to the move type first on the agenda.
Unlike the update rules for private games and private topoi and beliefs, the
rule for specifying the agenda is not about loading information from an agent’s
resources onto her gameboard, but about assembling information already on
the gameboard, turning it into a content-specific type and pushing that type
onto the agenda.
We do not present any theory of how the information on the gameboard is
turned into actual utterances. We will just say that the information on topoi
and beliefs affect the content of the utterance. For example, in a case where
a route is to be suggested, a topos regarding routes, such as τshorter combined
with beliefs about the available routes can be combined to contribute content
to the suggestionmove. Themost recently added items on topoi and beliefs are
relevant to the move the agent is about to make.
The update function would thus be a function from a record of a type where
there is a project, a game, a topos and a set of beliefs—but no specified content
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on the agenda—to a type of information state where there is a move type on
the agenda where the label ‘ctnt’ is associated with a specific content. This rule














c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
belief : RecType
c3 : in(belief, r.pr.beliefs)
c4 : relevant_to(belief, fst(r.sh.project))
ctnt : RecType
c5 : derived_from(ctnt, {t, belief})
⋅
pr : agenda = [
e : Suggest
ctnt = e.ctnt : RecType
] : list(RecType)
5.5.4.4 Identify Suggestion Game
Based on the latest utterancemade, dialogue participant B is able to identify in
which conversational game she is being invited to play. Also, dialogue partici-
pant Amust now consider the game that was up until now private, as explicitly
shared. This update rule is specific to the speech act type Suggest. If the latest
utterance is a suggestion, thenwe are allowed to load the suggestion game onto








sh : games = [TSuggestionGame | r.sh.games] : list(TGame)
When the suggestion game is pushed onto B’s shared game, it also has to be
instantiated. This is done as in (5.18), but with the assignments adjusted so that
the playerwhohas the assignmentOTHERon A’s dgbhas the assignment SELF,
and vice versa.
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(5.31) player1 = OTHER
player2 = SELF
We have now considered some ways in which the notion of conversational
game can be employed to account for updates necessary for actively partici-
pating in a conversation. In the following section we will suggest how games
can also be useful in the process of accommodating enthymematic relations,
that is, assigning a rhetorical relation between two dialogue moves where one
is an antecedent and the other a consequent of a enthymematic argument.
5.5.5 Accommodation of Enthymemes
The participants in (5.8) are faced with a situation which is common in dia-
logue—that the rhetorical relation is not made explicit by means of a word
like “therefore”, “since” or “because”. The relation between “Let’s take Walnut
Street” and “It’s shorter” must thus be inferred by dialogue participant B. We
refer to this as accommodating the enthymeme, parallel to the accommoda-
tion of topoi discussed in Chapter 4.
However, in the case of enthymeme accommodation it is the enthymematic
relation that is accommodated rather than any semantic content. The ques-
tion is: On what does dialogue participant B base the accommodation of the
enthymeme? In fact, it is probably the case that many factors contribute to
the accommodation of the eud. In theWalnut Street example, (5.8), we have a
lexically encoded imperative or exhortation that clearly indicates that we are
dealing with a suggestion. Thus, the conversational game which we can expect
to be on the shared dgb for all dialogue participants, at this point involves
the possibility of a move of type assertion to follow, motivating the content
of the suggestion move. Therefore, even though (5.8) does not include a term
explicitly signaling that an enthymeme is under discussion, knowledge of basic
conversational practice would give this away. However, it seems to also depend
on the identification of some topos which supports this interpretation. Intu-
itively, the rule in (5.32) applies to a situation of a type where an assertion has




pr : topoi : list(Topos)









c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : spec(t, λr′ : r.sh.l-m.ctnt ⋅ r.sh.l-m.prev.ctnt)
⋅
sh : eud = [λr′ : r.l-m.ctnt ⋅ r.sh.l-m.prev.ctnt] : list(Enthymeme)
5.6 Summary
In this chapterwehavediscussed the issue of howenthymemesmay contribute
to lower the cognitive load of dialogue participants. Rather than stating, sug-
gesting or requesting somethingwithout providing a reason, a dialogue partici-
pant can add anutterance giving a reason for the state of affairs described in the
previous utterance. Such supporting utterances have been shown to often not
convey any new factual information, that is, they are informationally redun-
dant. However, Walker (1996) shows that they still—despite adding linguistic
material—make the processing of the entire utterance quicker than if they had
been withheld.
We have argued that irus can be linked to enthymemes, and that they facil-
itate the accommodation of a salient topos that could underpin the enthy-
meme. This could be particularly important in contexts where one agent tries
to persuade another not of what is the state of the world, but of changing
the world in some way, that is, of doing something. Basing a suggestion on
a topos enables an agent to justify it directly by supplying the premise of an
enthymematic argument where the suggestion is the consequent.
We suggest some update rules in which conversational games related to
speech act typemay governwhich kindof moves canbe expected in a conversa-
tion instantiating a particular game type.We focused on the silent updates nec-
essary for a dialogue participant to participate in a dialogue and make moves
whose speech act type and order depends on which conversational game the
agent is participating in, and whose content depends among other things on
the topoi the agent has access to.
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5.6.1 Enthymemes and Artificial Intelligence
If irus and enthymemes are indeed linked in the way we have argued above,
this sheds some light onwhy enthymemes are such an important part of rhetor-
ical discourse—they simply make it easier to accept the beliefs the speaker
wants the audience to encompass or the actions shewants the audience to per-
form.
Taking rhetoric into account in artificial intelligence (AI) has proven suc-
cessful in some cases, for example, Miller (2003) reports that rhetorical ethos
is central for creating an agent capable of passing the Turing test, that is, not
being recognised as a machine by a human user for a certain period of time.
Andrews et al. (2006) show that social cues and emotion (pathos) contribute
to more human like (and thus more user friendly) dialogue systems.
As the work byWalker (1996) suggests, irus can facilitate the processing of
the linguistic contributions of an artificial agent by a human. Integrating these
insights with a formal theory of enthymematic reasoning provides us with a
theory telling us which irus are actually helpful in a particular context—the
ones supported by salient topoi. This may be particularly useful in contexts
where the user of for example a spoken dialogue system is under heavy cog-
nitive load. One such example is in-vehicle dialogue systems.
In a data collection carried out within the dico project4 (Villing, 2009) to
test how in-vehicle conversation adapts to shifting cognitive load, Breitholtz
and Villing (2008) report many examples of enthymematic arguments, most
of which also involve irus. The data consist of dyadic in-vehicle interactions
where one subject—the passenger—is given a map and a list of destinations
and is asked to provide the other subject—the driver—with driving instruc-
tions. Both subjects have access to the same situational context, such as street
view, traffic intensity, etc. Despite this the passenger often justifies instructions
by supplying information about the state of the traffic and street ahead.
For example, in (5.33) it is clear to the driver as well as the passenger that the
street they are driving on is ending. By supplying the premise (5.33b) the pas-
senger points to an enthymeme based on a number of premises, most of which
have been stated earlier (for example that Rose Street crosses the street they
are driving down), and a topos that has to be inferred (if you are looking for
a crossing street, and you haven’t yet passed it, and there is only one crossing
street left, this has to be the street you are looking for).
4 dico is a project that aims to demonstrate how state-of-the-art spoken language technology
can enable access to communication, entertainment and information services as well as to
environment control in vehicles. A priority in the project is cognitive load management for
safe in-vehicle dialogue.
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(5.33) a. A: Rosengatan ja det måste vara nästa
Rose Street yes it must be next
b. A: för vi kommer inte så mycket längre
cause we don’t get much further.
We suggest that the reason they do this is because the enthymematic struc-
ture helps the recipient of the iru to make up her mind or correctly interpret
an utterance—if the iru provided links the assertion or suggestion made to a
topos she finds acceptable she ismore likely to agreewith the proposition. This
indicates that many artificial agents, e.g. in domains of instruction and advice
giving, would communicate more efficiently if they were extended to include
enthymematic competence.
These findings demonstrate the need to motivate for rhetorical purposes
rather than to provide new information about one’s reasons. In the context
of speech interfaces for e.g. GPS systems in cars the need to justify instruc-
tions becomes even more urgent, among other reasons because human users
of artificial intelligence tend to need the reassurance of explanation. This is
especially true in complex tasks such as giving driving instructions based on
a combination of geographical knowledge, current traffic and—possibly—the
preferences of the driver.
© Ellen Breitholtz, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004436794_007
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chapter 6
Rhetorical Reasoning in Dialogue
Thus far we have introduced enthymemes and topoi in a gameboard analysis
of dialogue, and suggested ways in which to represent the role of rhetorical
reasoning in interpretation and production of dialogue. In this chapter we will
consider a fewdifferent problems and situations requiring reasoning.The focus
is not so much on the updates of the dialogue, but on the topoi and associated
enthymemes which can be identified in, or derived from, the discourse.
When we interpret an enthymeme we draw on principles of reasoning—
topoi—that we have acquired through interaction with others and the world
around us. However, many enthymemes are so specific that they require much
abstraction to be recognised as belonging to, or being underpinned by, a par-
ticular topos. Moreover, sometimes enthymemes in discourse require that we
manipulate and/or combine several topoi to reach one that directly warrants
the enthymeme. There are also situations where an enthymeme evokes two or
more topoi which are incompatible, or which, when applied in a given context,
lead to incompatible conclusions.
In this chapter we will consider some of these issues. First, we will look at
two textbook examples of non-monotonic reasoning, and suggest how these
can be framed in a game board model of rhetorical reasoning cast in ttr.
Secondly, we will move on to a slightly longer dialogue excerpt, where topoi
play a role for coherence and meaning interpretation. Finally, we will consider
howwemaymodel the acquisition of topoi based on enthymemes in dialogue.
None of these analyses are fully fleshed out, but rather suggestions of strands
of research where the notion of rhetorical reasoning might be helpful.
6.1 A Rhetorical Perspective on Non-monotonicity
An important feature of classical logic is that if a formula is derivable from a
theory (a set of sentences1), then it must also be derivable from an expansion
of that theory. Let us say for example that Γ is a set of formulae, A is a formula
and A is a logical consequence of Γ (Γ ⊢ A). Then Γ, B ⊢ A is true as well.
1 By which we mean formulae with no free occurrences of variables.
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Natural reasoning, on the other hand, is situated. This means that con-
textual factors—such as the point of view of individual agents with certain
beliefs—influence the reasoning. In such situated reasoning we sometimes
draw conclusions which we later have to retract in the light of new informa-
tion. One reason for this is that we often consider problems about which we
have limited information. To handle cases like these, various types of non-
monotonic logic were proposed in the early eighties by for example McDer-
mott and Doyle (1980); Reiter (1980) andMcCarthy (1980). Approaches to non-
monotonic logic often suggest that we represent human reasoning in terms
of defaults, as proposed by Reiter (1980), with later followers such as Horty
(2012).
The principle of default logic is that there are rules which are usually true,
but which may in some cases be overridden by other, more specific rules.
However, in some cases—such as the “Nixon-diamond problem” (Reiter and
Criscuolo, 1981)—we cannot represent all accessible information as one con-
sistent set of rules, even if we allow for specific rules to override less spe-
cific ones. This type of reasoning is not uncommon in conversation and other
types of natural discourse—see for example McCarthy (1980); Schulz and Van
Rooij (2006)—and poses a challenge to formal approaches to dialogue and dis-
course.
In this section we give an account of two problems often discussed in the
literature on non-monotonic reasoning. Both of these reflect that we have
access to topoi which, when applied in a particular context, might be incon-
sistent or lead to incompatible conclusions. Our account treats the rules of
non-monotonic logic as topoi accessible to an agent. The first problem we will
consider concerns a situation where we receive new information which, by
being more specific, cancels out the topos previously drawn on and replaces it
with another. The second problem is more complicated since it has to do with
topoi where one is not a specification of the other, but where two topoi applied
in the same context lead to different conclusions.
6.1.1 The Tweety Triangle
The “Tweety triangle” puzzle exemplifies a dialogue situation where we draw
on a topos which has to be discarded further on in the dialogue, in the light
of new information. In this case the accommodated topos warrants the enthy-
meme conveyed in the dialogue, but when new information is added, the new
enthymeme under discussion is no longer warranted by the topos originally
evoked. In short, the puzzle comes down to this: when we say that Tweety is a
bird, and thereforeTweety flies, we drawon a principle saying that if something
is a bird, then it flies. In first order logic this is expressed as (6.1).
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(6.1) ∀x (bird(x) → fly(x))
We know, however, that there are some types of birdswhich do not fly, like pen-
guins and ostriches. So we also have access to rules like
(6.2) a. ∀x (penguin(x) → ¬fly(x))
b. ∀x (penguin(x) → bird(x))
This means that the rule in (6.1) has to be modified:
(6.3) ∀x ((bird(x) ∧ ¬penguin(x)) → fly(x))
In most natural discourse, we allow for exceptions like this, but we do not nec-
essarily have rules for every single exception. It would be possible to include
more exceptions for other types of non-flying birds. However, this could be dif-
ficult since there might be species of non-flying birds which we do not know
of (but we know theymight exist). Also, there might be individual birds which,
for various reasons, do not fly. So, what we really want is a rule that expresses
“under normal circumstances, birds fly” or “if we are not dealingwith an excep-
tion, then birds fly”. This is usually done through default rules as in (6.4), which
should be interpreted as “if x is a bird and there is nothing to contradict that x
flies, then x flies”.
(6.4) bird(x). fly(x)
fly(x)
Let us now think of the Tweety-problem as situated in a dialogue context. We
assume that A and B are involved in a conversation, and for some reason they
discuss whether Tweety the bird flies or not, and the following exchange takes
place:
(6.5) a. A: Tweety flies—he is a bird!
b. B: No, he doesn’t—he’s a penguin!
In the scenario above the utterances of A and B convey two enthymemes—
Tweety flies since he is a bird, and Tweety does not fly since he is a penguin.
A’s enthymeme is underpinned by a topos saying that if we have a situation
where something is a bird, we can assume that we also have a situation where
that something flies, τ1. B’s objection, on the other hand, evokes a topos say-
ing that if something is a penguin, this something does not fly, τ2. Given that
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Tweety is a penguin, the topos about penguins could be considered more reli-
able, and Awouldhave to reconsider her judgement. According toHorty (2012),
the reason why the rule about penguins overrides the one about birds, is that
the rule saying that penguins do not fly is more specific than the one saying
that birds do. It is more specific since penguin is a type of bird, but bird is not
a type of penguin. We think of this kind of subtyping as a topos saying that if
something is a penguin it is a bird, τ3. In (6.6) we see the enthymemes involved
in this exchange and in (6.7) the topoi evoked.
(6.6) a. ε1 = λr: x = Tweety : Ind
cbird : bird(x)
⋅ cfly : fly(r.x)
b. ε2 = λr: x = Tweety : Ind
cpenguin : penguin(x)
⋅ cdo_not_fly : do_not_fly(r.x)
(6.7) a. τ1 = λr: x : Ind
cbird : bird(x)
⋅ cfly : fly(r.x)
b. τ2 = λr: x : Ind
cpenguin : penguin(x)
⋅ cdo_not_fly : do_not_fly(r.x)
c. τ3 = λr: x : Ind
cpenguin : penguin(x)
⋅ cbird : bird(r.x)
Let us assume that, at the outset of the exchange in (6.7), the project which A
has inmind is to reach an agreement with B onwhether Tweety flies or not. On
the topic of Tweety A has access to a set of relevant resources. Among these is
the topos τ1, which is loaded onto private topoi on A’s dgb, and a belief about
Tweety, represented here by a record type like the one in (6.8).2
(6.8) TTweety_flies =
x = Tweety : Ind
cbird : bird(x)
cfly : fly(x)
In (6.9) we see the type of A’s initial information state, with the topos τ1, and
the belief TTweety_flies on A’s private dgb. The proposition that τ1 is present on the
private dgb should be interpreted as τ1 having been brought to the fore in A’s
mind, but not (yet) taken by A to be shared in the conversation.
2 Record types representing contextually relevant individuals which are accessed during a dia-
logue are reminiscent of file cards representing referents of definite noun phrases in Heim
(1983), and mental files in Recanati (2012).
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(6.9) ISA1 :
private :
agenda = [ ] : list(RecType)
topoi = [ τ1] : list(Topos)
beliefs = TTweety_flies : RecType
shared : RecType
After A has uttered (6.5a), the enthymeme ε1—that Tweety flies since he is a
bird—is under discussion. As a result of this, τ1 is evoked and integrated into
the shared dgb, as seen in 6.10.
(6.10) ISA3 : shared :
eud = [ε1] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τ1] : list(Topos)
We could imagine a few different scenarios here, the first being that B does not
recognise τ1. Unlikely as this may seem, if it were to occur, B couldmake a clari-
fication request along the lines of “what do youmean he’s a bird?”, questioning
the relevance of the premise. A could then reply by pointing to τ1, if something
is a bird, it flies. B could agree or disagree with this, and if B objects, A would
have to provide some support for the claim. If B agrees, she could evaluate the
argument and possibly object, but in this case not object to the topos that birds
generally fly, but to the conclusion that the individual Tweety flies, as seen in ε1.
The second scenario is that B does have access to the topos that birds fly, τ1, and
that she thereby is able to accommodate ε1. So the topos τ1 is integrated on B’s
shared dgb, along with ε1. Thus, B agrees that this enthymeme is indeed under
discussion. B then further evaluates the enthymemeby searching her resources
for the type “Tweety”. We assume that B believes that Tweety is a penguin, as
represented in B’s type for Tweety, TTweetyB, in (6.11):
(6.11) TTweetyB =
x = Tweety : Ind
cbird : bird(x)
cpenguin : penguin(x)
Note that the type in (6.11) might have many other constraints, such as “black
and white”, “eats fish”, etc. However, we restrict ourselves now to those aspects
of B’s Tweety-type which are relevant for this dialogue. Now, B continues the
evaluation by searching her resources for topoi which may be relevant to the
enthymeme on the one hand and on the other hand to the type of Tweety. She
finds two such topoi, namely τ2 “if something is a penguin, it does not fly”, and
τ3, “if something is a penguin, it is a bird”. As stated above, this rule tells us that
“penguin” is a subtype of “bird”.





topoi = [τ2, τ3] : list(Topos)
beliefs = τTweetyB : RecType
shared :
eud = [ε1] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τ1] : list(Topos)
com =
x = Tweety : Ind
cbird : bird(x)
: RecType
Now B may compare τ1, which was evoked and accommodated in the light of
A’s enthymematic argument ε1, with the topoi she herself has loaded onto her
private dgb, τ2 and τ3. On the one hand we have τ1, “if something is a bird, it
flies”, on the other τ2, “if something is a penguin, it does not fly” and τ2, “if some-
thing is a penguin, it is a bird”.
Now B has access to two topoi which are relevant for evaluating Tweety’s
ability to fly. One according to which he can fly because he is a bird, and one
according towhichhe cannot fly becausehe is apenguin. Since the topos τ3 says
that “penguin” and “bird” are in a subtype-supertype relation, τ2 ismore specific
than τ1, τ2 constitutes a stronger argument as long as it is applicable to Tweety.
At this point in the dialogue, B has evaluated the enthymeme under discus-
sion and does not agree. An item is integrated on on B’s agenda to refute A’s
argument (the assertion “Tweety can’t fly”) followed by the assertion “He’s a
penguin!”. (6.13) is the type of B’s information state after this utterance. The
topos B would expect A to accommodate is at least τ2, (see 6.7b), since this
topos is required to underpin the enthymeme.
(6.13)
pr :






cdo_not_fly : do_not_fly(r.x) ] : list(Topos)
sh :
eud : [λr:




cdo_not_fly : do_not_fly(r.x) ] : list(Enthymeme)
l-m :
e : assert(B, A, ctnt)





cdo_not_fly : do_not_fly(r.x) ] : list(Topos)
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Let’s assume that A accommodates this topos. A then has to evaluate the
latest enthymeme under discussion in relation to the enthymeme he himself
produced, and the activated topoi. If A has access to the same type for Tweety
as B has, or at least a type which shares the constraint that Tweety is a pen-
guin, and a topos which says that penguin is a subtype of bird, Awill be able to
evaluate B’s argument and his own argument in the light of B’s argument, and
come to the conclusion that B’s argument is stronger since it is more specific
(cf. Horty, 2012). However, if C would enter the discussion and say that Tweety
actually flies, since he has a pair of artificial wings, both A and Bwould have to
reevaluate their position. The type of “Penguin-bird who has artificial wings” is
more specific than “Bird” or “Penguin-bird”, and therefore a topos stating that
someonewho has artificial wings flies would be stronger, in case the constraint
“has artificial wings” is in the Tweety-type.
6.1.2 The Nixon Diamond
Another problem often discussed in the context of non-monotonic reasoning
is the so-called “Nixon Diamond”, often visualised as in Figure (3) (Reiter and
Criscuolo, 1981; Strasser and Antonelli, 2019). In this puzzle, the following situ-
ation is described:
(6.14) a. Nixon is a Quaker
b. Nixon is a Republican
c. Quakers are pacifists
d. Republicans are not pacifists
If we were to formulate rules based on the information in (6.14), these rules
wouldmake up an inconsistent theory. If we apply (6.14a) and (6.14c), we arrive
at the conclusion that Nixon is a pacifist. However, if we apply (6.14b) and
(6.14d), we arrive at the opposite conclusion, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Traditionally, problems like these are treated either sceptically or credulously
(Strasser and Antonelli, 2019). On the sceptical approach only inferences that
are consistent with all the facts and inference rules of a theory are accepted.
In the Nixon case that means that neither the conclusion that Nixon is a paci-
fist, nor the one that he is a non-pacifist, are accepted. The credulous reasoner,
on the other hand, accepts as many inferences as possible, as long as they are
not inconsistent with other accepted inferences. In the Nixon case this means
accepting either the inference that Nixon is a pacifist or the inference that he
is a non-pacifist.
However, neither of these approaches tells us how agents interactively rea-
son to draw one conclusion or the other, possibly based on different takes on a
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situation or type of situation, or because their goals differ. The argumentsmade
may be aimed at e.g. retrospectively justifying a speaker’s position rather than
reaching a conclusion based on an accepted set of topoi, or at reaching a spe-
cific outcome supported by some topoi but not others. We therefore suggest
that we look at problems related to human non-monotonic reasoning from a
rhetorical perspective in a dialogue setting.
The Nixon diamond-puzzle is slightly different from the puzzle discussed
in Section 6.1.1. In the case of the Tweety puzzle there is a subtype relation-
ship between “penguin” and “bird”, which means that “penguin” entails “bird”.
Therefore, in the case of Tweety,we can follow theprinciple that amore specific
rule, τ2 “penguins do not fly”, (6.7b), takes precedence over a less specific rule
like τ1, “birds fly”, (6.7a). In the case of the Nixon diamond there is no entail-
ment relation between “Quaker” and “Republican”. Instead, the puzzle arises
from two types entailing incompatible types (pacifist and non-pacifist respec-
tively), while both being applicable to one individual.
figure 3
The “Nixon Diamond”
To illustrate what a rhetorical approach to non monotonic reasoning would
look like, let us imagine again a conversation between two people discussing
whether Nixon is (or was) a pacifist or a non-pacifist. Two of the arguments
presented by the dialogue participants are the following:
(6.15) a. A: Nixon is not a pacifist—he’s a Republican!
b. B: He’s a pacifist—he’s a Quaker!
Initially in this conversation, A assigns Richard Nixon a type which may be
restricted in a number of ways, but has at least the restrictions non_pacifist and
Republican.We see this type in (6.16).TNixonA is a subtype of the less specific type
TNixonnon_pac.
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(6.16) TNixonA =




x = Nixon : Ind
cnon_pacifist : non_pacifist(x)
A also has access to a topos saying that if someone is a Republican, that person
is a non-pacifist.We refer to this topos, “Republicans are non-pacifists” in (6.18),
as τ1.
(6.18) τ1 = λr: x : Ind
crepublican : republican(x)
⋅ cnon_pacifist : non_pacifist(r.x)
In (6.19) we see A’s information state just before she produces the utterance
(6.15a). On the agenda is a claim that Nixon is not a pacifist, and on private






topoi = [τ1] : list(Topos)
beliefs = TNixonA : RecType
We assume that A has a conversational game similar to the suggestion game
discussed in Chapter 5, Figure 1, loaded onto her dgb. This game—let us call
it the claim game—allows for a player to make a claim followed by a move to
support this claim, corresponding to the motivation move of the suggestion
game. After this move the other player may either agree, disagree, or refute the
argument by means of a new round of the claim game.
In order to completely account for the dialogue in (6.15) we would have to
make further adjustments to the update rules presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
However, as in our account of the Tweety puzzle, we have omitted some steps
of our analysis in order to focus on the dynamics of enthymemes, topoi and
beliefs.
After having stated that Nixon is not a pacifist, (6.15a), A’s shared informa-
tion state is updated. A now considers it a shared comittment that Nixon is a




eud = [] : list(Enthymeme)





com = TNixonnon_pac : RecType
When A has uttered his argument in favour of Nixon not being a pacifist—
that Nixon is a Republican—‘sh.com’ and ‘l-m’ are updated on A’s dgb, and
the enthymeme ε1—“Nixon is a Republican, therefore he is not a pacifist”—is
added. A now expects ε1 to be shared in the conversation (6.21).We see the type
of A’s information state after these updates in (6.22):
(6.21) ε1 = λr: x = Nixon : Ind
crepublican : republican(x)
⋅ cnon_pacifist : non_pacifist(r.x)
(6.22) sh :
eud = [ε1] : list(Enthymeme)










x = Nixon : Ind
crepublican : republican(x)
com = TNixonnon_pac : RecType
Now, since A knows that she is presenting an enthymeme, and that there exists
a link between the antecedent and consequent of (6.15a), A assumes that the
topos τ1 underpinning ε1, is now shared. Thus, τ1—if someone is a Republi-
can, that person is a non-pacifist—is integrated on her shared dgb as seen in
(6.23).
(6.23) sh : eud = [ε1] : list(Enthymeme)
topoi = [τ1] : list(Topos)
Let us now focus on the information state of dialogue participant B. When A
has uttered (6.15b) the topos τ1 and a belief about Nixon that is relevant to the
conversation (that is, one that involves at least the constraint that Nixon is a
Republican) are integrated on B’s private dgb. Based on this the enthymeme ε1
is also accommodated.
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At the point in the dialoguewhere A has just uttered (6.15b), we thus assume
that B’s shared information state is of the type in (6.24).
(6.24) sh :
eud = [ε1] : list(Enthymeme)






By the rule fintegrate_topos (see Section 4.1.3), the topos τ1 is integrated on B’s shared
dgb.
In order to evaluate ε1 B accesses his knowledge of Nixon, represented as the
type in (6.25). This type has, among others, the constraint Quaker. Since the
belief that Nixon is also a Republican is already shared, this is also a constraint
on (6.25).
(6.25) TNixonB=
x = Nixon : Ind
cQuaker : Quaker(x)
cRepublican : Republican(x)
For some reason, either because B wants to argue that Nixon is a pacifist,
or because Quaker is simply a more salient quality of Nixon for him than
Republican, the topos which is pushed onto B’s private topoi is τ2, as seen in
(6.26).
(6.26) τ2 = λr x : Ind
cquaker : Quaker(x)
⋅ cpacifist : pacifist(r.x)
Dialogue participant B now must take two topoi into account. According to
one of these, which he considers shared, if you are a Republican you are not
a pacifist. According to the other, which is private, if you are a Quaker you are
a pacifist. On the other hand B has to consider the type of an individual who
is both a Quaker and a Republican. On B’s private topoi we find a topos saying
that Quakers are pacifists (τ2), and on shared topoi a topos saying that Repub-
licans are not pacifists (τ1). The topos τ2 underpins a move being added to B’s
agenda which is part of an enthymematic argument refuting the claim made
by A, that Nixon is a pacifist.
B assumes that (6.15b) conveys an enthymeme saying that Nixon is not a
pacifist, since he is a Republican, ε2 below. This enthymeme also evokes the
topos τ2, which B now expects to be shared in the conversation.
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(6.27) ε2 = λr: x = Nixon : Ind
crepublican : quaker(x)
⋅ cpacifist : pacifist(r.x)
In (6.28) we see B’s information state after uttering (6.15d).
(6.28)
private :
agenda = [] : list(RecType)
topoi = [] : list(Topos)
shared :




e = nixon : Ind
cQuaker : Quaker(x)
topoi = [τ2, τ1] : list(Topos)
Now B’s take on the state of the dialogue is that there are two enthymemes
under discussion—Nixon is a Quaker and therefore a pacifist, and Nixon is a
Republican and therefore anon-pacifist. On B’s view it is also the case that topoi
underpinning both arguments have been evoked in the dialogue. Since “paci-
fist” and “non-pacifist” can never be in a subtype—supertype relation to each
other, A and Bmust interactively evaluate the arguments based on how general
they take the rules expressed in the topoi to be andwhether they think that one
of the rules is more committing than the other. One could for example say that
if someone is a Quaker, that person has to be a pacifist, otherwise he would no
longer be a Quaker, while being a Republican could mean nothing more than
having voted for a Republican candidate—not necessarily embracing all polit-
ical views typically taken by Republicans. It is obviously also possible to reason
in favour of the conclusion that Nixon is a non-pacifist in a similar way.
We believe that this kind of argumentation could be modelled along the
lines of the analysis of our example dialogue so far, but we leave the details
of this analysis for future work. For a monolithic logical system the presence
of inconsistent conclusions and the impact of individual preferences on the
acceptability of topoi, as well as the ambiguity of terms used, present a prob-
lem. However, this is not a problem in dialogue, since dialogue participants
can at any point back track, make clarification requests, specify and negotiate
arguments and motivations, meaning, etc. Thus, in order to capture reason-
ing in interaction, we need to allow for different conclusions being drawn by
different participants, and also for participants reaching different conclusions
depending on context and point of view.
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6.2 Drawing on Topoi in Conversation
In the previous sections in this chapter we have considered examples which
weremadeup to illustrate someproblems introducedby thenon-monotonicity
often found in common sense reasoning. However, in spontaneous dialogue,
reasoning is often messier than that. For example, reasoning may be inter-
twined with lexical disambiguation and anaphora resolution and—especially
if the conversational participants have a close personal relationship—it is hard
for an external analyst to tell which topoi are accessible to the participants in
a particular interaction.
In order to account for the reasoning in such interactions, more manipula-
tions of enthymemes and topoi involved may thus be necessary compared to
what is needed to account for clear cut examples from the literature.
In this section we will return to an exchange previously discussed in Chap-
ter 1, about whether dogs should be allowed upstairs or not.We argue that one
component in this reasoningprocess is the set of topoi that are evoked through-
out the conversation, and we will suggest how the dialogue participants can
arrive at the reasoning behaviour displayed in this excerpt through manipula-
tions of the surface enthymemes and the topoi that underpin them.
In doing so, we are not claiming that we can determine the exact resources
which any particular dialogue participant would have at their disposal when
taking part in this dialogue. Rather we set ourselves the task of describing
which topoi and enthymemes could be accessed by an agent in order for the
dialogue to play out the way it does. There is a great, if not unlimited, num-
ber of possible topoi through which the same result could be achieved. What
is important is to show that our theory enables us to formulate at least one of
these. Let us first have a look at the dialogue again:
(6.29) Cherrilyn: Most dogs aren’t allowed up ⟨pause⟩ upstairs.





Cherrilyn: Yeah I mean ⟨pause⟩ dog hairs rise anyway so
Fiona: What do you mean, rise?
Cherrilyn: The hair ⟨pause⟩ it rises upstairs.
I mean I, you know friends said it was, oh God I
wouldn’t allow mine upstairs because of all the
⟨pause⟩ dog hairs!
Oh well ⟨pause⟩ they go up there anyway.
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Fiona: So, but I don’t know what it is, right, it’s only a few
bloody hairs! (BNC file KBL:4196–4206)
The dialogue in (6.29) is essentially about whether dogs should be allowed
everywhere in the house, or—more specifically—upstairs. Important for the
analysis of this conversation is the notion of communicative project (3.2.3.2).
The overall project seems to be to establish and expand common ground
regarding where dogs should be allowed and why, and the argumentation
orients either in favour of or against dogs being allowed upstairs. However,
it is possible to distinguish sub-projects, like the clarification sequence after
Cherrilyn’s utterance Yeah I mean, dog hairs rise anyway so. We will look at
the enthymemes conveyed and topoi available to the dialogue partners at
certain points in time throughout the dialogue, starting with Cherrilyn just
after she has uttered He is allowed to go wherever he wants, do whatever he
likes.
Fiona’s response to Cherrilyn’s claim that her dog is allowed to go every-
where, the utterance Too right! So they should! Shouldn’t they? ends with a tag
question. Tag questionsmay have at least two functions—to signal uncertainty
in the speaker, or to bring the interlocutor into the conversation (Andersen,
1998). In this context the function of the question could be either or both of
these. Cherrilyn has already communicated her view when she said that her
dog is allowed to go wherever he wants (including upstairs) and do whatever
he likes, but she does so implicitly. In her response Too right, so they should,
shouldn’t they? Fiona shows agreement with the proposition that dogs should
be allowed upstairs.
Now, Cherrilyn could produce any out of many different utterances in re-
sponse to Fiona’s agreement, but she chooses Yeah, I mean, dog hairs rise any-
way. There is obviously no way of telling precisely why and based on which
assumptions Cherrilyn says this. However, she seems to be taking a stand for
dogs being allowed to go upstairs, since she claims that her own dog is allowed
to “go wherever he likes”.
The continuation of this dialogue implies that Cherrilyn intends her utter-
ance in (6.29), Yeah, I mean, dog hairs rise anyway, as support for her earlier
claim.
In (6.30) we see the enthymematic argument conveyed by Cherrilyn’s utter-
ances, where the proposition that dog hairs rise is given as a reason for Cherri-
lyn’s dog being allowed upstairs. We refer to this enthymeme—“dog hairs rise,
therefore my dog is allowed upstairs” as ε1, represented in ttr as a function
from a situation type where dog hairs rise, to a situation where Cherrilyn’s dog
is allowed upstairs.










cbe_allowed : be_allowed(x, e-loc)
We assume that Cherrilyn’s information state is updated with the enthymeme
ε1, which she now considers to be under discussion. If Cherrilyn expects the
interaction to be successful, that is, if she expects Fiona to correctly interpret
her utterance in relation to the previous discourse, Cherrilynmust assume that
a topos or set of topoi underpinning the enthymeme is also accommodated
by Fiona. Thus, Cherrilyn’s gameboard will be updated with the relevant topos
or set of topoi via either update rule fintegrate_topos (Section 4.2.2 and Appendix
1, section 2) and fintegrate_resource_topos (Section 4.2.5 and Appendix 1, section 2),
depending on the salience of the integrated topos3 with regard to the inter-
locutor, in this case Fiona.
Contextual clues and intonation might contribute to Fiona’s ability to ac-
commodate an enthymematic relation between the utterance Yeah, dog hairs
rise anyway and the previously established and agreed upon notion that dogs
should be allowed upstairs. However, there is still need for a topos warranting
the reasoning in ε1.
The most straightforward way of obtaining the topos that underpins ε1 is by
removing the manifest fields of the enthymeme.4 In this case that means that
the underpinning topos would be “dog hairs rise, therefore dogs are allowed
upstairs”. However, Fiona signals a lack of understanding by asking “what do
you mean rise”. This indicates that the topos is not acceptable to her.
So, we assume that Fiona interprets Cherrilyn’s utterances as expressing an
enthymematic argument,meaning that ε1 is integrated on Fiona’s shared game-
board at this point in time. Fiona then tries to find a topos warranting ε1. Fail-
ing to do so, she makes a clarification request which indicates that none of
the meanings of rise which she is aware of helps her reach a relevant inter-
pretation of the utterance. Fiona’s clarification request is an explicit signal
that she has not been able to accommodate a topos or set of topoi warrant-
ing ε1.
3 For a discussion of this see Section 4.2.5.
4 See Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 for a discussion about differentways inwhich enthymemes
and topoi can be related.
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In her response to the clarification request Cherrilyn does not only elabo-
rate which interpretation of rise she had in mind, she also adds a sequence
to explain the reasoning behind her utterance dog hairs rise anyway. The se-
quence friends said it was, oh God I wouldn’t allow mine upstairs because of all
the dog hairs actually evokes a topos—τdogs_shed—the relevance of which Cher-
rilyn rejects by saying dog hairs rise anyway.
So, let us lookmore closely at the underpinning topoi and the reasoning that
would be necessary for arriving at ε1 drawing on these topoi.
6.2.1 The Topoi of Dog Hairs
One topos that everybody involved seems to agree on is that if a dog with hairs
is at a certain place at a certain time, there will be hairs of that dog at that








cof : of(y, x)
e-loc : Loc
e-time : Time




cof1 : of(z, r.x)
e-time1 : Time
c< : r.e-time < e-time1
cbe1 : be(z, r.e-loc, e-time)
We may generalise the topos in (6.31) by removing the field labelled with ‘y’ in
the domain type and all the fields which depend on the y-field, chairs and cof.
There is nothing in the return type that depends on these fields, and therefore
a generalisation is possible. The topos we obtain after the generalisation says
that if there is a dog upstairs at some point in time there will be hairs there at
a later point in time (no matter if the dog is hairy or not). We call this topos
τdogs_shed.










cof1 : of(z, r.x)
e-time1 : Time
c< : r.e-time < e-time1
cbe1 : be(z, r.e-loc, e-time)
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In this case we are interested in dogs shedding in a specific location—
upstairs. The τdogs_shed could be made more specific, by adding fields to the
domain type (see Appendix 2). We then obtain a topos specifying that τdogs_shed
applies to situations where the location is upstairs, that is if a dog is upstairs
at some point in time, there will be doghairs upstairs at a later point in time.
Since upstairs is a subtype of location, (6.33), which we refer to as τdogs_up_shed_up,
is a specification of τdogs_shed in (6.32).











cof1 : of(z, r.x)
e-time1 : Time
c< : r.e-time<e-time1
cbe1 : be(z, r.e-loc, e-time1)
Cherrilyn and Fionawould also, presumably, have access to a topos stating that
doghairs upstairs are undesirable. We refer to this topos as τhairs_up_undes.







cof1 : of(z, x)
e-time1 : Time
cbe1 : be(z, e-loc, e-time1)
⋅ cundesirable : undesirable(r)
Now, in order to arrive at a topos saying that dogs upstairs are undesirable,
τdogs_up_undes, we need to combine the topoi τdogs_up_hairs_up and τhairs_up_undes. We do
this through composition.
6.2.2 Composition of Topoi and Enthymemes
To discuss composition of two topoi or enthymemes, we first need to talk about
how to derive fixed-point types for functions in ttr (for an in-depth discussion,
see Cooper, 2005a). In this context a fixed point type represents a holistic, or
static, perspective on the two situation types involved in a topos. For example,
if we have a topos saying that “if the weather is warm, people spend time at
the beach”, we may from this topos construe a type of situation which is war-
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ranted by the topos, namely one where the weather is warm and people spend
time at the beach. In more formal terms, the fixed point type of a function f,
ℱ(f), is obtained by extending the type of the domain of f with the dependent
type that characterises its range (Cooper, 2005a); see Appendix 2, section 3 for
a formal definition.
To obtain a fixed-point type for τdogs_up_hairs_up we need to merge the domain
type and the result type adjusting the references to r in the dependencies, as
shown in (6.35).Wewill refer to this type asℱ(τdogs_up_hairs_up), andwe could say
it represents a situationwhere there is a dog upstairs at some point in time and







cbe : be(x, e-loc, e-time)
z : set(Ind)
chairs1 : hairs(z)
cof1 : of(z, x)
e-time1 : Time
c< : e-time < e-time1
cbe1 : be(z, e-loc, e-time1)
(6.36) The composition τ1 ∘ τ2 of two topoi τ1 and τ2 such that
τ1 = λr: T1 ⋅ T2(r), τ2 = λr: T3 ⋅ T4(r), and ℱ(τ1) ⊑ T3, is λr: ℱ(τ1) ⋅ T4(r)
According to the definition in (6.36) the fixed-point type of a topos must
be a subtype of the domain-type (antecedent) of the topos with which it is
to be composed. Since ℱ(τdogs_up_hairs_up) is a subtype of the domain type of
τhairs_up_undes, they may be composed. The composition of these topoi—τdogs_up_
hairs_up ∘ τhairs_up_undes—is τdogs_and_hairs_up_undes in (6.37).
rhetorical reasoning in dialogue 127







cbe : be(x, e-loc, e-time)
z : set(Ind)
chairs1 : hairs(z)
cof1 : of(z, x)
e-time1 : Time
c< : e-time < e-time1
cbe1 : be(z, e-loc, e-time1)
. cundesirable : undesirable(r)
Through generalisation, we finally arrive at a topos stating that if a dog is
upstairs, that is an undesirable situation:






cbe : be(x, e-loc, e-time)
⋅ cundesirable : undesirable(r)
The topos in (6.38) seems to be recognized by Cherrilyn and Fiona, in the sense
that they are both aware that this is a generally accepted way of reasoning.
Also, it serves as underpinning for a second enthymeme in this dialogue—an
enthymeme evoked by Cherrilyn’s report of her friends’ comment I wouldn’t
allow mine upstairs because of all the dog hairs!, which would also be under-
pinned by a topos like τundes_disal in (6.39).




In order to reason as they do, Cherrilyn’s friends have to accept not only the
topos τdogs_up_hairs_up, but also a topos saying the opposite—if there are no dogs
upstairs, there will be no dog hairs upstairs. In other words, Cherrilyn’s friends
interpret the implication between dogs up and hairs up as a biconditional. This
type of reasoning may be logically faulty, but it has been shown implication
is often interpreted this way (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2008), and this
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interpretionmay bemore useful inmany real life situations. For example, if we
do a job we get paid, and if we do not do the job we do not get paid—it is not
the case that we may get paid even if we do not do the job.
However, when Cherrilyn points out that her friend’s reasoning—and that
of all other dogs-upstairs-disallowers—is not valid, it could be argued that she
in fact forces the conversation, or the conversation participants, to accommo-
date amore logically accurateway of reasoning, or a higher degree of exactness
of reasoning.
So, bypointing to the fact that hairs rise, drawingon the topos τhairs_down_hairs_up
in (6.40), Cherrilyn has demonstrated that it is not possible to avoid hairs
upstairs by keeping dogs downstairs. Also, we would need a topos saying that
if two possible actions lead to the same result, you should choose the action
which is preferable in some respect, for example because it takes less effort or
because it gives some additional desirable result.
(6.40) a. if there are doghairs downstairs at some point in time there will be



















cbe1 : be(z, e-loc1, e-time1)
So there is a question of balancing the undesirable consequences of dogs
upstairs with the desirable consequences. Cherrilyn’s point is that it does not
matter which of these takes precedence, since both options—allowing dogs
upstairs or not allowing dogs upstairs—result in the same type of situation:
hairs upstairs.
Fiona, on the other hand, questions the topos that dogs should not be
allowed upstairs from another angle: She claims that dog hairs upstairs is not a
serious problem, which renders the discussion of whether hairs get upstairs or
not less relevant. The topos which she is challenging is τhairs_up_undes.
Our analysis of this example illustrates how the topoi underpinning an argu-
ment must be recognisable to interlocutors in order for the communication to
be successful. To obtain a topos that would warrant the conclusion that dogs
should be allowed upstairs based on the premise that dog hairs rise, many
manipulations on topoi are required.
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In her first utterance “dog hairs rise anyway”, Cherrilyn fails to relevantly
connect the enthymeme to the topoi to which she has access, so she clarifies
not only by elaborating on the appropriate interpretation of rise, but also by
pointing to an enthymeme partly based on competing topoi. This dialogue is
thus an example of a spontaneous conversation of the kind we mentioned in
connection to the Nixon puzzle, where the set of topoi drawn on by individual
dialogue participants is not necessarily consistent, and where dialogue partici-
pants sometimes utilise topoi which they do not agree with. This is not surpris-
ing per se—as humanswe are capable of reasoning about actual and hypothet-
ical situations considering matters from different points of view depending on
the context. However, modelling this kind of reasoning requires a theory that
allows inconsistent rules and rules which can be manipulated with regard to
context.
6.3 Acquiring Topoi in Interaction
In Chapter 1 we mentioned that topoi can be seen as cultural indicators. This
means that the topoi which members of a group live by can be seen as a char-
acterisation of the socio-cultural environment of that group. Similarly, an indi-
vidual’s personal set of topoi can be seen as defining the experiences of that
individual. However, such sets are by no means closed—we acquire new topoi
throughout life, some are explicitly pointed out to us, some we learn through
inference. Consider, for example, the exchange in (6.41) taken from a corpus of
argumentative three-party dialogues (Lavelle et al., 2012).
(6.41) A: I wanna wanna know what she plays but
[you know what I mean]
B: [apparently she’s the next Mozart]
A: the next Mozart so piano (GP13 47–50)
A’s final utterance in (6.41) conveys the enthymeme in (6.42)—She is the next
Mozart, hence, she plays the piano.
(6.42) she is the next Mozart
she plays the piano
Let us assume a situation where B does not know which instrument Mozart
played. When encountering the enthymeme in (6.42), B may accommodate a
topos saying that if someone is a Mozart, they play the piano. Not only can
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this topos tentatively be made common ground in the dialogue, it can also be
incorporated into B’s long-term resources. Previously, we have thought of the
rhetorical resources of a dialogue participant as something external to thedgb.
However, in order to model, within our current theory, an update where topoi
are added to the long term resources of an agent, we will introduce ‘resources’
as a third field on the dgb. In facquire_topos below, the type associated with the
label ‘resources’ is ‘list(Topos)’, since the only resources we will consider here
are topoi.
The function handling the update of resources bymeans of topos accommo-
dation says that if there is no topos accessible in your rhetorical resources such
that it can be used to warrant the enthymeme currently under discussion, you
may add a topos which is identical to the enthymeme under discussion to the
topoi that are shared in the conversation, and also incorporate it in your rhetor-
ical resources. In order to formulate such a rule, we must first define negation
for record types. Following Cooper and Ginzburg (2015) we define negation as
in (6.43):5
(6.43) For any type T, an object a is of type ¬T, a: ¬T, iff there is some T ′ such
that a: T ′ and T ′ precludes T (T ′ ⊥ T)
The update rule facquire_topos says that if there is no topos in the rhetorical
resources of an agent of which the enthymeme currently under discussion
is a specification, then the agent is licensed to add a topos identical to that
enthymemenot only to the topoiwhich are shared in the conversation, but also
to their rhetorical resources. In future interactions, this toposmight be adjusted
or generalised further, or rejected if the agent learns that it is unacceptable to









c1 : in(t, r.resources)
c2 : spec(t, fst(r.shared.eud))
⋅
resources = [fst(r.shared.eud) | r.resources] : list(Topos)
shared : topoi = [fst(r.shared.eud) | r.shared.topos ] : list(Topos)
Situations where we encounter enthymemes for which we cannot find a suit-
able underpinning topos can be expected to be more frequent when individ-
5 See also Section 4.2.4 and Appendix 2, Section 1.1 on preclusion.
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uals find themselves in novel types of situations. This is the case for adults
experiencing unfamiliar socio-cultural contexts as well as for children who are
struggling to get a grip on functional and acceptable reasoning. It has been
suggested that enthymematic reasoning plays a role for lexical disambiguation
(Pustejovsky, 1998), and we suggest that it also may play a role for acquisition
of new concepts by means of accommodation of new topoi. However, due to a
tendency to overextension, discussed for example by Barrett (1978) and Clark
(2015), the meaning children associate with an expression sometimes deviates
from the conventionalmeaning of that expression in the language community.
An example of this can be found in the following interaction of a mother
reading a bedtime story to a four-year-old child from Breitholtz (2015):
(6.45) Mother: When SnowWhitewas still a baby hermother died. After
some time her father, the king, remarried. His new wife
was beautiful but vain and wicked.
Child: Yes mum—a widow!
To anyone familiar with the conventional meaning of the word widow, it seems
obvious that the child has got it wrong. However, howdid she get it wrong?And
can themechanisms of how she got it wrong explain howmost of us eventually
get it right?
The mother’s utterance in (6.45) says explicitly that Snow White’s step-
mother is vain and wicked. Thus wemay assume that the type of SnowWhite’s
stepmother that is commonground in the dialogue this far is the one in (6.46).6
(6.46) Tstep_mother:
x = SnowWhite’s stepmother : Ind
cvain : vain(x)
cwicked : wicked(x)
The child’s utterance together with that of themother convey a co-constructed
enthymeme saying that SnowWhite’s stepmother is vain andwicked, therefore,
she is a widow. We refer to this enthymeme as ε1, as seen in (6.47). Intuitively,
ε1 represents the idea that if you have a situation of the type where someone is
vain and wicked, you can predict the type of situation where that person is a
widow.
6 This could also be a subtype of 6.46 including other constraints like “woman”. However, we
leave aside such considerations here for clarity.
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(6.47) ε1=λr:
x = SnowWhite’s stepmother : Ind
cvain : vain(x)
cwicked : wicked(x)
⋅ cwidow : widow(r.x)
For the child to make this argument, we must assume that she has access to a






⋅ cwidow : widow(r.x)
It seems reasonable to say that if the child believes that someone being vain
and wicked is a reason for concluding that that person is a widow, the child
perceives vain andwicked as essential components of themeaning of the word
widow. But howwas this idea established? No one is likely to have told the child
that widow means vain and wicked, or that widows are vain and wicked. We
argue that this is a result of children’s tendency to overextension mentioned
above, and the general ability of accommodation (previously discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.5).
Onepossible source of input leading the child to construe a topos thatwould
warrant ε1 is other fairy tales such as Cinderella:
(6.49) “After a few years Cinderella’s father took a newwife, a widowwith two
daughters of her own”
From this passage, we learn that Cinderella’s stepmother is a widow. As the
story evolves, we receive evidence that she is also vain and wicked. From the
story of Cinderella a topos regarding widows may be tentatively construed,
namely the one in (6.50):
(6.50) τ2 = λr: x : Ind
cwidow : widow(x)
⋅ cvain : vain(r.x)
cwicked : wicked(r.x)
This topos says that if wehave a situationof the typewhere someone is awidow,
we also have a type of situation where that person is vain and wicked.
There aremanyways inwhich human reasoning does not adhere to the rules
of classical logic—some of these we have discussed in this book. The tran-
sistion from τ2 to τ1in this example is an instance of one of the most obvious
deviations of human reasoning with respect to classical logic—biconditional
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strengthening, that is, interpreting conditionals as biconditionals (Wason, 1968;
Sztencel, 2018).
We could think of this as a principle of human reasoning and introduce a
rule in ourmodel saying that if wehave a topos λr :T1 ⋅T2, we are licensed to add
to our resources a topos λr :T2 ⋅T1.We could also think of the reasoning process
as more associative, and related to the kind of associations that arise in neural
activity where co-activation of two neural patterns eventually leads to external
stimulation of one engendering the second pattern even in the absence of a
stimulus, often referred to as Hebbian reinforcement (Hebb, 1949). From this
point of view, a child may perceive a number of features co-occurring in one
particular situation, and based on this may construe various types of depen-
dencies between these features, and the ones that co-occur more often will
eventually be more strongly connected. Thus, when encountering a type of sit-
uationwhere someone (SnowWhite’s stepmother) is vain andwicked, the child






Other topoi that would be possible to derive from (6.51) include ones saying
that vainwidows arewicked and that widows arewicked and vain. In fact, from
all topoi we may, in principle, derive any topos that has the same fixed point
type.
This way of thinking about the building up of rhetorical resources and con-
cepts may seem very open ended. However, we do not argue that the topoi we
have access to are necessarily biconditional or that any topos derived from a
particular situation type is acceptable in reasoning, but in order to model the
acquisition of new topoi our theory must allow for less restricted ways of mak-
ing inferences.
To achieve a dynamic theory of language learning and reasoning, where we
can account for things like the overextension common in children, while at
the same time mostly avoid unacceptable predictions, we believe it necessary
to include a statistical or probabilistic component. Exactly how this would be
set up we leave aside for the time being, but it seems intuitively clear that the
child, as she encounters the word “widow” in other situations, will revise the
7 See Section 6.2.2.
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dependencies of the relevant topoi in her resources, and “vain” and “wicked”
will gradually move from the centre of the meaning of widow to the periphery
to become at most a connotation.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter we have seen examples illustrating how we use reasoning to
establish the meaning of words as well as to disambiguate word meaning. Our
approach allows us to represent misunderstanding and misinterpretation of
meaning, since it is based on the conceptualisation of entities and individuals
rather than on a God’s eye view of meaning. Thus our account fits well with an
approach to meaning where speakers constantly adjust meanings on the basis
of experience, which can be found in work by for example Pustejovsky (1998),
Cooper (2012), Gregoromichelaki et al. (2012), Ludlow (2014), Kempson et al.
(2016) and Larsson and Myrendal (2017).
One of the advantages of using topoi rather than default rules as underpin-
ning for the kind of non-monotonic reasoning we find in enthymemes, is that
the set of topoi of one agent doesnot necessarily constitute amonolithic logical
system. Thus the topoi in an individual’s resources do not need to be consistent
or lead to consistent conclusions evenwithin onemodel or domain (Breitholtz,
2014a).
The ability to follow various strains of reasoning—also inconsistent ones—
seems to be a prerequisite for the complex type of interactive language under-
standing and problem solving that humansmaster sowell. However, in order to
fully take advantage of the possibility tomodel this ability, weneed to be able to
account for the reasoning of agents with access to a wider range of topoi than
those we have considered here.
A natural progression of the account presented here would be to extend our
model to include a probabilistic component. This would enable us to make
predictions regarding the enthymematic inferences of an agent with access to
several topoi applicable in a particular situation. It would also allow for mod-
elling the learning of new topoi through interaction with other agents.
Interesting work has been done by Cooper et al. (2014) on probabilistic
semantics in ttr, and Clark and Lappin (2010) convincingly show how lan-
guage learning is related to probability theory. Both of these approaches fit well
with the approach that we suggest, and they offer a way to introduce a proba-
bilistic component into the account of learning presented here.
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In this bookwehave investigated the role of enthymemes and topoi indialogue.
These concepts,which are known fromAristotle’swork, refer to rhetorical argu-
ments and the warrants of such arguments respectively. A defining feature
of an enthymeme is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from its
premises (unlike in a logical argument), and therefore the topoi that underpin
enthymemes must be acceptable to the audience or interlocutor at which the
argument is aimed. Hence, the reasoning based on topoi is sometimes referred
to as “common sense” reasoning.
However, enthymematic reasoning goes beyond that. In fact any type of rea-
soning can be accounted for using enthymemes and topoi, ranging from situ-
ations where we do not find a topos acceptable (and which are thus not part
of “common sense”) but recognisable, to instances of strictly logical reasoning
where the inference rules have been made explicit (Brandom, 1998).
In Chapter 1 we introduced the concepts of enthymeme and topos and con-
sidered how theymay present themselves in dialogue, and how enthymematic
reasoning is relevant to many of the challenges in interactional linguistics. In
Chapter 2 we were interested in how enthymemes and topoi relate to differ-
ent types of inferences and how they contribute to cohesion and meaning. In
Chapter 3 we introduced a dialogue semantic account of how enthymematic
reasoning causes updates of dialogue participants’ information states, cast in
ttr, a type theory with records. In Chapter 4 we looked at how some fea-
tures of dialogical reasoning such as why-questions can be analysed in terms
of enthymemes and topoi, and in Chapter 5 we moved on to consider how
enthymematic reasoning relates to models of dialogue, context and cognition.
In Chapter 6 we looked at how our theory accounts for non-monotonicity,
ambiguous meaning in conversation and the acquisition of new topoi. In this
final chapter wewill sum up themain conclusions drawn in the previous chap-
ters and suggest some directions for future work.
7.1.1 Pragmatic Inference
Few theories in linguistics or philosophy of language deny that some kind of
background knowledge or set of beliefs about the world is necessary in order
for a language user to draw pragmatic inferences. However, the organisation of
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this knowledge and themechanisms for including it in dialoguemodels are still
far from accounted for in pragmatics.
The anti-inferentialist theory of meaning in context (Recanati, 2004) does
pay more attention to the role of world knowledge than theories like Gricean
pragmatics andRelevanceTheory. But itmainly acknowledges the role of world
knowledge in the context of primary pragmatic processes such as disambigua-
tion and enrichment, and less as underpinning pragmatic inferences like con-
versational implicatures.
In overtly rhetorical discourse such as political speeches the role of back-
ground knowledge or assumptions is particularly evident. In this context en-
thymemes are sometimes very conspicuous since they draw on potentially
controversial topoi. This is not least true in the current, increasingly polarised,
political climate.
In dialogue, particularly informal conversation, on the other hand, enthy-
mematic arguments tend to be less noticeable, as many of the things that
underpin our arguments in everyday conversation are associated with com-
monly acknowledged topoi. For example, when interpreting pieces of dialogue
like “Let’s walk alongWalnut Street—it’s shorter” we might not even reflect on
the rhetorical structure, since the enthymeme conveyed is based on common-
place and uncontroversial topoi such as the assumptions that if you are going
somewhere you want to get there as quickly as possible, if a route is short it is
fast, etc.
In the literature on pragmatic inferences it is often suggested that the prin-
ciples for making such inferences are universal and independent of context.
We have shown that while we may draw on general principles to infer more
than the truth-conditional content of an utterance, we cannot rely only on a
small and closed set of high-level principles like Gricean maxims or relevance
assumptions.
7.1.2 Defining Genres
In Chapter 5 we discussed some parameters that can be used to distinguish
betweengenres of languageuse or conversational types.Wementionedactivity,
communicative project and conversational game as examples of such param-
eters. We may think of communicative projects as linked to the subgoals of
the activity, and of conversational games as related to activities as well as to
projects, in the sense that the speech act sequence (or sequence of adjacency
pairs) typically employed to carry out a communicative project depends on the
nature of the project itself, but also on the kind of activity in association with
which the conversation occurs.
Let us imagine, for example, that a group of friends are going camping and
they are dividing up the various tasks which are necessary to set up camp. In
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this scenario, the activity is “setting up camp”. The communicative project of
making decisions about tasks would probably be carried out by means of a
different conversational game, or sequence of conversational games, than in
a similar situation in the military where hierarchies are very well defined and
there is no expectation that decisions should be made jointly.
We suggested that topoi should be added to the set of parameters defin-
ing conversational types. In this context, the notion of topoi is to some extent
related to activity type, since certain topoi are strongly associatedwith particu-
lar activity types. For example, in a patient-doctor conversation we can expect
topoi related to health, body, etc., to bemore frequent than topoi regarding the
economy or money. However, topoi also contribute to how the activity plays
out, since the socio-cultural context in which the activity is embedded may
affect which topoi of health are introduced in the interaction.
7.1.3 Enthymemes in Conversational AI
Related to the question of defining genres of conversation is the question of
how tomodel context.Whenmodelling artificial agents, world knowledgemay
be organised for example as schemas or frames. These can be seen as groups
or clusters of connected concepts for things, people and events, usually related
to a particular domain or activity such as dining in a restaurant. While we do
not want to rule out the use of frames and schemas for modelling context, we
suggest thatmodelling someworld knowledge as topoi could be advantageous.
Many topoi would be included in several schemas and it might sometimes
be hard for an agent to identify a given situation as belonging to a particular
schema or frame, whereas it may be easier to recognise an enthymematic argu-
ment as evoking a particular topos.With a set of topoi at its disposal rather than
only a set of domain specific schemas, an artificial agent has a higher degree of
flexibility and is free to draw on any topos in any domain, specify it, generalise
it and combine it with other topoi just as people do. It seems to us that this
approach is valuable if we want to build creative agents who can adjust to new
situations.
In the context of dialogue systems we pointed out a connection between
enthymemes and informationally redundant utterances (irus). irus have
been shown to contribute to decreasing the cognitive load of dialogue partic-
ipants. We argued that irus and their antecedents evoke enthymemes draw-
ing on situation relevant topoi. The fact that suggestions, proposals or claims
are presented with a supporting premise decreases cognitive load, since the
addressee has to do less work to find the appropriate topos or topoi.
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7.1.4 Accommodation
In the context of pragmatic inferences we extended the notion of accommo-
dation to cover enthymemes and topoi.We discussed several different cases of
topos accommodation, that is, when a topos is added to the discourse model
because it is perceived as a necessary warrant of an enthymeme under dis-
cussion. In the modelling of a dialogue, accommodation of a topos results in
integrating the topos on the shared dgb.1 We distinguished different cases of
topos accommodation based on the resources available to the language user
and the salience of the topos in a given context.
The first case iswhen a dialogue participant anticipates the accommodation
of a topos, that is, the topos is already salient and part of the discourse model
for a dialogue participant. The accommodation in this case consists of the inte-
gration of already acknowledged and relevant topoi into the shared discourse
model. In our model, this corresponds to the topoi being moved from the pri-
vate to the shared dgb. This kind of topos accommodation was described in
Section 4.2.1.
Secondly, we have the case where a topos is evoked that is available in the
long term memory of a dialogue participant. In this case, the topos is recog-
nisable to the dialogue participant, but it is not salient in the sense that it is
already present in his or her mind in the discourse context. An example where
this kind of accommodation occurs is the excerpt about “rollers” in (4.36).
Note that we do not make strong claims regarding the precise architecture
of the private game board and other resources accessible to a dialogue partic-
ipant. We could think of the rhetorical resources of an agent as part of that
agent’s private game board, or external to it. The point is that we sometimes
need to differentiate between easily accessible topoi (ones that are salient and
relevant for a particular speaker engaged in dialogue in a particular context)
and less accessible topoi.
Another case of accommodation is when a dialogue participant cannot
identify a topos that would warrant the enthymeme currently under discus-
sion, but is still able to reconstruct and tentatively accommodate a topos that
warrants the enthymeme. This means that we can accommodate topoi we did
not previously recognise. We suggest that this kind of accommodation con-
tributes to acquisition of new topoi, in that an agent may add new, tentatively
1 Since topoi are usually notmade explicit, they are not straightforwardly integrated in theway
that explicit dialogue moves are. For example, an answer to a question raised in the previous
turn is automatically integrated as the latest move made in the dialogue. Topoi, on the other
hand, are typically integrated through accommodation.
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accommodated topoi to his resources, where they might over time become
more prominent as the language user encountersmore instances of these topoi
in interactionwith other language users. An example of this kind of accommo-
dation can be found in Section 6.3.
In addition to the different types of topos accommodation, we also intro-
duced a rule for accommodation of enthymemes based on topoi. The type of
situation we are interested in here is when an agent infers an enthymematic
structure between two utterances or parts of an utterance based on topoi
that are easily associated with the discourse. This kind of accommodation
contributes to cohesion in dialogue by warranting an enthymematic relation
between two discourse units. An example of this kind of accommodation is
the “Walnut Street” example in (5.4).
7.1.5 Formalisation
Wehave suggested a way of formalising enthymematic reasoning in ttr, draw-
ing on previous work by Cooper and Ginzburg, thus extending the kinds of
linguistic phenomena previously accounted for in the literature on ttr to
also include enthymemes and topoi. Developing the formal analysis has con-
tributed to many of the conclusions discussed above. One insight in particular
regards the nature of enthymemes and topoi and the relation between them.
Topoi tend not to be instantiated, viz. they usually apply to more than one
individual of a certain type, while enthymemes are specific arguments used in
particular dialogues and situations. In our formalisation we treat enthymemes
and topoi as the same type of formal object—a function from a situation of a
particular type to another type of situation.
It is possible that instantiated principles of reasoning become part of our
rhetorical resources, if they concern individuals and events that are central
enough tomotivate this. That topoi and enthymemes aremodelled as the same
type of formal object means that we have a way of moving seamlessly between
enthymemes and related topoi. This is necessary to account for howwe expand
our resources by integrating topoi based on enthymematic inferences fromdis-
course. Such mechanisms may also explain how we can obtain new topoi by
combining, generalising and restricting topoi which are already established in
our resources. In our account of these operations we draw on the subtype-
supertype relation that exists between parts of enthymemes and the topoi that
underpin them.
7.1.6 Non-monotonic Reasoning
In Chapter 6 we suggest using topoi as resources for non-monotonic reason-
ing. Using a collection of topoi integrated in one dgb we can account not only
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for situationswhere topoi are hierarchical, but also for situationswhere several
topoi apply, but taken together are inconsistent or lead to conclusions that are
inconsistent. The reason for this is that a system of topoi is not a monolithic
logical system. Allowing for mutually inconsistent topoi enables, for example,
modelling of internal deliberation or a discussion where arguments are used
which are potentially acceptable by themselves, but lead to an inconsistent sys-
tem, such as the “Nixon Diamond” example discussed in Section 6.1.2.
7.2 FutureWork
7.2.1 Experimental and Corpus Studies
The work presented in this book is mostly neither experimental nor quantita-
tive, and a natural progression would be to test some of the hypotheses and
models experimentally. For example, the connection between enthymemes
and Why-questions could be systematically tested to see how people respond
to such questions at different points in dialogue, and how this is related to the
incremental update of their rhetorical resources.
It could also be fruitful to use experimental techniques to investigate the
enthymemes people use in a dialogue, and to see what factors influence which
argument people choose when more than one topos is available. It seems pos-
sible that how people respond toWhy-questions is influenced by both the cur-
rent turn, and the enthymematic arguments they have shared previously in the
dialogue, with later turns leading to more explicit descriptions of topoi as par-
ticipants incrementally refine and recognise their own arguments through the
process of dialogue.
The hypotheses that enthymemes are somehow related to cognitive load
could also be tested, for example in an in-vehicle environment (see for exam-
ple Villing, 2009). Drivers would be given instructions in the form of valid
enthymematic arguments (that is, enthymemes underpinned by a relevant
topos), in the form of enthymematic arguments that do not have obvious con-
nections to relevant topoi, or in the form of instructions without a support-
ing premise, leaving the question of the underpinning topos open. The sub-
ject’s cognitive load would be measured continuously. An experiment like this
would not only test the connection between cognitive load and acceptable
enthymemes, but potentially also provide some information aboutwhich topoi
are considered relevant in particular situations.
Quantitative corpus studies of enthymemes are problematic since enthy-
memes are not easy to find automatically, and manual searches that would
produce enough data for quantitative studies are not feasible. One option
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that might be worth pursuing in this context is enthymeme mining (Razu-
vayevskaya and Teufel, 2017; Maraev et al., 2020).
Implementing our model in a conversational AI system would be a way
of testing the predictions made by our theory as well as the effects of using
enthymemes on interctions between humans and artificial agents.
7.2.2 Enthymematic Reasoning and Probabilistic Inference
A consequence of the gradual nature of topoi is that the acceptability of an
enthymeme is based on the non-binary acceptability in a particular context
of the warranting topos. When we model a dialogue based on already existing
data, we know which enthymemes are conveyed in the discourse and we may
construe topoi which would result in the observed dialogue behaviour. How-
ever, if we were to model artificial agents capable of interpreting, producing
and reacting to new dialogue contributions, other issues arise.
One such issue is howan agent is to choose between available topoi based on
the degree of acceptability of these topoi in the context. In recent work in this
directionMaguire (2019) encodes enthymemes and topoi as Bayesian networks
implemented in ttr. Combining techniques from Maguire (2019) and other
probabilistic approaches to dialogue modelling, such as Cooper et al. (2014),
with insights from the experimental studies sketchedabovewouldprovidedata
for testing such a model.
7.2.3 Theoretical Development
The formal account presented in this book provides a way of formally account-
ing for phenomenadiscussed in the literature on reasoning going back to antiq-
uity, even in cases when the theories of reasoning presented cannot be cast
in a traditional logical framework. Being able to formally account for some
aspects of theories like Aristotelian dialectic, which has been shown to be fun-
damentally pragmatic in nature (Mora-Márquez, 2017), would elucidate our
understanding of some of these theories.
A precise theory of enthymemes and topoi also enables us to relate (non-
formal) accounts of rhetoric and argumentation to formal and computational
models in linguistics and language technology. One area where this is relevant
is within “third wave” sociolinguistics (Eckert, 2012), where topoi could be used
to characterise personae, particularly in argumentative contexts, using simi-
lar techniques to those used by Burnett (2019) (see for example Breitholtz and
Cooper, 2018; Noble et al., 2020).
A micro-rhetorical perspective on discourse and dialogue combines differ-
ent strands of linguistic research which each contribute important perspec-
tives on linguistic interaction. Including enthymemes and topoi in an analysis
of dialogue has the potential of capturing notions of individual- and socio-
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cultural identity, as well as point of view. One example of a field of study where
it is necessary to take socio-cultural aspects into account is humour and laugh-
ter, see for example Ginzburg et al. (2015) and Breitholtz and Maraev (2019).
7.3 Summary
In this book we have shown that by including enthymematic reasoning based
on topoi in an account of dialogue, we can capture in a precise way how back-
ground assumptions and knowledge is integrated into the common ground of
a dialogue.We have also sketched away of formally accounting for phenomena
at the semantics-pragmatics interface which opens up a wide range of oppor-
tunities for applied, experimental and theoretical future work.
© Ellen Breitholtz, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004436794_009









e : assert(x, y, ctnt)
x = A : Ind








e : ask(x, y, ctnt)
x = B : Ind
y = A : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
qud = [(λt : Type ⋅ λr′ : t ⋅ r.sh.l-m.e.ctnt) | r.sh.qud] : list(Question)








x = A : Ind




x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt = fst(sh.qud) : Question
e :
e : assert(x,y,ctnt)
x = A : Ind
y = B : Ind
ctnt : RecType
qud = [λt : Type ⋅ λr′ : t ⋅ l-m.prev.prev.e.ctnt] : list(Question)
⋅
sh : eud = [r.sh.qud(r.sh.l-m.e.ctnt)] : list(Enthymeme)
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1.3 Accommodate Enthymeme, faccommmodate_enthymeme (p. 106)
λr:
pr : topoi : list(Topos)









c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : spec(t, λr′ : r.sh.l-m.ctnt ⋅ r.sh.l-m.prev.ctnt)
⋅
sh : eud = [λr′ : r.l-m.ctnt ⋅ r.sh.l-m.prev.ctnt] : list(Enthymeme)
2 Topoi
2.1 Integrate Topos, fintegrate_topos (p. 67)
λr:






c1 : in(t, r.private.topoi)
c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)
2.2 Integrate Topos′, fintegrate_topos′ (p. 72)
λr:






c1 : in(t, r.private.topoi)
c2 : underspec.(fst(r.shared.eud), t))
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.private.topoi] : list(Topos)
2.3 Reraise Topos, freraise_topos (p. 75)




c1 : in(t, r.shared.topoi)
c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t)
⋅
shared : topoi = [μ(e.t, r.sh.topoi)] : list(Topos)
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2.4 Integrate Resource Topos, fintegrate_resource_topos (p.79)
λr:







c2 : specification(fst(r.shared.eud), t))
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)
2.5 Integrate Resource Topos′, fintegrate_resource_topos′ (p.79)
λr:







c2 : specification(t, fst(r.shared.eud)))
⋅
shared : topoi = [e.t | r.shared.topoi] : list(Topos)














c1 : in(t, resources)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
belief : RecType
c3 : in(belief, resources)
c4 : relevant_to(belief, fst(r.sh.project))
⋅
pr :










ctnt = ERec : RecType
] : list(RecType)
topoi : list(Topos)





c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
⋅
pr : topoi = μ(e.t, r.pr.topoi) : list(RecType)








c1 : in(t, r.resources)
c2 : spec(t, fst(r.shared.eud))
⋅
resources = [fst(r.shared.eud) | r.resources] : list(Topos)
shared : topoi = [fst(r.shared.eud) | r.shared.topos ] : list(Topos)
3 Agenda
3.1 Update Agenda with Suggestion, fupdate_agenda_suggestion (p. 98)
λr: pr : agenda = [ ] : list(RecType)
games = [TSuggestionGameInst] : list(TGame)
⋅

















c1 : in(t, r.pr.topoi)
c2 : relevant_to(t, fst(r.sh.project))
belief : RecType
c3 : in(belief, r.pr.beliefs)
c4 : relevant_to(belief, fst(r.sh.project))
ctnt : RecType
c5 : derived_from(ctnt, {t, belief})
⋅
pr : ag = [
e : Suggest




4.1 Update Private Games, fud_pr_games (p. 95)
λr: pr : games : list(TGame)
sh : project = [ TDecisionProject] : list(RecType)
⋅ λe: g : TSuggestionGame
c1 : in(g, r.pr.games)
⋅
pr : games = [μ(e.g, r.pr.games) ] : list(TGame)
4.2 Update Private Games′, fud_pr_games′ (p. 96)
λr: pr : games : list(TGame)
sh : project = [TDecisionProject] : list(RecType)
⋅ λe: g : TSuggestionGame
c1 : ¬in(g, r.pr.games)
⋅
pr : games = [e.g | r.pr.games] : list(TGame)
4.3 Instantiation of Game, finst_TSuggestionGame (p. 97)
λr: player1 : Ind
player2 : Ind
⋅
e : suggest(r.player1) ⌢ e : motivate(r.player1) ⩽1⌢ e : respond(r.player2)







sh : games = [TSuggestionGame | r.sh.games] : list(TGame)
© Ellen Breitholtz, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004436794_010
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appendix 2
Definitions
1 Types and Relations between Types
1.1 Preclusion (p. 76)
A type T1 precludes a type T2 iff is there can be no s such that s : T1 and s : T2.
1.2 Negation (p. 130)
For any type T, an object a is of type ¬T, a: ¬T, iff there is some T ′ such that
a: T ′ and T ′ precludes T (T ′ ⊥ T)
2 Specification of Topoi and Enthymemes
2.1 Specification (p. 67)
Assuming topos τ = λr:T1 ⋅ T2 and enthymeme ε = λr:T3 ⋅ T4, ε is a specification
of τ, i.e., specification(ε,τ) is witnessed, iff T3 ⊑ T1 and for any r, ε(r) ⊑ τ(r).
2.2 Underspecification (p. 72)
Assuming topos τ = λr:T1 ⋅ T2 and enthymeme ε = λr:T3 ⋅ T4, ε is an underspec-
ification of τ, i.e., underspecification(ε,τ) is witnessed, iff T1 ⊏ T3 and for any r,
ε(r) ⊑ τ(r).
3 Operations on Enthymemes and Topoi
3.1 Fixed-Point Types of Enthymemes andTopoi (pp. 125–126)
If, for some type T1, f : (T1 → Type) then ℱ(f) is a fixed point type for f, that is a
: ℱ(f) implies a : f (a).
For a function (topos or enthymeme) λr :T1 . T2(r), ℱ(λr :T1 . T2(r)) = T1 .∧ T ′
where T ′ is like T2(r) except that any path r.π is replaced by π.
3.2 Composition (p. 126)
The composition τ1 ∘ τ2 of two topoi τ1 and τ2 such that τ1 = λr: T1 ⋅ T2(r), τ2 =
λr: T3 ⋅ T4(r), and ℱ(τ1) ⊑ T3, is λr: ℱ(τ1) ⋅ T4(r)
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